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Abstract
This thesis proposes an empirical analysis of performance in the telecommunications
industry, in relation to the regulatory framework in place in the sector. We rst pro-
vide an introduction and overview of the related literature on performance measure-
ment and regulatory institutions. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on rm-level measures of
productivity components and, in particular, of technical change and e¢ciency. This
analysis is motivated by the form of incentive regulation in force in the industry,
which links future price increases allowed by the regulator to certain measures of the
operators performance. Chapter 1 investigates embodied technical change in the
U.S. industry relying on rm-level panel data. It builds on the denition of capital
as a sum of vintages of di¤erent qualities and incorporates this denition into a cost
function. Estimates of embodied technical change in this sample vary depending on
the specication, but do not appear large enough to a¤ect productivity. Chapter 2
analyses the variation of e¢ciency over time in the same sample of U.S. operators.
This is done by applying estimators that allow for (freely) time-varying e¢ciency
to an input stochastic distance function. Estimates conrm that standard panel
estimators, which are commonly used by regulators to assess relative e¢ciency, do
not adequately capture the time-varying component of e¢ciency. Finally, Chapter
3 studies how cross-country di¤erences in sector performance, measured in terms of
access to mobile networks, can be explained by regulatory and country governance.
In particular, using a system approach, it considers whether the impact of regulatory
governance on penetration can be an indirect result of country institutions. In addi-
tion, feedback e¤ects between access to infrastructure and income are incorporated
in the analysis. The analysis is carried out on a panel of low and middle-income
countries. The empirical results show that the establishment of a separate telecom-
munications regulator is associated to higher penetration levels, and that this is
more important for low-income countries. The e¤ect is partly related to the quality
of wider country governance rather than sector-specic institutions.
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Introduction
In the last decades, infrastructure sectors have been a¤ected by signicant and
widespread reforms. This trend has gradually led to the commercialization and the
privatization of the national incumbent operator, and in some cases to radically
restructuring the sector.
The telecommunications industry is one of the sectors where reform has devel-
oped more rapidly, in line with the increasingly central role that telecommunications
services play for both individuals and rms. The importance of the sector goes be-
yond its share of the Gross Domestic Product of a country, as telecommunications
services transform pervasively markets and social interactions, and are therefore
considered enabling services for other economic sectors. Moreover, the industry is
a¤ected by major technological and market changes, which are more rapid than in
other infrastructure sectors, and are arguably among the factors that have allowed
a faster pace of reform.
While some countries have been precursors of the reform process, the trend
has acquired a worldwide dimension in the nineties, when European Union mem-
ber states liberalized their telecommunications markets and reform spread also to
less developed countries, mainly through support from international organizations.
Extensive reforms have mainly consisted of the privatization of the incumbent, the
introduction of competition, particularly in the mobile market, and the establish-
11
ment of separate (non-Ministry) regulatory agencies.
In parallel, economic theory has extended its focus from e¢cient pricing under
natural monopoly (Braeutigam, 1989) and optimal incentive schemes for regulated
monopolies (La¤ont and Tirole, 1986) to the study of issues arising in an industry
characterized by competition between a dominant vertically integrated rm and new
entrants (e.g. survey by Armstrong et al., 1994). The question itself of the condi-
tions under which competition is preferable to monopoly has also been addressed
(Armstrong and Sappington, 2006).
In addition, the literature has increasingly emphasized the limitations of the
assumption that the regulator is omniscient, benevolent, and able to fulll any
promises he makes, (Armstrong and Sappington, 2006) and therefore the need
to account for the complexity of the environment has emerged. For instance, with
respect to sector reform, the choice between a regulated monopoly and a competitive
market is a¤ected by a variety of institutional factors, such as the degree of regulatory
independence and accountability.
As the practice of regulation has progressed, some areas of analysis have attracted
growing attention by professional and academic economists. For instance, the move
to incentive regulation has renewed interest in the measurement of productivity and
e¢ciency. These are indicators that are used by regulators as a basis for setting
future price rules and, at the same time, they are considered among the measures
of the e¤ectiveness of regulation.
The aim of this thesis is two-fold. Firstly, relying on rm-level panel data, it
investigates the question of embodied technical change and of relative e¢ciency in
the telecommunications sector. As mentioned above, these are relevant measures in
12
the regulatory process of setting the rules that constrain future prices.
Secondly, following the literature on the e¤ects of institutions on regulatory
policy, it studies the interplay between regulatory governance (e.g. the establishment
of a separate regulator) and country institutions in promoting telecommunications
penetration. This analysis is carried out on a cross-country panel dataset.
The remainder of this introduction is organized as follows. The next section
outlines the main characteristics of the telecommunications sector. Sections 3 and
4 provide some background on the strains of the literature this thesis builds on.
Finally, Section 5 summarizes the contents of the three remaining chapters.
1. Economic Characteristics of the Sector
Telecommunications networks are organized in a hierarchical way. In simple
terms, subscribers are connected, through the local loop, to the networks local ex-
changes which, in turn, are connected to higher levels of the network architecture.
This structure allows customers connected to di¤erent local exchanges to communi-
cate with each other.
In the traditional xed telephony market, the sectors structure was characterized
by a vertically integrated operator. Mostly due to the substantial xed costs incurred
for network deployment, some portions of the infrastructure were provided by a single
rm. The governments presence in the sector has thus been generally justied on
natural monopoly arguments, because market forces alone could not achieve an
e¢cient outcome.2
In some countries, notably in Europe, in this early phase of market development,
2The rst-best competitive market outcome of uniform marginal cost pricing cannot be achieved
if the rm maximizes prot in the absence of lump-sum transfers, given the substantial xed costs
involved in network investment. Instead, under these assumptions, the optimal outcome with
uniform prices is given by the Ramsey pricing rule. The rm sets a mark-up on marginal costs
which is inversely proportional to the price elasticity of demand, under the assumption of zero
cross-price elasticities and income elasticities (Braeutigam, 1989).
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the government was initially the owner of the network operator and subsequently
its role evolved into that of regulator of the privatized incumbent. However, this
is not a universal feature of the sector as, for instance, in the U.S. and in Canada,
private ownership in the telecommunications sector dates back from the early days
of telephony (Wallsten, 2006).
Following the sectors liberalization, competitors have entered one or more mar-
ket segments. In particular, when microwave links were deployed in the long-distance
network, it became apparent that this part of the infrastructure could be replicated
also by competitors. Entry has therefore taken place, at least initially, in markets
where alternative infrastructure could be rolled-out at reasonable cost and margins
were attractive (e.g. business customers).
Where new entrants have not built their own infrastructure, they have relied
on the incumbents network to provide services to end-users. The distinction be-
tween retail and wholesale services has therefore become relevant in the new market
structure. Retail telecommunications services are services provided to end-users.
Wholesale telecommunications services, on the other hand, are network component
services that the incumbent provides to other industry players so that they can
compete and provide an end-to-end service to their retail customers.
For new entrants, purchasing wholesale services represents, at least to a certain
degree, an alternative to rolling out their own infrastructure. Examples of wholesale
services required to provide retail long-distance calls are origination, transport and
termination services. The availability of wholesale services usually rests on the
imposition of regulatory obligations on the vertically integrated incumbent.
However, given that the incumbent is also a competitor in the retail market, there
14
are concerns it may act anti-competitively in the provision of inputs to alternative
operators. One of the key issues so far, not surprisingly, has been competitors
access to the incumbents infrastructure, in particular to the copper network between
the local exchange and the customers premises. As a result, the theory of access
pricing in the telecommunications industry has attracted considerable interest in the
literature (e.g. see review by Armstrong, 2002).
The problem of access is also related to the nature of competition in the market,
i.e. whether new entrants are service providers or infrastructure-based operators.
Service providers have minimal infrastructure and therefore rely on the incumbents
network for the provision of services to their retail customers. New entrants may
also choose to bypass certain parts of the incumbents infrastructure by investing in
network deployment. However, this is especially expensive in the case of the local
loop, given the substantial costs of trenches and ducts.3
Regulation also needs to be adapted to a changing environment, a¤ected by
technology and market transformations. In particular, many operators are cur-
rently investing in next generation networks (NGNs). These allow both voice and
data communications to be transformed into packets of information that can be
transmitted without the need to keep a dedicated circuit for a specic phone call,
as required instead in traditional networks. As a consequence, this move should im-
prove the potential for optimizing network capacity as well as cost e¢ciency, but it
also involves substantial investment by incumbent operators. In addition, as demand
3However, alternative networks have been deployed in some high-margin urban areas. In general
this is a simplied description of competitors. In fact, there are a variety of intermediate solutions
between pure resale and a fully-edged infrastructure operator. For instance, in the broadband
market, incumbents in EU member states are required to o¤er a range of wholesale access services
which allow competitors to choose the preferred level of investment. As a result, a di¤erent mix
of wholesale access services, as well as of alternative self-provided infrastructure, has emerged in
European countries.
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for high bandwidth services (e.g. IPTV and video on demand) increases, operators
are upgrading their networks investing in ber deployment, which allows for higher
transmission speed compared with traditional copper-based access networks.
In light of this, it is di¢cult to predict in which direction regulatory practice will
move. The move to next generation networks, in conjunction with current trends
towards separation of the network (or the access network) from service provision,
may in fact slow down the roll-back of regulation rather than increase its pace. As
some commentators conclude, the telecoms sector is undergoing signicant and con-
current changes, with the only common theme being an evolution from the relative
simplicity of the past towards complexity in the future. (Cave and Corkery, 2006)
2. Empirical investigation of telecommunications technology
As mentioned above, this thesis is related to two strands of the literature on
the telecommunications industry: at a microeconomic level, the structure of the
production technology and, at an aggregate level, the role of regulatory and country
institutions.
In the seventies and the eighties, the methodology to estimate cost and pro-
duction functions was applied to telecommunications data to explore the nature of
returns to scale in the sector. This was mainly related to the policy question of
whether a competitive market structure would be e¢cient or, as argued by incum-
bents, whether the provision of telecommunications services was a natural monopoly
(e.g. see review in Correa, 2003).
In the early seventies, the seminal papers estimated production functions and
were broadly consistent with a nding of constant returns to scale. Subsequent
studies, in line with a more general trend in microeconomics, focused on the dual
16
representation of technology through cost functions. For instance, Fuss and Waver-
man (1981) applied the translog cost function proposed by Christensen et al. (1973)
to time-series data from the Canadian telecommunications sector.
The interest in the structure of the sector, and especially the presence of economies
of scale, was further stimulated by the decision by the U.S. Department of Justice
to break-up the dominant and vertically integrated operator AT&T in 1984. Several
academics focused on the estimation of cost functions and proposed various tests to
investigate the question of whether the Bell System was a natural monopoly and,
related to this, assess the economic merits of its structural separation.4 While Fuss
and Waverman (1981) and Evans and Heckman (1984) concluded that competition
in long-distance services was possible, other studies (e.g. Röller, 1990) found that
the data was consistent with a natural monopoly.
In the above-mentioned studies, time series data was used to estimate cost func-
tions. A major change in the established methodologies to study the technology of
telecommunications operators was the use of panel data by Shin and Ying (1992),
following the development and di¤usion of panel data in applied econometrics. This
allowed overcoming the small sample problem that had a¤ected earlier studies. In
addition, Shin and Ying (1992) used output quantities rather than deriving them
from revenue and price data, thus addressing the measurement error problem that
could be caused by this procedure.
4A resurgence of the topic in recent years, even though in the less extreme version of func-
tional separation, has been spurred by concerns about abusive practices by vertically integrated
incumbents. In this form of separation, some telecommunications incumbents have created sepa-
rate access divisions that provide, on an equal basis, inputs to the incumbents retail arms and to
competitors.
However, the debate has not focused on the subadditivity of the cost function. The move to
next generation networks (i.e. parts of the network are replaced by bre and voice and data are
transmitted over the same infrastructure) could well reignite the debate on the incumbents scale
advantages due to the substantial sunk investments and xed costs involved in the migration to the
new environment.
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However, following market liberalization in many jurisdictions, the question of
whether the telecommunications industry (or at least some market segments) is a
natural monopoly has gradually lost interest. The estimation of the operators costs,
on the other hand, is still very relevant for public policy purposes.
Productivity measures are relied upon by some regulators when reviewing the
price cap regime that will apply to the operators they oversee. When calculat-
ing productivity, a simple growth accounting formula would not allow disentangling
productivitys various components, including economies of scale and scope, alloca-
tive e¢ciency and technical change (Fuss and Waverman, 2002). For this reason,
knowledge of the production technology is still essential.5
In general, interest in e¢ciency and productivity measurement is also motivated
by the expectation that economic regulation should encourage rms to improve their
e¢ciency. In consequence, one of the main questions investigated in empirical papers
has been whether the shift from rate of return regulation to incentive regulation has
resulted in increased e¢ciency. This issue has mostly been analyzed with reference
to the U.S. telecommunications sector, given data availability and the gradual move
of U.S. states to incentive regulation.6 The estimation of productivity and e¢ciency
in the U.S. telecommunications industry has been the subject of several papers,
which adopt Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (Majumdar, 1997; Resende, 2000;
Uri, 2001) and stochastic frontier techniques (Resende, 1999). DEA is a linear
programming technique which compares each operator with the production or cost
level of a peer group, while Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) compares a given rm
5The investigation of the rms costs is further complicated by the multi-product nature of
telecommunications operators, which use the same infrastructure to provide di¤erent services, such
as access to the network and di¤erent types of calls.
6The sector in regulated both at federal level, by the Federal Communications Commission, and
at state level. States have moved to various forms of incentive regulation at di¤erent points in time.
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to a frontier, dened either in terms of output or cost levels, derived from sample
data using a statistical methodology.
In other recent applications, comparisons among international operators have
been drawn to investigate other policy questions, for instance whether liberalization
and privatization have an e¤ect on e¢ciency.7
In this thesis, the estimation of cost and production functions has two objectives.
In Chapter 1, it is the approach chosen to estimate embodied technical change, i.e.
the improvement in assets quality in new vintages of assets purchased by a rm.
Most papers have modeled technical change as a time trend, therefore assuming
implicitly that all technical change is disembodied. This latter assumption implies
an organizational type of progress, which would a¤ect the capital stock already in
place by making it more e¢cient without requiring any new investment in physical
assets.
In Chapter 2, a stochastic distance function is estimated to compare the results
from di¤erent estimators of relative e¢ciency. A distance function is an extension
of the concept of production function to a multi-product technology. The analysis is
motivated by the question of whether estimators commonly employed in empirical
studies of relative e¢ciency provide potentially misleading results as to the time
prole of e¢ciency. In particular, the study in Chapter 2 applies estimators allowing
for (freely) time-varying, rather than constraining its variation over time to pre-
specied functions.
3. The role of institutions in the telecommunications sector
The question of the wider institutional framework within which a regulator op-
erates is the focus of a strand of the literature on infrastructure sectors which has
7Picazo-Tadeo and Quiros-Romero (2004).
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acquired prominence since the reform wave of the nineties, in particular after the
publication of the seminal work by Levy and Spiller (1994). In essence, the authors
emphasized the link between a given countrys institutions and regulatory gover-
nance in infrastructure industries.
As argued by Brown et al. (2006), one could think of regulatory governance as
the how of regulation, as opposed to the what which instead refers, for instance,
to the regime governing interconnection and price controls. Both detailed regulations
and regulatory governance need to take into account a countrys specic conditions,
especially in less developed countries, where the divergence between written rules
and their actual implementation may be more signicant. An empirical study on
the link between country institutions and regulatory governance has been carried
out by Gual and Trillas (2006).
The interest in regulatory governance is spurred not only by its interrelation
with country institutions, but also by the impact it may have on the performance of
an infrastructure sector, commonly dened in terms of access to infrastructure. For
the telecommunications network, this is referred to as penetration, measured as the
number of subscribers (xed or mobile) per 100 population.
In fact, understanding the factors leading to improved access to infrastructure
in some countries appears di¢cult  we observe countries with very di¤erent so-
cioeconomic characteristics having similar proportions of telecom subscribers. One
explanation that has been proposed in the literature is the wave of telecom sector re-
form which, in the mid-90s, led many countries to commercialize and (in many cases)
privatize their national incumbent telecom company; to liberalize telecom markets;
to introduce competition, particularly in the mobile sector; and to establish separate
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(non-Ministry) regulatory agencies.
Much attention has been devoted by international institutions, such as the World
Bank, to the question of how to reform a sector so as to improve access to infrastruc-
ture, be it communications networks or energy and other utilities. Previous studies
that have analyzed the impact of reform packages on xed telecommunications pen-
etration include Ros (1999), Wallsten (2001) and Estache et al. (2006).
Within this reform program, particularly important is the establishment of a
separate regulator, i.e. one that is autonomous (or independent) both of the
government and of the incumbent telecom operator. Gutierrez (2003) has further
developed the approach of the aforementioned studies by introducing a better de-
scription of a given countrys regulatory characteristics.8
However, this literature does not, with some exceptions (e.g. Gasmi et al. (2007),
pay much explicit attention to the institutional setting within which the new regu-
latory agencies operate such as political structure, the rule of law or the degree of
economic openness.
The last chapter of the present thesis takes a fresh look at the relationship
between regulation and performance in the telecommunications sector and, in par-
ticular, to the role of the institutional setting. Unlike previous studies, it treats
regulatory governance as an endogenous variable which is related, among other fac-
tors, to general country governance.
Another key di¤erence between Chapter 3 and previous papers is given by the
explicit consideration of the potential impact of telecommunications penetration
on aggregate income. In fact, the importance of the telecommunications sector in
8Similar questions have also been analysed in other infrastructure industries. In the electricity
sector, the rst study that has addressed the question of whether regulatory governance has an
e¤ect on generation capacity using panel data is Cubbin and Stern (2006).
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improving a countrys income level is a major complication when analyzing the fac-
tors that inuence telecommunications penetration rates. While it is conventional
to assume that income is among the variables a¤ecting the demand for infrastruc-
ture capacity and services, the economic feedback impact of telecommunications
infrastructure capacity also needs to be modelled if we are not to have a misleading
picture.
4. Summary of the thesis
4.1 Technical change and e¢ciency: rm-level estimates
The aim of the present thesis is to analyze and contribute to two strands of
the economic literature which have found widespread application in infrastructure
industries, as summarized above. Firstly, it focuses on the rm-level measurement
of the productivity of telecommunications operators, specically of embodied tech-
nical change and productive e¢ciency. Secondly, it analyses the role of regulatory
institutions in promoting access to infrastructure, as well as the interplay between
governance, penetration and aggregate income.
Chapter 1 presents the results from the estimation of technical change in a sam-
ple of telecommunications operators, taking explicitly into account innovations em-
bodied in new vintages of capital. The relevance of embodied technical change for
telecommunications operators is due to the fact that regulators often take past per-
formance as an indication of future productivity gains that an operator can achieve.
As a result, regulators may set tight price rules for a regulated rm, in the expec-
tation that it will achieve further productivity gains. Therefore, an investment in
more e¢cient equipment might result in a tighter price rule in future periods. How-
ever, given that this investment would increase capital costs for the regulated rm
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 unlike disembodied technical change  it may potentially result in a problem of
lower incentives to invest in more e¢cient vintages of capital.
Despite the large interest in the embodiment hypothesis in numerous elds of
economics, there have been very few studies on the role of embodiment and its
implications for regulated sectors. Chapter 1 empirically investigates this topic in
the context of the U.S. telecommunications industry using a panel of 28 incumbent
Local Exchange Carriers over 14 years (1990  2003).
Unlike previous studies on telecommunications that interpret average age as a
proxy for embodied technical change, without an explicit derivation, Chapter 1
builds on a framework developed by Sakellaris and Wilson (2004). In their study,
building on the theoretical denition of embodiment, they assume a constant yearly
rate of technical change throughout the sample period and they dene capital stock
in e¢ciency units with respect to a base year.
In addition, the analysis relies on the most disaggregated data available for
investment in di¤erent categories of telecommunications plant by the large U.S.
telecommunications operators in order to calculate surviving capital as accurately as
possible. The assumption that all assets share the same rate of embodied technical
change is partially relaxed: capital assets with long lives (e.g. buildings, poles,
conduits) are kept separate from telecom equipment, which typically needs faster
replacement and is characterized by higher technical change.
In general, an inherent di¢culty in estimating embodied technical change is the
impossibility to isolate the other inputs and the outputs which are directly associated
to a specic vintage of capital, as would be required by the theoretical formulation
of the problem in order to identify the e¤ects of di¤erent vintages on output. In the
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estimation, this problem is somewhat alleviated by the cross-section variation in the
sample.
According to our results, depending on the specication, the estimated rate of
embodied technical change ranges between 0% and 5.7%. At the lower end of the
interval, the variation in investment across rms and across time is not su¢cient to
identify di¤erential capital quality (i.e. embodied technical change). At the upper
end of the interval, the estimate is about one percentage point higher than the results
obtained by Sung (2002) following a di¤erent methodology.
While some variation in results is expected, evidence for embodied technical
change does not appear conclusive in this sample. In addition to methodological and
data issues already highlighted, this may also reect slower network modernization
in the period under analysis compared to a longer timeframe (e.g. as analyzed by
Sung, 2002). While our sample period includes the 1999-2000 investment bubble
in telecommunications companies and infrastructure, average gross investment for
the incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (LECs) does not appear very dynamic. In
particular, average gross investment was either at or moderately growing until 1999,
underwent a step increase in 2000 and declined very markedly until 2003.9
This is consistent with two stylized facts about the telecommunications bub-
ble. As reported in the 2003 OECD Communications Outlook, overinvestment in
facilities took place mainly in backbone markets and intercontinental links. There-
fore LECs were less a¤ected given that they did not focus on such markets. In
addition, the irrational exuberance of the late 1990s concerned more the avail-
9The sample period contrasts markedly with the signicantly longer period of analysis covered in
Sung (1998, 2002) which spans from 1951 to 1991, during which major technical innovations trans-
formed the industry, e.g. the evolution from mechanical to electronic switches and the digitalization
of the access network.
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ability of nancial capital to invest in new services and new geographic markets
rather than heavy investment in physical capital (OECD, 2003). Again, this phe-
nomenon in the U.S. a¤ected mostly Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs)
and long-distance operator rather than the operators in our sample.
Using the same sample of operators, Chapter 2 estimates an input distance func-
tion to analyze the rms technical e¢ciency. This is motivated by the increasing
use by utilities regulators of the measurement of relative performance when imple-
menting incentive-based regulation in a given infrastructure sector. However, not
all studies emphasize adequately that di¤erent assumptions and therefore di¤erent
estimation techniques may produce contrasting results. In particular, the assump-
tion, made in some approaches, that ine¢ciency is constant over a period of time
appears di¢cult to justify.
Compared with previous studies on the telecommunications industry, the new
element in the analysis is the application of panel estimators that account for (freely)
time-varying ine¢ciency, proposed by Greene (2004) and Greene (2005a). Rather
than constraining the pattern of ine¢ciency over time on the basis of a given func-
tion, these estimators allow the ine¢ciency component to vary randomly from one
period to another.
In addition, the framework of the analysis is an input distance function. The
advantages of a distance function are two-fold: rstly, it provides a natural extension
of the production function for a multi-output rm; secondly, compared to a cost
function, it does not require input prices data and the behavioral assumption of cost
minimization. However, related to the latter point, the distance function provides
a partial picture as it only allows for the estimation of technical e¢ciency, rather
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than overall economic e¢ciency. Another limitation of the analysis is that the model
assumes all ine¢ciency to be time-varying, therefore leaving any element which does
not change over time (e.g. ine¢cient management practices) in the rm-specic
e¤ect.
Results show that the sample of U.S. operators included in the study shows
considerable variation in productive e¢ciency over time, which suggests that an
estimator that abstracted from such variation may be misleading. In addition, it
is interesting to consider the time pattern of average e¢ciency in conjunction with
market and regulatory changes that took place over the period of analysis. As
explained above, one such event was the telecommunications bubble. Average
estimated e¢ciency in our sample follows broadly the same trend as the investment
in the telecommunications market: it increases during the period of market growth,
reaches its highest value in 2000 in coincidence with the peak of the market, after
which it falls.
Average e¢ciency in the sample can also be related to another major change
that took place in the U.S. telecommunications market in 1990  1991, namely the
move from rate of return regulation to incentive regulation. In the rst years of the
sample, until 1994, estimated e¢ciency declines compared to its 1990 level. This
may appear surprising, given that the introduction of incentive regulation was aimed
at promoting e¢ciency. However, the e¤ect may have been lagged or other factors
may have counterbalanced regulations impact on e¢ciency. Finally, the nding
conrms the results in Uri (2001) who concludes that average technical e¢ciency
has not increased between the 1988-1990 time period and 1991-1999, i.e. before and
after the introduction of incentive regulation across the U.S.
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4.2 Regulatory institutions and telecommunications penetration
The last chapter of this thesis studies the relationship between regulation and
performance in the mobile telecommunications sector, taking account of the eco-
nomic impact of telecommunications infrastructure on aggregate income and of the
role of country institutions in promoting economic growth. We address these ques-
tions by estimating a system of equations for a panel of 93 low and middle-income
countries over the 1995 - 2004 period.
The focus on the mobile market is motivated by two types of considerations.
Firstly, mobile markets have often been characterised by a relatively competitive
market structure almost from service launch, while the liberalization of xed mar-
kets has somewhat lagged behind. This raises the question of whether results on
regulatory governance from previous studies, which concerned the xed market,
would hold also in a more competitive market, where regulation is usually more
limited.
Secondly, mobile communications have enjoyed impressive rates of growth across
low and middle-income countries in recent years and therefore seem to represent
better telecommunications infrastructure in our sample. The average number of
phones per 100 population in our sample has increased from less than 1 in 1990
to around 40 in 2004. Compared to the availability of xed lines (around 17 lines
per 100 population as of 2004), the success of mobile communications is even more
staggering. High connection charges and long waiting lists, as well as the substantial
investment required to develop extensive xed networks, have held back traditional
communications networks and favoured the expansion of mobile services.
In terms of methodology, the main advantage of the approach followed in the
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present thesis is that we estimate a system of equations rather than a single reduced-
form equation. This should allow investigating more thoroughly the interactions
among the above mentioned variables, which perforce are either ignored or only
implicitly modeled in the single equation reduced form model. In this respect, this
studys contribution is the explicit inclusion of regulatory governance and country
institutions in the framework of analysis, as well as the treatment of regulation as
endogenous.
In addition, the present dataset includes a reasonably large set of developing
countries only (93 countries). Hence, we have a more homogenous group of countries
than in most previous studies. The latter have often combined both developed and
developing countries and therefore implicitly assumed that a common model held
for very di¤erent countries.
The limitations of the analysis are mainly related to the measurement of the
governance variables. Firstly, in common with other studies (but see a new dataset
in Montoya and Trillas, 2007) regulatory governance is measured on the basis of
formal characteristics of the legal framework, such as the existence of the regulator
and the way it is funded. However, this may not coincide with the actual governance
of the regulatory authority i.e. how the regulator operates and is allowed by the
government to operate in practice.
Secondly, related to the previous point, the only available measure of regulatory
governance for all our countries is a dichotomous variable which takes value one when
a certain characteristic is present (e.g. regulator separate from Ministry, autonomous
funding) and zero otherwise. This type of variable does not allow us to quantify
di¤erences between countries regulators in any detail. However, compared to an
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index-type variable, it is more suitable for system estimation.
Thirdly, country institutions are among the explanatory variables in the system.
There is an open question of the potential endogeneity of country institutions. This
is a key and hotly debated theme in the empirical literature on institutions and
growth (Durlauf et al., 2005). In the present study, the issue is addressed by treating
the proxies for country institutions as predetermined for the year in question. This
approach is motivated by institutions strong persistence over time, especially in
relation to the limited timeframe of the present sample.
The evidence we present conrms the positive e¤ect of regulatory institutions on
telecommunications penetration. We nd evidence that the existence of a separate
industry regulator is associated to higher penetration rates of mobile telecommunica-
tions in developing countries, with estimates varying depending on the specication.
In particular, we nd a di¤erent pattern between low-income and middle-income
countries. The marginal e¤ect of a separate regulator in lower-income countries is
higher compared to middle-income countries. On this basis, the establishment of
a separate body in charge of regulating the industry appears especially crucial in
lower-income countries. This can be explained by the fact that, in middle-income
countries, market forces may be more important for encouraging the sectors devel-
opment, compared to the regulatory agency.
According to the estimates obtained in the system, there is a positive relationship
between country institutions, proxied by the development of the nancial sector,
and sector-specic governance. Therefore, part of the positive e¤ect of regulatory
institutions on the telecommunications sector may be related to overall country
governance. However, it is likely the importance is underestimated in the present
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study. The importance of better proxies for country institutions is highlighted by
the higher coe¢cients and signicance obtained when the Kaufmann et al. (2006)
indexes for the rule of law and quality of governance are considered.
Finally, the impact of mobile telecoms infrastructure on per capita GDP is not
found to be signicant except for a subset of countries over a longer 15-year period.
This may be related to unobserved characteristics of the sub-sample, which was
selected on the basis of the availability of data for a longer period, but may also
indicate that the impact of mobile infrastructure on GDP cannot be detected over
a short time span. Moreover, the analysis is carried out on aggregate data, which
are not well suited to uncover the mechanism through which mobile phones can
a¤ect income and growth (for a micro-level approach see the seminal contribution
by Jensen, 2007).
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Part I
Technical Change and
E¢ciency: Firm-Level
Estimates
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Chapter 1
Embodied Technical Change in
the U.S. Telecommunications
Industry
1.1 Introduction
The measurement of productivity and the identication of its components have at-
tracted considerable attention in a variety of industries. Resende (1999) and Uri
(2000, 2001), among others, have examined productivity growth in the U.S. telecom-
munications sector. One of the ndings of these studies is that technical change
represents a high share of productivity gains (Uri, 2001). However, the source of
technical progress has not been investigated so far. Most papers have modelled tech-
nical change as a time trend, therefore assuming implicitly that all technical change
is disembodied. This assumption implies an organizational type of progress, which
would a¤ect the capital stock already in place by making it more e¢cient without
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requiring any new investment in physical assets.
However, technical progress in the telecommunications sector may be due to
investment in new and more e¢cient capital, that is it may be embodied in new
capital rather than disembodied. Embodiment could be dened as the extent to
which in the long run productivity growth is due to improvements in the quality of
machinery and equipment (Oulton, 2007). Therefore embodied technical change is
reected in improvements which a¤ect the e¢ciency only of new capital goods rather
than all the capital stock. The deployment of advanced communications networks
by telecommunications operators1 indicates the importance of innovation through
new infrastructure in this industry.
This question becomes even more relevant for the sector because of its potential
interaction with the type of regulation incumbents are subject to. In the 1990s,
traditional cost of service regulation was replaced by price-based incentive regulation
of telecommunications services in most U.S. states. Under price cap regulation,
baskets of certain services provided by incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (LECs)
are subject to a cap, which limits the expected price increase in the regulated rms
average prices. The level of the cap for regulated rms is positively related to their
productivity gains relative to the economy.2 Therefore, given the form of regulation,
the more productive the telecommunications industry compared to the rest of the
economy the tighter, coeteris paribus, is the price cap.
If embodied technical change were found to be empirically relevant for regulated
operators and if its level had a large impact on productivity growth, past investment
1For instance, the Network Modernization Plan agreed by Verizon with the Pennsylvania regu-
lator in the 1990s.
2The level of the cap is last years cap, increased by ination in the overall economy, but
adjusted for productivity di¤erences between the average rms in the overall economy and the
industry being regulated [this di¤erence is the X factor itself] (Tardi¤ and Taylor, 2003).
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decisions of regulated rms would a¤ect their future allowed price levels. If this was
the case, the regulator would have to consider whether the current form of regulation
reduced incentives to invest.3
Despite the large interest in the embodiment hypothesis in numerous elds of
economics,4 there have been very few studies on the role of embodiment and its
implications for regulated sectors.5 This chapter empirically investigates this topic
in the context of the U.S. telecommunications industry.
A key point in the analysis is adopting a denition of the capital stock which al-
lows incorporating the potential embodied (or investment-specic) technical change.
The capital stock for a given asset is usually constructed by summing together
di¤erent vintages of capital which may not be homogenous, given that older equip-
ment may not be as productive as the latest equipment available. For this reason, the
question of aggregating investments made in di¤erent periods into a single measure
of capital stock is fraught with di¢culties and this problem has been recognised in
the literature since the debate on vintage e¤ects in the 1950s. In order to address this
problem, statistical agencies are working towards the construction of capital mea-
sures that are adjusted for quality changes in successive vintages of capital. They
develop quality-adjusted price indexes, for instance based on hedonic methods, to
derive more accurate estimates of the capital stock.
3 If prices are not quality-adjusted, investment in more productive vintages of capital should be
accompanied by higher Total Factor Productivity (TFP) levels.
4The importance of embodied technical progress has been investigated widely in the theoretical
and empirical growth literature, since the debate of vintage e¤ects in the 1950s and 1960s (e.g.
Solow, 1957; Jorgenson, 1966). In addition, more recent papers on embodied technical progress have
also focused, for instance, on optimal investment with energy saving technical progress (Boucekkine
and Pommeret, 2004) and on the estimation of embodied technical progress in the manufacturing
sector, using plant data (Sakellaris and Wilson, 2004) or stock market data (Laitner and Stolyarov,
2004).
5With the exception of Mandy (2004) on the use of cost models for regulating telecoms inter-
connection charges and Sung (1998, 2002), who estimated the rate of embodied technical change in
a sample of US telecommunications operators.
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In the present study, we follow a di¤erent approach, which traces back to the
early embodiment literature. Following Sakellaris and Wilson (2004), we dene
capital as the sum of investment ows in assets, where each years investment is
adjusted by a factor that reects the lower quality of older vintages compared to
most recent ones. This factor represents investment-specic technical change. As a
result, this approach reduces the value of capital expenditure in the early years of
the sample.
However, this adjustment may not necessarily reect reality. In the presence of
investment-specic technical change, one would assume that the price of equipment
would tend to decline faster or rise more slowly than would be otherwise and that,
in consequence, a rm may use more capital. However, this e¤ect may not be
reected in the rms capital expenditure: lower prices (i.e. better quality) and
higher quantities may compensate each other.6 The implication is that the present
approach, by articially reducing the value of capital expenditure, may distort the
estimated coe¢cients.
Using a panel of 28 U.S. telecommunications operators over 14 years, the present
study obtains estimates for the rate of embodied technical change ranging from 0%
to 5.7% per year, depending on the methodology. These estimates are not very
di¤erent from those obtained in previous papers using a narrower sample of U.S.
telecommunications operators and a di¤erent methodology (Sung 1998, 2002).
The nding of a positive rate of embodiment as opposed to a nding of no em-
bodiment has implications for the value of the capital stock. When the latter is
constructed assuming a positive rate of embodiment, the capital stock (in e¢ciency
6Given that we only observe capital expenditure, we cannot separate what we could call the
quantity e¤ect from the quality e¤ect (i.e. price decline).
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units) would grow faster than under the assumption of no embodiment.7 More-
over, an increase in capital quality (i.e. embodiment) means that capital services
will grow faster than the capital stock itself (Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000). This is
because capital services are proportional to the capital stock, and the constant of
proportionality is given by capital quality.
If prices are not adjusted to reect quality changes, investing in new (and more
productive) equipment should be accompanied by an increase in Total Factor Pro-
ductivity (TFP). This was found, among others, by Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000)
who, using o¢cial gures for the stock of capital, showed that a large contribu-
tor to the accelaration of TFP growth in the 1990s was investment in Informa-
tion and Communications Technologies (ICT). By adjusting capital for embodiment
through quality-adjusted prices, Cummins and Violante (2002) found that part of
TFP growth was explained by investment-specic technical change which was not
accounted for in o¢cial statistics. Therefore, incorporating quality-changes in the
measurement of capital resulted in lower TFP compared with the gures calculated
using o¢cial statistics.
In order to check whether the embodiment e¤ect has any impact on TFP mea-
surement in the present dataset, we calculate TFP growth rates obtained under the
alternative assumptions of zero and positive embodied technical change, where the
value of the parameter is the highest estimate obtained in the present study, i.e.
5.7% per year.
TFP growth under the assumption of embodiment is 0.2% higher than under
the assumption of no embodiment. The result that TFP is higher when capital
7This assumes that the rst year in the sample is used as a numeraire, otherwise the growth rate
of the capital stock is decreasing in the parameter representing embodiment (Sakellaris and Wilson,
2004), as in the present application.
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is adjusted for embodiment (rather than when it is not adjusted) depends on the
choice of the numeraire year which means that, in the present approach, capital
stock increases faster when the rate of embodied technical change is lower, rather
than vice versa (Sakellaris and Wilson, 2004).
Finally, the di¤erence between the TFP rates indicates that part of the produc-
tivity growth that feeds into the price cap formula for the regulated operators is
related to the their past investment choices. As a result, accurate measurement of
capital taking account of quality improvements would be of benet to regulators and
the industry.
The structure of the remainder of the chapter is as follows. The next section
briey reviews the most closely related studies, while Section 1.3 outlines the ap-
proach to the estimation of embodied technical change followed in this study. Section
1.4 describes the data. In Section 1.5, the main ndings and estimation issues are
discussed. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
The di¤erent approaches to the study and estimation of embodied technical change
can be broadly divided into methodologies based on comparisons of price indexes
and methodologies based on estimating cost and production functions.8 This section
summarizes very briey and comments on the studies which are most closely related
to the present work.
8A more limited strand of research was followed so far by Hobijn (2001) who developed a model
of investment, including embodied technical change, and estimated it using panel data for manu-
facturing industries.
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1.2.1 Production and Cost Functions
The early debate on embodiment (or vintage e¤ects) dates back to the late 1950s and
1960s in the eld of growth models. Some studies on the U.S. economy found that the
increase in capital per worker (capital deepening) was not among the major reasons
leading to the increase in output per worker over a given period of time (Solow, 1957).
On the contrary, the idea of embodiment suggested that capital modernization was
at least as important as capital deepening as a source of productivity.
Following the seminal contribution by Solow (1957), a production function in-
corporating vintage e¤ects was formulated which was functional to a growth model.
The Cobb-Douglas production functions formulated by Solow (1957) and Phelps
(1962) included explicitly the rate of embodied technical change, in the form of
larger weights assigned to more e¢cient vintages of capital in producing a given
output. The empirical testing of such formulation aimed at establishing the rela-
tionship between growth and investment, and drawing implications for economic
policy.
One of the main ndings of the early theoretical literature was that asymptotic
growth rates were the same regardless whether technical progress was embodied
or disembodied (Phelps, 1962).9 Other studies found instead that disembodied
technical change was important to explain growth.10
Nelson (1964) transformed the Cobb-Douglas production function in order to
decompose output growth to depend linearly on the age of the capital input. This
formulation allowed obtaining the rate of embodied technical change as the ratio
9 In the long-run, the growth rate is independent of the investment-output ratio, which is a
property of Cobb-Douglas models (Phelps, 1962, page 556). This result is not a¤ected by the
presence of vintage e¤ects.
10E.g. see account given by Hulten (1992).
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between the coe¢cient on the average age of capital and the coe¢cient on the
capital input. Thus, in Nelsons study, the links between the variables were used to
calculate the rate of embodied technical change for di¤erent values of the shares of
capital and labour on output value.
Numerous studies have attempted to estimate the rate of embodied technical
change, both at an aggregate level, and at a rm level. Some of the early studies, such
as Solows (1962), encountered the problem of estimating the parameters of interest
on the basis of assumptions on other important parameters (i.e. share of capital on
output and depreciation rate) and assuming that there was no disembodied technical
change. This di¢culty highlights the problem of disentangling physical decay from
embodied technical change (i.e. obsolescence), which is common to all empirical
studies in this area.
Expanding the same framework in Solow (1962),11 Wickens (1970) found that
embodied technical progress was not signicantly di¤erent from zero in the period
1900 - 1960 for the U.S. economy.12 You (1976) also found little evidence of em-
bodiment in the period 1929 - 1968 in the U.S. on the basis of time-series data.
Using Nelsons (1964) approximation of e¤ective capital (adjusted to incorporate
embodied technical progress) as a function of average age, You concluded that the
age distribution of capital did not enter the determination of growth of output per
man-hour in the sample he considered and that there was no evidence of embodied
technical change.
A more recent article, by Bahk and Gort (1993), examined technical change
11By transforming the Cobb-Douglas production function in order to obtain unconditional esti-
mates.
12Wickens found that the sum of the rate of depreciation and of embodied progress was not
signicantly di¤erent from zero.
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using plant-level data. In a Cobb-Douglas model that incorporated learning by
doing e¤ects, they measured embodied technical change by average vintage (i.e. the
year in which investment in capital was made) and estimated that a one-year fall
in average vintage was related to an increase in the plants gross output ranging
from 2.5% to 3%. Assuming, for instance, a one-third weight of capital in the
production function, this would mean that the rate of embodied technical change in
capital would be between 7.5% and 10.5%. Their estimates contrast with the results
by Wickens (1970) and You (1976), and seem to be related to the greater level of
disaggregation in their study, which used panel data from U.S. manufacturing plants
over the period 1973 - 1986. However, Bahk and Gorts result would still hinge on
assumptions on the weight of capital on output.
Finally, the contribution most closely related to the present study is Sakellaris
and Wilson (2004). They assume that technical change proceeds exponentially as
in Solow (1957, 1962) and Phelps (1962), but in discrete time. Moreover, they
allowed for variable capital utilization, using energy consumption as an indicator of
utilization. In their study, a constant yearly rate of technical change was assumed
throughout the sample period and capital stock was dened in e¢ciency units with
respect to a base year. Sakellaris and Wilson (2004) found a 12% rate of embodied
technical change, using panel data on U.S. manufacturing plants to estimate a Cobb-
Douglas production function.13
In the context of the telecommunications industry, Sung (1998, 2002) used aver-
age vintage as an index of quality for physical capital, based on the observation that
embodied technical change "simply refers to changes in the quality of capital goods"
13Their data refer to manufacturing plants and are contained in the Longitudinal Research Data-
base of the U.S. Bureau of Census.
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and that technical e¢ciency of di¤erent vintages varies. Moreover, the labour input
was also dened in terms of an index of labour quality.14
The author estimated di¤erent specications for a translog cost function. The
period of the analysis extended from 1951 to 1991 and the sample consisted of eight
U.S. telecommunications local exchange carriers.15 Both a long-run and a short-run
cost function were estimated, giving comparable results. In the study of the long-run
cost function, Sung (1998) obtained estimates of the contribution of capital quality
to shifts in the cost function between 1.6% and 3.2% while, in the short-run (Sung,
2002), such contribution ranged from 2.6% to 4.2%.
A major di¤erence with other studies was the use of cost functions rather than
production functions in order to alleviate problems of simultaneity in the choice of
inputs and outputs and to account for the multiproduct nature of the rm. However,
in both studies output was dened as deated revenues, which can give rise to
measurement problems (Shin and Ying, 1992). Moreover, even though the author
refers to Bahk and Gort (1993), the analysis lacks an explicit derivation of the
interpretation of average age as a proxy for embodied technical change.
1.2.2 Price-based measures
The seminal paper on price indexes incorporating quality changes was a study by
Gordon (1990) who constructed quality-adjusted indexes for a range of assets. Ad-
justing prices for quality change is crucial especially when the pace of technological
improvement in a given sector is very rapid. In these cases, a traditional price index
14Sung dened a weighted sum of working hours of the di¤erent occupational groups within a
rm. The index of labour quality was then dened as the ratio between the weighted sum and the
simple sum of working hours.
15Six operators were Bell operating companies (i.e. incumbent companies) and the remaining two
were independent operators.
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may not adequately capture asset price reductions. This is because a new asset may
sell at the same price as a previous model at the time of launch, but incorporate
more advanced characteristics. Gordon (1990) used, among others, hedonic tech-
niques to construct price indexes on the basis of detailed information on prices and
characteristics of 22 categories of durable equipment.16
Building on this work, Hulten (1992) derived estimates of embodied technical
change by comparing the rate of growth of the quality-adjusted price index for dif-
ferent durable goods with a consumption price index. Intuitively, this approach is
based on the fact that "the opportunity cost of innovating [...] is foregone consump-
tion" (Cummins and Violante, 2002).17 He found an estimate of 3.4% for the period
1949 - 1983 in the U.S. manufacturing sector. The most recent study using a similar
methodology, by Cummins and Violante (2002), found a 4% rate of annual change
over the period 1947 - 2000.
While price-based measures of embodied technical change have proved relatively
popular in the literature, it should be noted that the underlying methodology may
not be entirely robust. Sakellaris and Wilson (2004), quoting Gordon, highlight that
di¤erences between adjusted and unadjusted quality indexes may reect not only
16 In hedonic models, regressions are used to explain a time series of prices as a function of a set
of quality characteristics and time dummies. There are di¤erent ways in which these models can
be implemented. For instance, one approach could be to use the estimated coe¢cients on the time
dummies as an indication of price movements, keeping quality characteristics constant.
17The intuition for this approach is formalised in the literature by means of a simple two-sector
model of investment and nal goods (e.g. Cummins and Violante, 2002; Sakellaris and Wilson,
2001). It is assumed that both goods are produced competitively.
The production of nal goods (ct) follows a constant returns to scale technology which uses labour
and capital. Final goods can be used either for consumption or to produce investment goods. The
production function for investment goods in e¢ciency units is it = qtct, where qt is the technological
level specic to the investment sector.
The price of investment goods (in e¢ciency units) is pi

t and the price of consumption goods is
pct . Equating the marginal product and the relative price of the input gives p
i
t i

t = p
c
tct which,
combined with the production function of the investment good, results in
pi

t
pct
= 1
qt
. From this
expression, the change in the investment-specic technological level can be inferred from the change
of the price of investment goods relative to consumption goods.
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quality change, but also other factors.
1.3 Empirical Strategy
An inherent di¢culty in estimating embodied technical change is the impossibility
to isolate the other inputs and the output which are directly associated to a specic
vintage of capital, as would be required by the theoretical formulation of the problem
in order to identify the e¤ects of di¤erent vintages on output. In the estimation,
this problem is addressed by the cross-section variation in the sample: if two rms
show a di¤erent time pattern of investment up to a certain year, then their outputs
(or costs) in that year may di¤er, after controlling for other factors. By comparing
outputs (or costs), the variation in the distribution of investment between the two
rms can therefore be used to measure embodied technical change. However, this
only alleviates the aggregation problem described above, as well as the aggregation
between asset types which may potentially incorporate di¤erent levels of technical
change, as some equipment (e.g. switches) has been a¤ected by faster progress than
other types.
Taking into account the above considerations, the present study uses panel data
to estimate embodied technical change on the basis of a cost and a production func-
tion. Unlike previous studies on telecommunications, it relies on the most disag-
gregated data available for investment in di¤erent categories of telecommunications
plant by the large U.S. telecommunications operators in order to calculate surviving
capital as accurately as possible.
In addition, compared to Sung (1998, 2002), the sample includes a larger number
of rms (even though on a shorter time interval, due to data availability) and the
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assumption that all assets share the same rate of embodied technical change is
partially relaxed: capital assets with long lives (e.g. buildings, poles, conduits) are
kept separate from telecom equipment, which typically needs faster replacement and
is characterized by higher technical change.
The sensitivity of the results to di¤erent assumptions concerning depreciation is
also made possible by a exible formulation, which does not use depreciation rates
obtained from company data, but calculates the percentages of surviving investment
across time for each asset type.
Finally, output variables in the cost function are measured as physical quantities
in order to overcome measurement problems.
1.3.1 Denition of Capital
The previous discussion briey reviewed the alternative approaches to analyzing
embodied technical change, providing possible alternatives to the studies carried out
on the telecommunications industry by Sung (1998, 2002). The denition of capital
adopted by Sakellaris and Wilson (2004) seems better suited to address the issues
which were highlighted in the literature review. In particular, it has the appeal of
resembling closely the theoretical formulations adopted in the literature on embodied
technical change and therefore has a straightforward economic interpretation.
The seminal papers by Solow (1957) and Phelps (1962), under the assumption of
neutral technical change,18 specify the following production function in continuous
time: yt = B(t)F (Kt; Lt) where Kt and Lt are capital and labour respectively.
The measure of embodied technical progress grows exponentially at the rate  and
18Hicks-neutral technical change can be represented by a multiplicative term B which multiplies
the entire function, i.e. y = BF (K;L), and therefore results in a shift of the isoquant, keeping the
input ratios constant.
44
only a¤ects the e¢ciency of new capital goods: B(t) = B0e
t. It is also assumed
that the production function is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale. The
output corresponding to a given vintage of capital, and related labour, is given by
yt = B0e
vKcvtL
1 c
vt . The level of capital input in the production function above is
only the capital of vintage v surviving at time t and the corresponding level of labour
is that employed on capital of vintage v. Given that technical progress is neutral,
c (elasticity of output with respect to K) is constant for each vintage v. It can
be shown that summing the homogeneous outputs of all vintages, one obtains the
aggregate production function at time t: yt = B0J
c
tL
1 c
t , where Jt =
tZ
 1
e

c
vKvtdv.
In this expression, Jt is the sum of all surviving capital goods where older capital
carries a smaller weight.19
This denition can be made operational by constructing capital recursively as
the sum of past investment ows. Therefore, gross investment has to be adjusted to
take account of depreciation over time, so that only surviving capital is included in
the construction of the stock active at a given time period.
The depreciation measure that is employed in this procedure is crucial for the
correct measurement of capital. Economic depreciation, which is usually the ap-
propriate measure, covers two e¤ects: physical decay, due to wear and tear, and
obsolescence. The latter factor is precisely the investment-specic technical change
that studies on embodiment aim to measure. If this component was known, for
instance relying on the price-based measures described above, one could construct
the capital stock in e¢ciency units on the basis of physical decay and obsolescence,
19 In this setting, disembodied technical change would be expressed by a similar multiplicative
factor, which however would not depend on the specic vintage v, and would be applied to the
entire capital stock still productive at time t (Phelps, 1962).
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as in Cummins and Violante (2002).20 However, in the present study, the obsoles-
cence component is the parameter that needs to be estimated. For this reason, it
is important to ensure that gross investment is only depreciated for physical decay
and that no other adjustments are made that would account for obsolescence, such
as deation by quality-adjusted indexes.
Following Sakellaris and Wilson (2004), capital adjusted for embodied technical
change for a given asset type can be dened in e¢ciency units, relative to a given
base year t0, as
Jt =
TX
s=0
It sDt;t s(1 + )
t s t0 (1.1)
where It s is gross investment of vintage (t  s), Dt;t s is the fraction of vintage
(t  s) still productive at time t (accounting only for physical decay), (1 + )t s t0
is a factor that represents the productivity of vintage (t   s) with respect to the
numeraire year, t0, and T is service life for the specic asset category. Where service
life exceeds the available sample size, initial capital (J0) is added to obtain the
capital stock.21 The rate of embodied technical change is parameter  and is not
known.22
20Cummins and Violante (2002) estimate embodied technical change from quality-adjusted price
indexes and then use this value to construct capital, by combining their estimate with parameters
of physical decay.
21The possibility of estimating past investment ows was also explored, but proved unsuccessful.
In particular, given the very low correlation of rms investments with macro data for the sector it
was not possible to use aggregate data to estimate rm-level data. Moreover, the high variability in
investment in di¤erent asset types over time, for a given rm, would make unreliable any attempt
to estimate past rm investment.
22This denition has the advantage of measuring embodied technical change without changing
its numeraire year, t0, and for this reason it very suitable to data with a time-series component.
This can be shown by an example in which the numeraire is t0 = 2002 and it is assumed we are
calculating Jt at t = 2001. According to the denition, investment in (t  1) - i.e. 2000 - is divided
by (1+)2, the term in (t 2) - i.e. 1999 - is divided by (1+)3 and so on. Given that (1+) > 1,
this series increases with its exponent. Past investments are therefore divided by increasing numbers
and the e¢ciency of older investment is lower relative to todays. These discount factors depend
not only on the numeraire but also on t, the year for which the capital stock is calculated.
If we change t, we can verify that the discount factors do not change. Assume we were constructing
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Capital stock is given by the sum of investment ows, after removing physical de-
cay and adjusting to take into account the di¤erent embodied technical progress com-
pared to the base year. This approach assumes constant technical change throughout
the sample period with respect to the base year (i.e. the last in the sample), in which
the level of embodied technology is normalized to 1.
As noted by Sakellaris and Wilson (2004), (1 + )t s t0 represents the relative
productive e¢ciency of vintage (t s) whose opportunity cost is one unit of the con-
sumption good. This interpretation is based on the same framework underpinning
the price-based measures of embodiment, described in the literature review section.
An implication of this framework is that, in the above expression, investment is mea-
sured in foregone consumption units and, for this reason, it needs to be deated
by a consumption price deator that is not adjusted for quality changes in capital
goods.23
Moreover, the above denition of capital adjusted for embodied technical change
assumes perfect substitutability among di¤erent vintages of capital. It also implies
that rms always invest in the most advanced vintage, while production or resale of
older vintages may also take place in practice.
The adjustment for physical decay is carried out by multiplying investment in a
given type of asset in a given year by a hyperbolic (or beta) decay function. This
function depends on the asset life (S) for the specic type of asset and on the actual
Jt at t = 2000, while keeping 2002 as the numeraire. In this case, investment in (t  1)  i.e. 1999
 is divided by (1 + )3. This is consistent with what obtained above for the case t = 2001, which
implies that the above denition keeps the numeraire constant.
23An implication of the denition of capital adopted in this study is that, for capital to be
expressed in e¢ciency units, the value of  inserted in the denition should be the correct value
of embodied technical change.
Therefore, for other values of the parameter , capital may not be correctly measured and, as a
result, the estimated parameters of the cost and production functions may not accurately reect
the substitution between capital and other inputs.
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age of the asset (s).
Dt;t s =
S   s
S   bs
(1.2)
The value of b reects di¤erent curvatures of the function. For equipment, a
value of 0.5 is used by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Mohr and Gilbert, 1996)
and the same was also adopted here as the base case. Following the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, a value of 0.75 was used for structures. As will be explained below, the
sensitivity of the results to this assumption was tested by using a range of values
for b.24 The decay function does not remove obsolescence e¤ects (i.e. the reduction
in capital e¢ciency due to embodied technical change) as this would be in contrast
with the objective of the study.25
The factors used to adjust past investments are, as mentioned above, functions
of the numeraire year (in this case, 2003) and the vintage (t   s, i.e. investment
made s years prior to period t). For this reason, the exponents (t   s   t0) are
constant for each vintage, given a numeraire. Finally, it is assumed that investment
is immediately productive which seems a reasonable hypothesis with annual data
(i.e. the sum includes investment in year t).
Denition 1.1 is also used to construct the stock of capital assumed to incorporate
lower embodied technical change, for instance land and buildings (Sit in Equation
3). However,  is assumed equal to zero for these assets.
As will be explained below, the above denitions are used to construct the cap-
ital stock and to estimate both a production and a cost function so as to provide
24As the parameter b increases towards 1, the function Dt;t s approaches a horizontal line,
dropping to 0 at the end of the asset life. See Figure in Appendix.
25 In addition, it does not incorporate stochastic retirements of stock for simplicity.
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robustness checks on the results on embodied technical change. The remainder of
this section describes the approach to the estimation. In particular, we rstly de-
scribe the approach towards the estimation of the cost function. Secondly, we detail
alternative approaches to test the reliability of the results.
1.3.2 Estimation of a Cost Function
Most of the recent literature on the telecommunications industry focuses on the
estimation of cost functions, with some exceptions (e.g. Uri, 2001a). This is due to
a variety of reasons, including their natural extension to multi-output technologies
and their underlying assumptions. In particular, output in regulated industries is
often not storable and demand-driven, so it could be regarded as exogenous. In
addition, when the analysis is carried out at a micro level as in the present study, it
seems reasonable that rms regard prices as exogenous.
In consequence, cost functions do not su¤er from the problem of endogeneity
which has long being recognized in the estimation of production functions. In the
context of a production function, the regressors are inputs which are chosen opti-
mally by the rms and, for this reason, the assumption of exogeneity may fail thus
making the estimates inconsistent (Griliches and Mairesse, 1995). In a cost function,
the underlying assumptions would alleviate this problem. However, the information
requirements are more demanding for a cost function than for a production function,
as input prices for each rm in the sample are needed. Such information is available
for the sample used in the present study. Data on output quantities, rather than
simply revenues, is also available and this can be exploited in the context of a multi-
product cost function. However, some form of aggregation across outputs is still
needed to limit the number of parameters and, given that not all output quantities
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are available, this approach may be su¤er from an omitted variables problem.26
In the present study, a short-run cost function is estimated to take into account
that adjustment to long-run equilibrium may not be instantaneous for all inputs
and this would be even more applicable to regulated rms which may face short-run
constraints in minimizing costs.
The estimated cost function is a translog cost function, introduced by Chris-
tensen et al. (1973). This function is very commonly used in applications, as it
provides a second order approximation to an arbitrary cost function. In particular,
it does not su¤er from the curvature problems of Cobb-Douglas cost functions in
the presence of multiple outputs (Kumbahakar and Lovell, 2003). In addition, it
does not constrain the elasticities of substitution and the economies of scale over the
interval of production.
The translog variable cost function can be written as follows, for rm i = 1; 2; :::N
and period t = 1; 2; :::T :
lnV Cit(w; y; z) = 0 +
MX
m=1
m ln ym;it +
1
2
MX
m=1
MX
n=1
mn ln ym;it ln yn;it (1.3)
+
KX
k=1
k lnwk;it +
1
2
KX
k=1
KX
l=1
kl lnwk;it lnwl;it
+
PX
p=1
 p ln zl;it +
1
2
PX
p=1
HX
h=1
 ph ln zp;it ln zh;it +
+
KX
k=1
MX
m=1
km lnwk;it ln ym;it +
PX
p=1
MX
m=1
pm ln zp;it ln ym;it
+
KX
k=1
PX
p=1
kp lnwk;it ln zp;it + "it
26See the Appendix for the construction of the output variables.
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where ym are outputs, wk input prices and zp xed inputs. "it is an error term.
All variables are deviations from the sample mean after taking logs. Therefore,
rst-order coe¢cients can be interpreted as elasticities at the sample mean, given
that second-order and cross-product terms drop out when evaluating the derivative
of lnV Cit(w; y; z) at the sample mean.
The estimated function needs to satisfy the theoretical properties of a cost func-
tion (Coelli et al., 2005): (i) Nonnegative; (ii) Nondecreasing in input prices w; (iii)
Nondecreasing in output y; (iv) Homogeneous of degree one in input prices w, i.e.
multiplication of all input prices by a nonnegative amount c will result in a c-fold
increase in costs; and (v) Concave in w, which implies that input demand functions
cannot be increasing in input prices w. In addition, a short-run cost function is
non-increasing in the xed inputs.
Homogeneity of degree one with respect to input prices would require certain
restrictions on the coe¢cients, as follows:
KX
k=1
k = 1
KX
l=1
kl = 0;8k
KX
k=1
km = 0;8m
KX
k=1
kp = 0;8p
In addition, for a twice di¤erentiable cost function the second order derivatives
are equal, which implies a symmetry restriction on the cross-product coe¢cients:
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mn = nm; m; n = 1; 2; :::M
kl = lk; k; l = 1; 2; :::K
 ph =  hp; h; p = 1; 2; :::P
Applying Shephards lemma, one obtains the cost share equations of the variable
inputs, i.e. labour and materials:
@ lnV Cit
@ lnwk;it
=
wk;it
V Cit
@Cit
@wk;it
=
wk;itxk;it
V Cit
= Sk (1.4)
= k +
KX
k=1
kl lnwk;it +
MX
m=1
km ln ym;it +
PX
p=1
kp ln zp;it + "k;it
where "k is the error term for the share equation.
Due to the denition of equipment capital Jit (1.1), when lnJit is inserted in
the cost function this results in an expression in which the parameter of embodied
technical change () enters non-linearly and from which it is not possible to identify
separately the impact of  and of the coe¢cient on capital  p.
One way to address this issue, rather than directly attempting to estimate all
the parameters in the model simultaneously, is to assign di¤erent values to the
parameter  and estimate a cost function for each of the assumed values. These
alternative models can then be compared to investigate whether di¤erent values of
the parameter have any impact on the quality of the estimation. We proceed in
two steps. Firstly, the function is estimated for  = 0 in order to focus on model
specication. In addition, for each value of , a di¤erent shape of the physical decay
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function is assumed by varying the value of b from the base case of 0.5 to 0.75
(the latter value is often used for structures rather than equipment). Secondly, the
function is estimated for di¤erent values of the parameter  and the corresponding
log-likelihood is calculated for each value. The search is then rened by focusing on
the interval of values which results in higher log-likelihood.
1.3.3 Alternative Approaches
In order to provide a robustness check to the results, alternative approaches are
attempted. Firstly, following the same approach as for the cost function above, a
production function is estimated. Secondly, we attempt to address the identication
of the rate of embodied technical change directly by linearizing the denition of
capital and inserting this denition in a production function.27
Nonlinear production function
As explained above, an iterative procedure is followed in order to identify the value
of the rate of embodied technical change  resulting in the best t. As a rst
step, a translog and a Cobb-Douglas production function are estimated in order to
test which functional form is the more appropriate. Building on this result, the
estimation is repeated for a range of assumed values of  to identify the best t.
Linearized production function
Another approach to the identication problem is to transform algebraically de-
nition 1.1 into the product between a function of the rate of embodied technical
change and a function of the ow of investment. For these purposes, and taking into
27The latter approach was also implemented in a Cobb-Douglas cost function but the estimation
did not lead to signicant coe¢cients on the relevant variables.
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account that for most assets the time dimension of the sample is shorter than asset
life, the denition of capital Jt can be rewritten as
Jt = J0 +
t 1X
s=0
It;t s(1 + )
t s t0 (1.5)
 J0 +
1
(1 + )t0

t 1X
s=0
It;t s +

(1 + )t0

t 1X
s=0
It;t s(t  s)
where It;t s is surviving gross investment of vintage t   s in period t. The
sum equals initial capital and the ow of investment up to and including time t.
By approximating the sum using a rst-order Taylor expansion around  = 0,28
one obtains the second expression above which can be inserted in the production
function.
Given that this complicates the formulation of the production function, for sim-
plicity we estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function, as follows:
ln yit = i +  lnLit +  lnMit +  lnJit +  lnSit + "it (1.6)
In the above function, for rm i in period t, yit is output, i is a rm-specic
e¤ect, Lit indicates labour hours, Mit represents materials, Jit is the level of capital
stock and Sit is the level of stock of capital that is assumed to have a low rate of
embodied technical progress (e.g. land and support). The level of capital (Jit) is
obtained as the sum of the Jt from Equation 1.1 for individual asset types. Finally,
"it is the error term.
Inserting the denition of capital gives a linearized version of the Cobb-Douglas
28By the Taylor approximation, (1 + x)n  1 + nx for x small. In this case, (1+)
t s
(1+)t0
= 1+(t s)
(1+)t0
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function. Subtracting ln y0 from ln yt it is possible to obtain Equation 1.7, which
does not depend on J0.
29
ln yit   ln yi0 = (lnLit   lnLi0) + (lnMit   lnMi0) + (lnJit   lnJi0) + (1.7)
+(lnSit   lnSi0) + it
= (lnLit   lnLi0) + (lnMit   lnMi0) +
  ait
(1 + )t0
+
    bit
(1 + )t0
+
+(lnSit   lnSi0) + it
where ait =
P
Iit;t s
Ji0
and bit =
P
Iit;t s(t s)
(1+)t0
.
This new equation for (ln yt   ln y0) can be estimated and the rate of embodied
technical change  can be recovered as the ratio between the coe¢cients on the two
terms in the footnote, similarly to the derivation in Nelson (1964). However, the
approximation that allows simplifying (lnJit   lnJi0) is valid only for some time
periods in the sample. Consequently, while Equation 1.7 is estimated in this study,
it should be emphasized that the required assumptions are satisifed only in part and
therefore results cannot be used to estimate embodied technical change.
29 lnJt lnJ0 =ln

J0 +
P
It;t s
(1+)t0
+

P
It;t s(t s)
(1+)t0

 lnJ0 =
=ln
h
J0 

1 +
P
It;t s
J0(1+)
t0
+

P
It;t s(t s)
J0(1+)
t0
i
 lnJ0 =
=ln

1 +
P
It;t s
J0(1+)
t0
+

P
It;t s(t s)
J0(1+)
t0


P
It;t s
J0(1+)
t0
+

P
It;t s(t s)
J0(1+)
t0
=
= at
(1+)t0
+ bt
(1+)t0
The approximation ln(1 + x)  x is possible if x is small. In this case, however, this quantity is
small only for some time periods in the sample and therefore the approximation is not valid.
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1.4 Data
The sample is a panel of yearly data on 28 large Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers
(ILECs) over the period 1990 to 2003. The main source for the data is the Automated
Reporting Management Information System (ARMIS)30, published by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), the U.S. telecommunications regulator, and
available from the regulators website. Variables are briey described in this section
and more details are provided in Appendix.
For the cost function, variable costs (V C) are calculated as deated operating
expenses minus depreciation. The measures of output considered in this chapter
are access lines, local calls and toll calls. The price of labour is obtained as to-
tal compensation divided by the number of full-time employees, while the price of
materials is given by materials divided by the number of access lines. In line with
previous papers, materials are constructed as deated operating costs minus total
compensation to employees and depreciation costs. The shares of inputs over cost
(Sk) are calculated as the relevant expenses divided by variable costs.
The stock of capital was constructed separately for assets that could be expected
to exhibit low levels of embodied technical change (e.g. land, buildings) and those
that could be expected to show higher embodied technical change (i.e. telecommu-
nications equipment).
For each rm in the sample, gross capital stock was constructed on the basis of
investment ows. The objective was to reect the heterogeneity of capital, formed
by a series of vintages, and to abstract as much as possible from di¤erent rms
accounting policies. For instance, while capital stock in the LECs balance sheet is
30The tables used for the analysis are Reports 43-01 (Annual Summary Report), 43-02 (USOA
Rpoert - Balance Sheet Accounts), and 43-08 (Operating Data Report).
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a¤ected by the rms decisions to withdraw or write down assets, capital constructed
using the perpetual inventory method incorporate only gross additions. Instead
of relying on the companies depreciation gures, a common depreciation prole
was assumed for all the LECs.31 As described above, this was a hyperbolic decay
function. The detailed steps followed in the construction of capital are explained in
Appendix.
For the production function, output is proxied by deated revenues, which show
very high positive correlation with the actual quantities of output, i.e. numbers of
access lines and of calls. This assumption is often adopted in econometric studies
on the telecommunications industry (e.g. Resende 1999; Sung, 1998 and 2002),
although it may lead to a distorted representation of output because revenues are
a¤ected by the rms pricing strategies (in the specic case, they are also a¤ected
by price cap constraints, which are exogenous to the rms). However, it is not
straightforward to construct a basket of the LECs output quantities due to data
availability, as explained in Appendix.
Additional variables are considered both in the production and cost function,
including a measure of customer density (sheath length per access line), a measure
of congestion (number of calls per switch) and an indicator of modernization (the
share of ber on total network Kilometers).
31These are adjusted to reect the asset lives of the di¤erent assets.
As explained above, only physical depreciation is taken into account, rather than economic de-
preciation. This is because economic depreciation also incorporates obsolescence, which is precisely
what the present study aims to estimate. As a result, investment is not deated by a price index
which is quality-adjusted to reect investment-specic technical change.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Min Max Obs.
Deviation
Variable costs ($ 000) 1,547,159 1,650,790 91,094 6,766,698 392
Access Lines (units) 6,445,288 7,576,483 232,465 41,400,000 392
Local Calls (m) 16,100 19,800 529.5 99,300 392
Toll Calls (m) 2,919 3,126 84.3 16,800 392
Equipment ($ 000) 4,579,015 5,193,016 228,051 24,800,000 392
Sheath / line (Km/line) 0.034 0.020 0.002 0.117 359
Utilization (000) 0.396 0.219 0.038 0.976 388
Modernization (units) 0.090 0.040 0.006 0.220 387
1.4.1 Description of the Sample
The 28 operators included in the sample, although all classied as "large" in the
FCC tables, vary greatly in size, as can be seen from the summary statistics in the
table below.32
When looking at the behavior of the variables over time, variable costs do not
show a clear pattern: for many companies in the sample, they uctuate around a
constant level, while for others there is a positive or a negative trend. For the rms
showing a positive trend, variable costs have a peak corresponding to the years
between 1998 and 2000, corresponding to a period of expansion in the telecommuni-
cations market. The behavior of variable costs over time is plotted in the appendix
to this chapter. In terms of correlations between variable costs and measures of
output (i.e. access lines and calls), while variable costs are positively related to the
number of access lines, as expected, there is no clear relationship with the number
of calls.
While the measures for output and capital33 show an upward trend over time,
labour tends to fall, even if this trend cannot be clearly identied for all LECs. For
32The variation is partly due to di¤erent reporting conventions. Verizon reports results at the
operating company level, while BellSouth and Qwest results are aggregated.
The choice of sample was dictated by data availability, in particular with reference to gross
investment ows, which only the operators in this sample (i.e. incumbent LECs) are required to
report.
33For this purpose, capital was constructed as the simple sum of surviving investment, not ac-
counting for embodied technichal change.
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some of the operators, outputs positive trend peaks around the years between 1998
and 2000, and declines afterwards. Moreover, as expected, output exhibits positive
correlation with all inputs.
Lastly, it is interesting to note that the share of labour on output declines over
the sample period, while the share of capital increases. The share of labour on
variable costs declines over time for most of the sample, thus conrming the trend
for the corresponding share on output. Labour productivity increases, as could be
anticipated given the trend towards more competition in the sector.
Given the observations above on the behavior of variables over the sample period,
unit roots tests were carried out. The Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) and Maddala and
Wu (1999) tests for panel data failed to reject the null hypothesis of I(1) for the log of
output, once the optimal lag for removing serial correlation for each cross-section was
selected on the basis of the Akaike Information criterion. On the other hand, when
the same tests were applied to the logarithm of variable cost,34the null hypothesis
of non stationarity was rejected by the Maddala and Wu (1999) test, while it could
not be rejected by the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test. However, the test results
may not be entirely reliable, as most panel unit roots tests are designed for the case
in which T ! 1, followed by N ! 1, while in the present sample T = 14 and N
= 28. Moreover, these tests are sensitive to correlation between the di¤erent groups
(i.e. rms) and, as in the case of univariate test, to problems such as non-linearities
or structural breaks.35
In order to address the potential dynamic behavior of the variables, while also
taking into account the limited time dimension of the sample, we include a time
34The test was applied to the left-hand variable in the translog cost function, which was con-
structed as the ratio between variable cost and its average.
35For a discussion, see Smith and Fuertes (2005).
59
trend or time dummies in the model, in line with common practice, e.g. Bloom et
al. (2007) for estimation of the production function estimation, Coelli and Perelman
(1996) and Resende (1999) for applications to utilities.
Finally, when investment ows, measured by gross additions, are plotted over
time, the rms in the sample show very di¤erent patterns. As noted above, the
use of panel data allows exploiting di¤erences in investment proles, and therefore
vintage structures, across rms in order to circumvent the identication problem
which arises in studies relying on time-series aggregate data.
1.5 Main Results
1.5.1 Estimation Results of the Cost Function
As explained above, in order to overcome the identication problem, a grid search
is performed for a range of assumed values of the parameter. Capital with higher
technical change (Jit) is calculated for di¤erent values of the parameter . The cost
function (Equation 1.6) is then estimated for each assumed  to nd the value of
the parameter resulting in the highest log-likelihood.
As a rst step, in order to focus on the specication, the cost function is estimated
under the assumption of no embodied technical change (i.e.  = 0), while the
parameter of physical decay b is set to its base value of 0.5. The results are presented
in the table below.
The translog cost function is jointly estimated in a system with the labor cost
share, using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) techniques. Given that the sum
of cost shares equals 1 for each observation, when there are n factor share equations,
only n  1 of them are linearly independent. The estimation is therefore carried out
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removing the cost share equation for materials. The system of equations is estimated
by maximum likelihood and therefore parameter estimates, log-likelihood values and
estimated standard errors are invariant to the choice of the share equation (Berndt,
1991). Following common practice, conditions for linear homogeneity and symmetry
are imposed on the parameters of the translog cost function before estimation.
The results for the translog variable cost function are reported in Table 1.2.
The parameters of the share equation are not reported as they are equal to the
corresponding terms in the translog cost function, once the derivative over the price
of labour is taken (see Equation 1.4).
The system is estimated including a time trend, in order to capture disembod-
ied technical change, and rm-level xed e¤ects.36 The estimated coe¢cients are
reported in Table 1.2. However, before proceeding to comment on the coe¢cients, it
is important to check whether the properties of the cost function are satised.37 As
already mentioned, symmetry and homogeneity are already imposed before estima-
tion. In addition, estimated variable costs and marginal costs are non-negative at
all observations, and the function is concave in input prices on about 90% of obser-
vations, as indicated by the elasticities of substitution calculated on tted shares.38
Moreover, based on the estimated coe¢cients, the cost function exhibits mildly in-
creasing returns to scale.39
36The same model was also estimated both including and excluding xed e¤ects in the share
equation. In order to check whether it would be possible to disregard xed e¤ects, a Wald test
was conducted of the hypothesis that all the rm dummy variables were jointly zero in the share
equation. As it was not possible to reject this hypothesis, this would seem to suggest some form
of unobserved heterogeneity in the coe¢cients of the cost function. The same test gave consistent
results under the specication that included time dummies instead of a time trend.
37 In addition, we check that residuals are well-behaved and that there are no outliers. On the
basis of this analysis, two LECs are removed from the sample, i.e. Verizon Hawaii and Verizon DC.
38For the translog cost function, the elastiticies of substitutions are given by: kl =
klSkSl
SkSl
and
kk =
kkSk(1 Sk)
S2
k
, where Sk indicates the tted cost share of input k and kk and kl are estimated
parameters from the cost function (Greene, 2003).
39 In a variable cost function, the denition of returns to scale (RTS) needs to be modied to take
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Table 1.2: Translog Cost Function - Results for gamma = 0
Dependent Variable: lnV Cit
lnLinesit 0.753 lnPriceRatioit  t -0.013
(0.031)*** (0.001)***
lnLCallsit 0.031 lnLinesit  lnLCallsit -0.130
(0.018)* (0.066)**
lnTCallsit -0.033 lnLinesit  lnTCallsit 0.021
(0.011)*** (0.047)
lnPriceRatioit 0.397 lnLinesit  ln Jit -0.196
(0.008)*** (0.079)**
ln Jit 0.153 lnLinesit  lnSit -0.026
(0.036)*** (0.078)
lnSit 0.050 lnLinesit  t -0.006
(0.032) (0.005)
t -0.030 lnLCallsit  lnTCallsit 0.063
(0.002)*** (0.026)**
1
2
lnLines2it 0.324 lnLCallsit  ln Jit 0.163
(0.121)*** (0.045)***
1
2
lnLCalls2it -0.003 lnLCallsit  lnSit -0.082
(0.047) (0.048)*
1
2
lnTCalls2it -0.032 lnLCallsit  t 0.001
(0.029) (0.003)
1
2
lnPriceRatio2it 0.220 lnTCallsit  ln Jit -0.056
(0.004)*** (0.034)
1
2
ln J2it 0.033 lnTCallsit  lnSit 0.008
(0.113) (0.039)
1
2
lnS2it 0.008 lnTCallsit  t -0.002
(0.114) (0.002)
1
2
t2 -0.000 lnSit  t -0.004
(0.000) (0.004)
lnPriceRatioit  lnLinesit -0.196 ln Jit  t 0.014
(0.015)*** (0.004)***
lnPriceRatioit  lnLCallsit 0.043 ln Jit  lnSit 0.041
(0.007)*** (0.102)
lnPriceRatioit  lnTCallsit -0.013 Constant 0.153
(0.005)** (0.103)
lnPriceRatioit  ln Jit 0.084
(0.015)*** Fixed E¤ects Yes
lnPriceRatioit  lnSit 0.064 Observations 364
(0.014)*** Log likelihood 1812.40
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * signicant at 10 %, ** signicant at 5 %, *** signicant at
1 %. VC: variable costs normalized by the price of materials; Lines: access lines; LCalls: local calls;
TCalls: toll calls; Pratio: price of labor normalized by the price of materials; Equip: equipment
capital Struct: structures; t: time trend.
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The majority of the estimated coe¢cients is signicant. In particular, as ex-
pected, the sign of the rst-order capital terms is positive and signicant40, as are
the rst-order output terms on access lines and local calls. However, the coe¢cient
on toll calls is negative in this specication, while it is not signicant in others which
were tested.
The output interaction term between access lines and local calls (lnLinesit 
lnLCallsit) is negative and signicant, therefore indicating the presence of economies
of scope. This implies that an increase in one of the outputs leads to cost reductions
for a rm o¤ering both outputs and is expected, given that the provision of local calls
essentially relies on the access network. Regarding access lines and long-distance
calls (lnLinesit  lnTCallsit), it is not expected that these services would exhibit
economies of scope and, in the present sample, the coe¢cient on their interaction
term is not signicant. Finally, this study conrms the nding in Resende (1999)
that local and toll calls (lnLCallsit  lnTCallsit) are not characterized by economies
of scope.
Turning to price coe¢cients, the ratio of labor to materials input price (lnPriceRatioit)
is positive and signicant. Estimated factor shares are positive at all observations
and are in line with actual shares. In addition, the interaction term with time reveals
a decrease of the labor share over the relevant time period. This may be probably
related to an e¤ort to cut costs, induced both by the move to incentive regulation
and by increased competition over the sample period.
The measure of disembodied technical change (t) is signicant and the negative
account of the xed inputs. Following Caves et al. (1981), RTS = 1 
P
(@ lnV C=@ lnKl)P
(@ lnV C=@ ln yi)
, where y
indicates output and K xed factors.
40Given the denition of the variables, the derivative of the cost function with respect to capital
equals the partial derivative of lnV C with respect to ln J , because the second-order term and the
cross-products equal zero at the sample mean.
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coe¢cient indicates improvements over the period considered in the present study.
This is consistent with general observations about positive technical change in the
telecommunications sector and, for instance, with the ndings in Resende (1999) on
the 1988 - 1994 period for a sample of U.S. Local Exchange Carriers and in Correa
(2003) on U.K. operators from 1990 to 1997.
Finally, the model in Table 1.2 is used to compare the log-likelihood from a range
of assumed values of the parameter  (i.e. the rate of embodied technical change).
The best t is found for  = 4:9% and this is robust to changes to the shape of the
decay function for capital equipment.41
1.5.2 Estimation Results of the Production Function
Nonlinear Production Function
As for the cost function, di¤erent values of the parameter of embodied technical
change () are assumed. On this basis, the corresponding Jit is calculated and the
production function is estimated for each of the values of . However, as a rst step,
the production function is estimated under the assumption of no embodied technical
change (i.e.  = 0), with the parameter of physical decay b set to its base value of
0.5, in order to concentrate on the specication of the function.
The translog production function does not give signicant estimates for the co-
e¢cient on capital Jit, for alternative specications.
42 For this reason, this part of
the analysis relies on the results from a Cobb-Douglas production function, which
are presented in the table below (Table 1.3).
41For other specications, namely when the time trend was replaced with time dummies (with
and without rm xed e¤ects), the estimation did not converge.
42 In addition to the full translog function, alternative specications were tested, e.g. the time
trend was omitted or the cross-products terms for all variables were excluded from the specication.
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Table 1.3: Cobb-Douglas Production Function - Results for gamma = 0
OLS OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: ln yi;t
lnLit 0.167*** 0.168*** 0.141** 0.166***
(0.057) (0.053) (0.054) (0.056)
lnMit 0.189*** 0.188*** 0.194*** 0.193***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.028) (0.027)
ln Jit 0.494** 0.510*** 0.626*** 0.608***
(0.235) (0.174) (0.049) (0.049)
t 0.016* 0.016** 0.012** 0.014***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004)
lnSit 0.046 - - -
(0.171)
Oit -0.222 - - -
(0.367)
Constant 1.329*** 1.763 - -
(3.268) (3.243)
Observations 392 392 364 364
Fixed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
F test44 106.33*** 131.99*** - -
Log likelihood 487.99 487.62 - -
Note: Standard errors in brackets under coe¢cients in all columns are robust to heteroscedasticity
and serial correlation. * signicant at 10 %, ** signicant at 5 %, *** signicant at 1 %. Variables:
y: output; L: labour; M: materials; J: capital adjusted for embodied technical change (see Eq. 1);
S: structures other capital), O: sheath per access line; t: time trend.
As mentioned above, there are endogeneity issues arising in the estimation of
a production function due to the correlation between inputs and factors, such as
managerial ability, which are potentially observable by rms when they make input
decisions, but which are treated as unobservable in the estimation. The endogeneity
problem has been traditionally addressed by xed e¤ects estimation and by instru-
mental variables (Ackerberg et al., 2005). In light of this observation, the Cobb-
Douglas production function is initially estimated by a xed e¤ects estimator. The
reported standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.43
In Column 1, the results from the xed e¤ects estimator are reported. All co-
e¢cients are signicant and of the expected sign. The time trend captures the
impact of disembodied technical change, as commonly modeled in cost and produc-
tion functions. Both Jit and Sit, i.e. capital with higher technical change and
lower technical change respectively, are included. However, Sit does not seem to
43This adjustment is implemented in Stata following the result in Wooldridge (2002). It allows
for heteroscedasticity and for serial correlation across observations for the same rm.
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have a signicant e¤ect on output, once the other inputs are included in the model.
Moreover, total sheath divided by the number of total access lines was included as
an indicator of the di¤erent operational environments faced by the operators (Oit):
higher sheath per line indicates lower economies of density and therefore a worse
environment for the operator. The coe¢cient on this variable is not signicant,
which could be explained by the inclusion of xed e¤ects and a time trend. When
the model is estimated by OLS, without time dummies or a trend, then total sheath
per line has a negative impact on output, as expected.
Column 2 shows the estimates after removing the variables whose coe¢cients
were not signicant.
Moreover, in order to take account of the endogeneity of the capital and labor
inputs, the model is estimated by instrumental variables. In Column 3, capital (Jit)
is treated as endogenous and instrumented using lagged capital and the price of
capital. In Column 4, both capital and labour are allowed to be endogenous and, in
addition to the instruments used in Column 3, lagged labor and the price of labor
are also included. In both models, the coe¢cient on capital increases compared
with the case in which endogeneity is not taken into account. While the test of
overidentifying restrictions does not reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity
for Columns 3 and 4,45 there are questions as to whether lagged inputs can be used
as instruments, given that residuals are serially correlated. Moreover, the price of
capital has a weak correlation with both labor and capital, and its validity as an
instrument is therefore questionable.
45This test is applied to a regression estimated via instrumental variables, when the number of
instruments is greater than the number of included endogenous variables. The null hypothesis is
that excluded instruments are valid, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term.
For Columns 3 and 4 in the table, the test of overidentifying restrictions does not reject the null
hypothesis of instrument validity.
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Based on these considerations, the specications reported above in Table 1.3,
Column 2, is chosen for the purpose of comparing the results obtained for a range
of values of the rate of embodied technical change  and the parameter of physical
decay b.
The model is estimated for di¤erent values of . In addition, for each , di¤erent
values of the rate of physical decay b (see Equation 1.2) are assumed in order to
check the sensitivity of the results to this parameter, ranging from 0.5 (base case)
to 0.75 (which implied less physical decay throughout an assets life and a very fast
decay at the end of it). Therefore, a di¤erent Jit is constructed for each combination
of the rate of embodied technical change  and the rate of physical decay b. The
production function is then estimated for each of those combinations and the sum of
squared residuals is used to compare the goodness of t for the di¤erent combinations
(, b). On the basis of the sum of squared residuals, the value of  = 0 gives the
best estimates.
Finally, the models reported in the table above are estimated without properly
accounting for the behaviour of the variables over time. For instance, when time
dummies are included, rather than a simple trend, the coe¢cient on capital Jit
becomes insignicant. In order to alleviate the problems raised by trended variables,
the production function is also estimated in terms of deviations from the sample
mean for each year, following the approach in Bloom et al. (2006).46 However, the
estimation of the simple function reported in Table 1.3 above results in values of
the parameter of embodied technical change  in the range of 15% - 20%, which are
46Variables are dened as xit  lnXit   ln Xt, where Xt is the sample mean of the variable at
time t.
As can be seen in the Data Appendix to this chapter, for ln yit, this procedure dramatically
changes the pattern of the variable.
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Table 1.4: Cobb-Douglas Linearized Production Function
OLS OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: ln yi;t 1   ln yi0
lnLit   lnLi0 0.163** 0.133* 0.135* 0.817*
(0.072) (0.066) (0.068) (0.402)
lnMit   lnMi0 0.210** 0.207** 0.206** 0.140
(0.087) (0.096) (0.090) (0.100)
ait 0.176 0.355*** 0.362*** 0.780**
(0.144) (0.078) (0.068) (0.270)
bit 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.019** 0.021**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
lnSit   lnSi0 0.306 - - -
(0.194)
 - 5.73% 5.25% 2.69%
Observations 392 392 364 364
F test 47.63*** 55.46*** 54.85*** 29.60***
Note: Standard errors in brackets under coe¢cients in all columns are robust to heteroscedasticity
and serial correlation. * signicant at 10 %, ** signicant at 5 %, *** signicant at 1 %. Variables:
y: output; L: labour; M: materials; a: sum of investment ows; b: product between investment
ows and time trend; S: structures ( other capital).
outside the range found following other approaches and by Sung (1998, 2002).47
In line with the literature on the estimation of production functions, a dynamic
specication was also estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator.
Given the small number of cross-sections in the present sample, this estimator is
not particularly suitable for this study. Results from the dynamic specication are
reported in Appendix.
Linearized Production Function
As explained above, estimating Equation 1.7 allows recovering the rate of embodied
technical change  and the output elasticity of capital  separately. Due to the way
variables are dened in Equation 1.7, the rst year in the sample is excluded. The
model is estimated by OLS and standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and
serial correlation.
The table below presents the results from estimating Equation 1.7, including
values for  obtained as the ratio of the coe¢cients on bit and ait.
47This approach was only followed for physical depreciation corresponding to b = 0:5 for capital
Jit.
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When lnSit  lnSi0 is included in the production function (Column 1), its coe¢-
cient and the coe¢cient on ait are not signicant. Similar results are obtained when
other variables (i.e. time trend, time dummies or variables to reect the di¤erent
operating conditions of the operators) or xed e¤ects are included. The impact of
including further (nonsignicant) variables on the coe¢cients on ait and bit seems
related to the high collinearity between ait and bit, which also implies that in some
specications it is not possible to disentangle the e¤ect of each variable separately.48
In order to deal with the potential endogeneity of inputs, the model is estimated
by two-stage least squares. The structure of input demand functions suggests input
prices as natural instruments in this context. In Column 3, capital is instrumented
by the corresponding input price (i.e. the price of capital, constructed as described
in Appendix). When lnLit   lnLi0 is also treated as endogenous (Column 4), and
compensation per employee is used as a further instrument, the coe¢cient on the
variable increased to 0.8, while the rate of embodied technical change falls to 2.69%.49
Overall, the results from instrumental variables estimation seem to conrm broadly
those from OLS estimation.50
However, as already mentioned in Section 1.3.3, the assumptions required for the
estimation of Equation 1.7 are valid only for some time periods in the sample, which
makes the results above not suitable to draw conclusions on embodied technical
change.
Finally, as a check to the results above, the production function is estimated in
levels following a methodology similar to Sung (1998, 2002). Rather than relying
48While it is possible to reject the joint hypothesis that the coe¢cients on ait and bit are zero,
the two single hypotheses that the coe¢cients are zero cannot be rejected simultaneously.
49Given that materials were constructed as residual expenses, lnMit   lnMi0 was not treated as
endogenous.
50A GMM estimator is also applied, but the small number of cross-sections relative to the number
of instruments makes the GMM procedure not suitable to the present study.
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on the expression derived by algebraic manipulation of the non-linear production
function, variables ait and bit are replaced by their ratio (i.e. average vintage as
a proxy for capital quality) and lnJit is also included, under the assumption of
 = 0. In this specication, the coe¢cient on the ratio was 0.026, corresponding to
 = 2:6%,51 which is within the range estimated in the above mentioned studies.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
Embodied technical change was assessed in the present paper through the estimation
of a production function and of a cost function for a panel of 28 Local Exchange
Carriers (LECs) over a 14-year period. Following Sakellaris and Wilson (2004),
the proposed methodology dened capital as the sum of investment ows, adjusted
to take into account di¤erent quality across vintages. This approach resulted in a
non-linear function in the parameter of interest (i.e. the rate of embodied technical
change) and the specic formulation posed an identication problem, as the rate of
embodied technical change could not be estimated separately from the coe¢cient on
capital.
For this reason, the problem was addressed in two alternative ways. Firstly, as
explained in the paper, a range of values for the parameter of embodied technical
change  were assumed and the corresponding value of capital was calculated for
each of them. A translog cost function was then estimated for each of those values
and the best t was obtained for  = 4:9%. As a robustness check, a production
function was also estimated which, however, did not allow distinguishing between
embodied and disembodied technical change. Secondly, a linearized Cobb-Douglas
51The equation in levels is estimated including xed e¤ects and with clustered standard errors.
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production function was estimated, resulting in rates of embodied technical change
in the interval between 2.6% and 5.7% per year approximately.
In order to draw implications for setting the level of the price cap, Total Factor
Productivity (TFP) for the sample of Local Exchange Carriers was calculated under
the assumptions of a rate of embodied technical change equal to zero and equal to
5.7% per year (i.e. the lowest and highest estimates from the present study). For
illustration, a simplied setting was used and TFP was calculated without taking
account of other factors, such as economies of scale and ine¢ciency.52 For the
positive rate of embodied technical change (i.e. 5.73%), average TFP was higher
compared to the case of no technical change. The result that TFP is higher when
capital is adjusted for embodiment (rather than when it is not adjusted) depends on
the choice of the numeraire year which means that, in the present approach, capital
stock increases faster when the rate of embodied technical change is lower, rather
than vice versa (Sakellaris and Wilson, 2004).
The di¤erence between the TFP rates indicates that part of the productivity
growth that feeds into the price cap is due to the past investment prole of the
regulated operators. In the U.S. regulatory framework, the level of the cap which
limits increases in average prices is "last years cap, increased by ination in the
overall economy, but adjusted for productivity di¤erences between the average rms
52TFP growth between period t   1 and t was measured by the Törnquist index (see Fuss and
Waverman, 2002):  lnTFP =  lnY    lnX, where  lnY =
P
(1=2)(Rjt + Rj;t 1)[lnYjt  
lnYj;t 1] and  lnX =
P
(1=2)(Sit + Si;t 1)[lnXit   lnXi;t 1].
Yjt is the amount of output j produced at time t
Xit is the amount of input i utilized at time t
Rjt is the revenue share of output j at time t
Sit is the cost share of input i at time t
For simplicity, output was measured by the basket of services used for the production function
estimation and therefore the above formula simplies.
This representation of TFP, in particular the form of the output index, relies on the assumption
of proportionality between price and marginal cost (Fuss and Waverman, 2002). Given that the
rms in the sample are regulated and their prices are cost-based, this assumption can be expected
to hold.
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in the overall economy and the industry being regulated." A higher TFP for the
telecommunications operators would therefore result in an increase in the overall
"X factor", coeteris paribus. Therefore, the correct measurement of capital quality
would be an important input in the regulatory process.
However, it should be noted that factors other than technical change may a¤ect
TFP and, in consequence, the "X factor". In particular, on the input side, invest-
ment in new vintages can be expected to go in parallel with substitution between
labour and capital, which may be another reason why TFP is higher. On the output
side, an increase in demand over time could lead to the modernization of the capital
stock, as is currently the case for broadband connections. Therefore, the increase in
TFP and in the X factor may depend on the rate of growth of demand since this
will determine the speed of investment and hence the rate of embodiment.
In addition, while we tried to address the well-known problems in aggregating
di¤erent vintages of capital, the denition of capital stock used in the analysis may
still provide a distorted measure. This was derived from available data on capi-
tal expenditure, adjusted to reect the better quality of recent vintages of capital
compared to old ones. However, the implication is that the present approach, by
articially reducing the value of capital expenditure in earlier years, may distort the
estimated coe¢cients.53 If the price of equipment was available, a more promising
alternative would be to estimate the input demand functions to capture the e¤ect
of lower prices (i.e. better quality) of equipment in a direct way.
Finally, the validity of the production function estimation was limited by issues
of unobserved productivity di¤erences and simultaneity in the production function
53For instance, if the lower price of equipment and an increase in capital compensated each
other, capital expenditure would remain constant. The rms increased use of capital would not be
represented in our measure.
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approach, which were addressed by standard techniques relying on instrumental
variables and GMM procedures.54 As a possible improvement on the present set-
ting, the production function and the cost function may be incorporated in a wider
framework to fully take into account the endogeneity of inputs. In particular, con-
sidering the investment decisions of the regulated rms in some detail would seem
a promising avenue for future research, for instance analyzing technical change on
the basis of investment behavior (e.g. following Hobjin, 2001) or in the context of a
structural model of supply and demand (e.g. Nadiri and Nandi, 1999).
1.7 Appendix 1 - Construction of the Variables and
Data Quality
1.7.1 Construction of the Variables: Production Function
For the production function, output was proxied by deated revenues due to the
di¢culties of obtaining a basket of the LECs output measured in quantities. Specif-
ically, output for the LECs should include lines and call minutes. There are three
types of lines provided by the LECs: switched access lines, special access lines (i.e.
"dedicated lines from the customer to the interexchange carrier point of presence"55)
and leased lines. Volume data for leased lines were not available; a possibility could
then be to ignore lines. It is not clear whether this would be a signicant omission or
not, given that it was not possible to identify how much of the LECs revenues was
represented by leased lines. More importantly, ignoring leased lines may introduce
54For the production function, the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology could not be utilized
due to limited variation in the intermediate input (i.e. materials) which did not allow identication
of the parameters.
55Europe Economics, Operating Costs for the Access Network in ireland: an Econometric Ap-
proach, 27 February 2004.
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distortions between di¤erent LECs, since di¤erent operators may provide di¤erent
shares of leased lines on total output.
For these reasons, output was constructed as an index of revenues. In particular,
it is the weighted sum of local services revenues, long-distance revenues, and access
and miscellaneous revenues. Each of these were deated using appropriate price
indexes for U.S. cities from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. A chained index was
constructed, with the weights given by the revenue shares of the previous year. This
was preferred to a Laspeyres index or a Paasche index. It was observed that there
was some variability in the shares of the di¤erent services over the sample period and,
therefore, the choice of either the initial period or the end period as the reference
weights would introduce some distortions in the results.
The deviation of output from the sample mean in each period was also con-
structed in order to alleviate problems raised by the nonstationarity of the variable.
The resulting variable is shown in the Figure 1.1.
In line with previous papers, materials were constructed as operating costs minus
total compensation to employees and depreciation costs deated by the producer
price index for commodities (source Bureau of Labor Statistics).
Labour hours in a year were calculated as the number of full-time employees,
multiplied by the average hours of work per week in the communications sector
times 52 weeks. The source for the number of weekly working hours was the Bureau
of Labor Statistics and the data were for the communications workers.
Capital
The stock of capital was constructed separately for assets that could be expected
to exhibit low levels of embodied technical change (e.g. land, buildings) and those
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Figure 1.1: Deviation of Output from the Sample Mean (ln yit   ln yt)
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that could be expected to show higher embodied technical change (i.e. telecommu-
nications equipment).
The procedure for deriving each LECs capital input for "assets with higher
embodied technical change" in a given year could be summarized as follows:
1. Gross investment per year per category of assets was derived from each com-
panys accounts. The data source was the ARMIS 43-02 report, available from
the FCCs website. Asset types such as land and support (e.g. furniture, build-
ings, vehicles) but also conduits and poles, were excluded. The procedure for
deriving capital for asset types with expected low levels of embodied technical
change is described below.
2. Investment was deated to obtain real gross investment using an appropriate
deator at constant prices of the initial year in the sample (i.e. 1990). Fol-
lowing Sakellaris and Wilson (2004), the Personal Consumption Expenditure
deator from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics was used. This was to ensure
that the deator was not a price index adjusted for quality changes in capital
goods. As explained in the text, adjusting for quality changes in capital goods
would remove the obsolescence e¤ect which the present study aims to measure.
3. Real gross investment per year per asset category was then multiplied by the
percentage of that vintage that was still physically productive in each of the
subsequent years (see description of the hyperbolic decay function above).
It should be noted that the investment surviving in each of the subsequent
years had to be calculated, e.g. additions made in 1995 survive in di¤erent
percentages in the years 1996 to 2001.
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4. Each term thus obtained was multiplied by (1 + )t s t0 , where t0 is the nu-
meraire year, in this case year 2003, t is the year for which capital is constructed
and s is the number of years prior to year t. Note that  is unknown and is
the parameter to be estimated.
5. Following the steps above, one obtains a ow of past investments relative to
each year in the sample for a given asset category. Given that asset categories
will have di¤erent asset lives, the number of terms containing  will vary
depending on the category.
6. The terms obtained above for the di¤erent asset categories were then summed
to obtain the ow of surviving investment for a company.
The result of this procedure for a company at year t was a number of terms
representing surviving investment ows from t to 2003, each a function of parameter
. By repeating this procedure for every year in the sample, it was possible to
reconstruct the stock of capital surviving at each point in time. Moreover, the
initial capital stock in the rst year in the sample (i.e. 1990) had also to be included
to account for investments prior to that year.
Other assets were constructed as described above, except for the fact that the
investment ows were not multiplied by the adjustment term to take into account
embodied technical change.
Shape of the Decay Function
In the analysis, the adjustment for physical decay was carried out using a hyperbolic
(or beta) decay function (see Section 1.3). This function depends on the asset life
(S) for the specic type of asset and on the actual age of the asset (s).
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Figure 1.2: Hyperbolic Decay Function
Dt;t s =
S   s
S   bs
(1.8)
The parameter b reects di¤erent curvatures of the function, as illustrated in the
Figure below.
1.7.2 Construction of the Variables: Cost Function
While the variables relating to input prices were constructed by relying on the vari-
ables already obtained for the estimation of the production function, the output
measures used in the cost function di¤er substantially from the basket of weighted
revenues described above. In particular, exploiting the possibility to allow for mul-
tiple outputs in a translog cost function, both the number of lines and the number
of calls were introduced in the cost function. The sources for all output data was
ARMIS and, for some missing values, the Statistics of Common Communications
Carriers, also provided by the FCC on its website.
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Access lines were measured as the sum of switched access lines and special lines,
while calls were given by local calls and toll calls. In turn, the latter were obtained
as the sum of interLATA and intraLATA calls. See Production Function above
about the omission of leased lines due to non availability of the relevant data.
The behavior of variable costs, before transforming the variable, is plotted in the
graphs below.
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1.7.3 Data Quality
The raw data used to construct the variables, as described above, were checked for
consistency across time in order to identify possible errors. For instance, errors in
reporting gross investment were detected in the FCC gures. In particular, prior
to 2000, the instructions to the balance sheet accounts did not require data for
additions (i.e. gross investment) to be positive. In some cases, additions were
used to correct mistakes in previous years, even though there was a specic column
(transfers/adjustments) for the purpose. In the cases were additions were negative,
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it was assumed that there were no additions for that year.
Two operators were removed from the initial sample of large Incumbent LECs.
In particular, the perimeter of operation for GTE Midwest changed in 2000 and
observations were not available for the years 1990 to 1992. Contel was also removed
from the sample because of lack of data for some years.
Regarding Puerto Rico, in the years 1990 to 1993, there used to be two operat-
ing companies, Puerto Rico Telephone Company and Puerto Rico Communications
Corporation, and only the former was required to le its nancial statements with
the FCC. In 1994, the two companies merged. However, the di¤erence between data
in 1993 and in 1994 does not seem very signicant (asset values increase by less
than one fth between 1993 and 1994). Moreover, the scale of the operator is very
limited. For these reasons, the observations for Puerto Rico Telephone Company
prior to 1994 were kept in the dataset.
Another comment concerns the price indexes used to deate revenue data. These
indexes are national averages rather than state-level indexes, which would be avail-
able for some of the services. This may introduce some distortions in the data. The
reason why national averages were used is that some of the rms operate in more
than one state and it is a long process to allocate revenues to di¤erent states on
the basis of published gures. Similarly, labour hours are the average of the indus-
try multiplied by the number of full time employees. This may not reect di¤erent
utilization across rms.
Finally, as described above, the construction of both variables Jit (expected
to incorporate high embodied technical progress) and Sit (structures, expected to
incorporate lower embodied technical progress) involves deation by the Personal
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Consumer Expenditure (PCE) index. While deating structures by the same deator
used for telecoms assets may be desirable for consistency, it may not be correct. This
is because structures themselves may incorporate a certain degree of technical change
and would require a specic deator reecting improvements in structures quality.
If, in fact, the quality-adjusted deator for structures grew at a lower rate than the
PCE, failing to take quality changes into account would result in underestimating
the stock of structures in e¢ciency units. However, the price index for structures
did not grow appreciably faster than the price index for consumption (Cummins and
Violante, 2002) and therefore this e¤ect may not be very important.
1.8 Appendix 2 - Dynamic Specication of the Produc-
tion Function
In line with the literature (Ackerberg et al., 2005), the production function is also
estimated in a dynamic specication to reect the fact that current levels of output
might be a¤ected by previous periods outputs. In other words, the impact of past
values of the regressors is assumed to be persistent and, in a dynamic specication, is
captured by lags of the dependent variable. For this reason, we specify the following
dynamic model:
ln yit = i + ' ln yi;t 1 +  lnLit +  lnMit +  lnJit +  lnSit + t + "it
where, for rm i in period t, yit is output, i is a rm-specic e¤ect, Lit indicates
labour hours, Mit represents materials, Jit is the level of the capital stock and Sit is
the capital that is assumed to incorporate a low rate of embodied technical progress.
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The model above cannot be estimated by simple xed e¤ects because the esti-
mator would be biased in this context, due to the correlation between the lagged
dependent variable and the error term for a small number of periods (Nickell, 1981).
The Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator is commonly employed in similar settings.
The Arellano-Bond estimator transforms the model by di¤erencing and relies on the
Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM), where instruments include suitable lags
of the variables. In addition, it allows for regressors which are not stricly exogenous
and therefore can be fruitfully applied to the estimation of production functions.56
Results are reported below.57
Both the xed e¤ects and the GMM estimator indicate that the coe¢cient on
lagged output is signicant and of considerable size, while most other coe¢cients
are not signicant.
However, due to methodological problems, the above results are not reliable. As
already mentioned, the xed e¤ects estimator is biased in short panels. Roodman
(2006) refers to studies that nd a 20% bias even when T = 30 in simulations.
Regarding the Arellano-Bond estimator, the applicability of this type of estima-
tor to the present sample is limited by the small number of rms relative to the
number of periods. Firstly, the consistency of the estimator has been demonstrated
56 In the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator, the original equation in levels is estimated together
with the transformed equation, hence the denition of the estimator as "System GMM". Compared
to the Arellano-Bond estimator, it is more e¢cient.
However, in the current setting, the limited size of the sample made its application di¢cult.
When capital and labour were treated as predetermined, the number of instruments was very high,
even when restricting the number of lags to be used as instruments.
The system GMM estimator was developed in: Roodman, D. (2005), xtabond2, Stata module
to extend xtabond dynamic panel data estimator, Center for Global Development, Washington,
http://econpapers.repec.org/software/bocbocode/s435901.htm
57The tests of the null hypothesis of serial correlation check whether one of the assumptions
needed to use the estimator are satised. In particular, for lags to be used as instruments the
idiosyncratic disturbance (i.e. excluding the rm e¤ect) has to be serially uncorrelated.
The test is run on di¤erenced residuals. If the assumption of no serial correlation in the levels is
correct, the rst di¤erence is an MA(1) process and it has zero second-order autocorrelation. For
this reason, it is expected that the test rejects the null hypothesis of no rst-order autocorrelation
and accepts the hypothesis of second-order autocorrelation.
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Table 1.5: Cobb-Douglas Production Function, GMM Estimators - Results for
gamma = 0
Fixed E¤ects Arellano-Bond Arellano-Bond
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: ln yi;t
ln yi;t 1 0.737*** 0.686*** 0.759***
(0.061) (0.069) (0.076)
lnLit 0.030 0.044 0.065
(0.044) (0.060) (0.059)
lnMit 0.079*** 0.065** 0.069**
(0.025) (0.024) (0.031)
ln Jit 0.113 0.340 0.263
(0.189) (0.255) (0.218)
lnSit 0.029 -0.145 -0.108
(0.075) (0.128) (0.133)
Constant 0.058 -0.0004 0.155
(2.592) (0.104) (0.013)
Observations 364 336 336
Firm e¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
F test 316.73*** 47.86*** 76.27***
First order serial correlation - -3.11 -3.49
(p-value) - (0.002) (0.000)
Second order serial correlation - -0.74 -0.74
(p-value) - (0.457) (0.460)
Note: Standard errors in brackets under coe¢cients in all columns are robust to heteroscedasticity
and serial correlation. * signicant at 10 %, ** signicant at 5 %, *** signicant at 1 %. Variables:
y: output; L: labour; M: materials; J: capital adjusted for embodied technical change (see Eq. 1);
S: structures (other capital). In Column 2, lagged output is treated as endogenous. In Column 3,
lagged output is treated as endogenous, while capital and labour are treated as pre-determined.
for samples in which N goes to innity, under the assumption of a small number
of time periods.58 Secondly, the size of the instruments matrix increases quickly as
more variables are treated as endogenous, leading to poor identication.59 This is
a common problem in GMM estimation. As the number of instruments increases,
the number of elements in the covariance matrix also increases. In consequence,
a large matrix needs to be estimated and a small sample may not provide enough
information for the estimation of the covariance matrix. As a rule of thumb, when
the number of instruments exceeds the number of cross-sections the estimates are
not reliable (Roodman, 2006).
For these reasons, the dynamic formulation of the production function cannot
be used as a basis for the estimation of embodied technical change.
58Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) apply the estimator to an unbalanced
panel of 140 companies and between 7 and 9 yearly observations.
59For the GMM estimators reported in the table, the Sargan-Hansen test of the joint validity of
the instruments found that the instruments were valid. However, this test is known to be weak
when there are many instruments (Roodman, 2006).
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Chapter 2
Estimating Time-Varying
Technical Ine¢ciency for a
Panel of Telecommunications
Operators
2.1 Introduction
The measurement of relative performance is commonly found in a variety of di¤er-
ent areas, including non-prot organizations (e.g. hospitals, nursing homes), indus-
tries over time or across geographical regions, and units within a rm (e.g. bank
branches). Utilities regulators increasingly rely on the measurement of relative per-
formance when implementing incentive-based regulation in a given infrastructure
sector.
Econometric studies on e¢ciency usually rely on panel data and adopt sophis-
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ticated estimation techniques. However, not all studies emphasize adequately that
di¤erent assumptions and therefore di¤erent estimation techniques may produce
contrasting results. In particular, the assumption, made in some approaches, that
ine¢ciency is constant over a period of time appears di¢cult to justify. In addi-
tion, most panel estimators are not very good at disentangling heterogeneity from
ine¢ciency (Greene, 2005b). In applications, these two factors distort estimates of
ine¢ciency (Greene, 2005). The present analysis aims at comparing the e¢ciency
scores provided by di¤erent estimation methods, in order to assess the impact of
these concerns. Unlike previous studies, we apply panel estimators that distinguish
between heterogeneity and (freely) time-varying ine¢ciency, in order to compare the
results with those from traditional panel data methods.
The framework of the analysis is an input distance function. The advantages
of a distance function are two-fold: rstly, it provides a natural extension of the
production function for a multi-output rm; secondly, compared to a cost function,
it does not require the input prices data and the behavioral assumption of cost
minimization. However, related to the latter point, the distance function provides
a partial picture as it only allows the estimation of technical e¢ciency, rather than
overall economic e¢ciency.
Distance functions may be dened with an output orientation or with an input
orientation. The latter appears to be more suitable to a regulated industry, as
it seems more likely that such rms would have more control on inputs than on
outputs. This argument is similar to those encountered in the literature on the
empirical estimation of cost functions for multi-product regulated rms (Coelli and
Perelman, 1996). For this reason, the analysis will rely on input distance functions
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and focus on technical e¢ciency.
The present study implements this approach for a panel of 27 U.S. telecommu-
nications operators over the 1990 - 2003 period. Our results indicate that panel
models for which the ine¢ciency term is constant over time give very low e¢ciency
scores on average. The underestimation of e¢ciency is expected, given that in these
models the ine¢ciency term also captures time-invariant factors. When we estimate
the model using xed and random e¤ects panel estimators with time-varying ine¢-
ciency, we obtain more reasonable values of relative e¢ciency. In addition, compared
to standard panel estimators, they reduce the standard errors of estimated e¢ciency,
which suggests that they address better the heterogeneity among rms. In contrast
with more exible estimators, the Battese-Coelli (1992) specication, which assumes
that ine¢ciency follows a time trend common to all rms, generates e¢ciency es-
timates and a ranking of rms that almost coincide with those obtained when the
ine¢ciency is time-invariant.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 reviews papers which are
relevant for the present study. Section 2.3 presents the model specication and the
methodology. Section 2.4 describes the sample and the empirical results. Section
2.5 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
The estimation of productivity and e¢ciency in the U.S. telecommunications indus-
try has been the subject of several articles, which adopt a variety of methodologies
including Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (Majumdar, 1997; Resende, 2000; Uri,
2001) and stochastic frontier techniques (Resende, 1999), in particular cost fron-
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tiers. Empirical contributions in the eld of distance functions have mostly focused
on other utilities. Therefore, before discussing the existing applications of distance
functions to telecommunications data, we review the most relevant empirical contri-
butions in other sectors.
Coelli and Perelman (1996) and Coelli and Perelman (2000) are among the rst
applications of distance functions to utilities. They study a panel of 17 European
railways over the period from 1979 to 1983. The papers estimate a translog distance
function, both input and output oriented, and compare the results with those ob-
tained for a production function where output is measured as total revenues or as
an index.
In a more recent application, Sickles et al. (2002) estimate an output distance
function for a panel of 16 airlines from Eastern and Western Europe over the period
1977 - 1990. The functional form of the stochastic frontier is a Cobb-Douglas aug-
mented by a second-order term for the output measure. Unlike Coelli and Perelman,
Sickles et al. (2002) adopt a semi-parametric estimator and they compare its results
with the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method and the e¢ciency component
of the Malmquist index. With all methods, they nd that Eastern European carriers
are less e¢cient compared to their Western European competitors. A comparison
between stochastic frontier methods and the DEA approach is also provided by Berg
and Lin (2008), who study a panel of 44 Peruvian water utilities in 1996 to 1998.
They estimate an input distance function, mostly relying on cross-section data for
the year 1998. The paper nds that the stochastic frontier models produce e¢ciency
ranking that have a correlation around 0.5 and above with results from the DEA
approach.
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The contributions that are most closely related to the present study are Uri
(2002) and Resende (2008). Relying on a sample of 19 Local Exchange Carriers
(LEC) over the 1988 - 1999 period, Uri (2002) estimates a translog output distance
function and nds no change in technical e¢ciency between 1988 - 1990 and 1991
- 1999, which he takes as an indication that incentive regulation did not promote
technical e¢ciency. The estimation methodology implemented in the paper is the
corrected OLS (COLS) approach. However, it is not clear whether the results are
reliable, given that he nds that the rst-order output coe¢cients are positive rather
than negative as dictated by theory.1
Resende (2008) estimates a translog output distance function, using a sample of
30 LECs, over the period 1988 - 2000.2 The paper compares the e¢ciency scores pro-
duced by Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), deterministic frontier models (OLS
and random e¤ects) and the following stochastic frontier methods:3 (i) Random
e¤ects time-invariant ine¢ciency; (ii) Battese and Coelli (1992) time-varying inef-
ciency4; and Battese and Coelli (1995) time-varying ine¢ciency.5 Resende (2008)
nds that e¢ciency scores do not show a monotonic variation across time. However,
given that the equation shown in the paper does not include any time trend or time
interactions it is not clear whether period specic events are adequately captured in
the model and are therefore reected in the error and in the ine¢ciency term.
In addition, he nds that the scores estimated with the Battese-Coelli (1992)
1 In an output distance function, keeping inputs constant, there is an inverse relationship between
the amount of a given output the rm can produce and the other outputs.
2 It is not possible to compare the results of the present chapter with those in Resende (2008),
given that this working paper does not provide the estimated coe¢cients on the basis that the focus
of the study is on e¢ciency scores and rankings.
3 In all cases, it is assumed that the ine¢ciency follows a half-normal distribution.
4 Ine¢ciency is assumed to be an exponential function of time, with a common parameter across
rms.
5 In this version of the model, the ine¢ciency depends on various explanatory variables, however
only a time trend is used in Resende (2008).
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model has a very high rank-order correlation with the stochastic frontier estimated
under the random e¤ects model. This appears consistent with our result that this
estimator provides e¢ciency scores which are very close to those obtained using
the xed e¤ects and the random e¤ects models, with time-invariant ine¢ciency.
Other methodologies show much lower correlations, as expected. With respect to the
variation of e¢ciency patters over time, Resende (2008) nds substantial persistence
in the ranking provided by most estimators, which indicates only moderate changes
in e¢ciency over time.
The di¤erences between the sample used in Resende (2008) and in the present
study arise in two respects. Firstly, our dataset derives the capital input using
the perpetual inventory method, which requires data on gross investment. Such
information is only available for the sample of large incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers (LECs) we used. Secondly, the dataset in the present study extends to
2003 while, for the sample in Resende (2008), not all variables are available for
recent years.
Moreover, unlike Uri (2002) and Resende (2008) the present study estimates an
input distance function rather than an output distance function, given that it seems
more likely that telecommunications operators set inputs rather than outputs. In
addition, it explicitly models the interactions between a time trend, and inputs and
outputs. This aspect appears especially important if the analysis aims at investigat-
ing changes in technical e¢ciency over time. In terms of estimation methodologies,
the main di¤erences with the above mentioned studies are: a) the implementation of
estimators that allow for ine¢ciency to vary freely across periods and across rms;
and b) the explicit modelling of heterogeneity.
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2.3 The Estimation of Distance Functions
This section briey reviews the main concepts from the literature on stochastic
frontiers, specically on production functions. In addition, it describes the role of
distance functions in the estimation of technical e¢ciency for multi-output rms and
species the functional form of the model estimated in the present analysis.
2.3.1 Frontier Production Function
The focus of this chapter is on technical e¢ciency, that is the relationship between
the observed output a rm produces and the potential quantity of output it could
produce as specied by a production function, given certain amounts of inputs.
Assuming that the technology of interest concerns the production of a single output,
the measure of technical e¢ciency can be embedded in a production function. It is
common to empirically specify the function as follows:
yi = f(Xi;)  TEi (2.1)
ln yi = + 
T  xi + lnTEi = + 
T  xi   ui
where i = 1; 2; :::N indexes the rms in the sample,  is a vector of parameters
and Xi a vector of inputs. Techical e¢ciency, as dened above, is the ratio between
observed output and potential output and satises 0 < TE  1. In the second
line, as in most applications, it is assumed that f(Xi;) is linear in xi, the logs
of the inputs (or functions of them). Moreover, ui > 0 is a measure of technical
ine¢ciency, where ui =   lnTEi. Therefore, TEi = exp( ui). Under the assump-
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tion of uncorrelation between the error and the regressors, OLS provides consistent
estimates of the slope parameters but not of the intercept, given that  E(ui) < 0.
This limitation can be overcome by shifting the least squares line upward so that
the largest residual is zero. This procedure is known as corrected OLS (COLS).
However, there is a more fundamental problem in the above formulation. The
deviation of a given observation from the maximum output that could be achieved
is all attributed to technical ine¢ciency, while random factors outside the control of
the rm or measurement error play no role. As an extension of the previous model,
the stochastic frontier production function was introduced by Aigner et al. (1977),
as opposed to the deterministic approach above. For a sample of rms producing a
single output, the stochastic model takes the form
ln yi = + 
T  xi + vi   ui (2.2)
where vi is a symmetric random error accounting for statistical noise and ui >
0 represents technical ine¢ciency. The composed error "i = vi   ui is therefore
asymmetric. In the basic formulation of the model, it is assumed that vi is normally
distributed with zero mean and constant variance 2v, while ui follows a half-normal
distribution, i.e. the nonnegative part of a normal with zero mean and constant
variance 2u.
6 It is commonly assumed that the errors are distributed independently
of each other and independence is also assumed across rms i.
Finally, both errors are assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory vari-
ables xi. As above, OLS provides consistent estimates of the slope parameters but
6Other distributions are the truncated normal (N(; 2)), the exponential and the gamma dis-
tribution.
Most of the empirical applications that compare the results from di¤erent distributions nd
reasonably robust estimates of ine¢ciency (but not necessarily of the parameters). For instance,
see Greene (2008) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000).
92
not of the intercept, given that E("i) =  E(ui) < 0. Therefore, this estimation
method cannot be used for the purposes of e¢ciency analysis. Maximum likelihood
methods are usually adopted to estimate the parameters in the above model (Kumb-
hakar and Lovell, 2000). After estimation, the result by Jondrow, Lovell, Materov
and Schmidt (1982) (JMLS) provides an estimate of E(uij"i) so as to disentangle
the ine¢ciency from the random error.7
When rms are observed repeatedly over time, panel estimators can be applied to
Equation 2.2 to address some shortcomings of cross-sectional models. For instance,
rm heterogeneity can be identied by applying panel data estimators to the frontier
model. Pitt and Lee (1981) adapted the random e¤ects model to this context by
assuming that the ine¢ciency component followed a half-normal distribution.8 The
resulting specication is given by yit = +
T xit+ vit ui, where the ine¢ciency
component is xed over time. Following the same line of research, Schmidt and Sick-
les (1984) developed a xed e¤ects estimator for the frontier model, which provides
consistent estimates even if ine¢ciency is correlated with input levels. For the xed
e¤ects estimator (Schmidt and Sickles, 1984), the model is yit = i +
T xit + vit,
where i =    ui and no distributional assumptions on ui are required. The inef-
ciency component is xed over time and the estimated ine¢ciency is calculated as
u^i = max(^i)   ^i. According to the denition, at least one rm is assumed to be
technically e¢cient and the e¢ciency of the others is measured in relative terms. In
both of these early panel data models, the heterogeneity among rms is interpreted
as ine¢ciency and therefore the advantage of repeated observations per rm is lost.
Moreover, the standard estimation of a stochastic frontier model with panel data
7The result can also be applied to the truncated normal model, even though the parameters in
the formula are di¤erent.
8As for the cross-sectional case, alternative assumptions on the distribution are possible.
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Table 2.1: Summary of Econometric Specication: Standard Panel Models
Fixed E¤ects Random E¤ects Battese-Coelli
Firm-specic component Fixed (i) uit = ui uit = exp[(t  T )] ui
Random Error "it = vit "it = vit   ui "it = vit   uit
- ui  N
+(0; 2u) ui  N
+(0; 2u)
i:i:d:(0; 2v) vit  N(0; 
2
v) vit  N(0; 
2
v)
Ine¢ciency ui = max(i)  i E[uijvit   ui] E[uitjvit   uit]
also has drawbacks, in particular it relies on the assumption that the ine¢ciency
term is xed over time. While the estimation of the rm-specic component ui im-
proves as the number of available time periods increases, the same assumption of
time invariance is less likely to hold.
In an attempt to alleviate this concern, a number of alternative specications for
the ine¢ciency term have been proposed. The Battese and Coelli (1992) formulation,
which is commonly adopted in applications, including Resende (2008), characterizes
the ine¢ciency as uit = exp[(t T )]ui, where t is the period, T is the last period
and the stochastic component ui is time invariant. In the above model ine¢ciency
is constrained to vary with an exponential pattern which is common to all rms in
the sample. Battese and Coelli (1995) extend the framework by assuming that uit
is distributed as a truncated normal, and that the mean of the distribution of uit is
a function of explanatory variables which may for instance include time dummies.9
The main assumption on the panel models estimated in the chapter are summa-
rized in Table 2.1.
The models proposed in Greene (2004) and Greene (2005a) di¤er from the papers
by Battese and Coelli in that they allow uit to vary freely from period to period for
the di¤erent rms and they accommodate rm heterogeneity, instead of considering
it as ine¢ciency. The assumption implicit in this formulation is that all ine¢ciency
9 In Resende (2008), a time trend is the only variable considered. Given that the time trend is
not rm-specic, this formulation generates a common pattern for all the rms in the sample as for
Battese and Coelli (1992).
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Table 2.2: Summary of Econometric Specication
Pooled True FE True RE
Firm-specic component None Fixed (i) wi
Random Error "it = vit   uit "it = vit   uit "it = vit   uit
uit  N
+(0; 2u) uit  N
+(0; 2u) uit  N
+(0; 2u)
vit  N(0; 
2
v) vit  N(0; 
2
v) vit  N(0; 
2
v)
Ine¢ciency E[uitjvit   uit] E[uitjvit   uit] E[uitjwi   uit + vit]
is assumed to be time varying. This is the counterpart to the underlying assumption
of the Schmidt and Sickles (1984) and the Pitt and Lee (1981) models, in which all
ine¢ciency is assumed to be time invariant. In the so-called true xed e¤ects
model (Greene, 2004), the estimated specication is yit = i + 
T  xit + vit   uit,
where a set of dummy variables is added to the cross-sectional stochastic frontier
model. For the true random e¤ects model (Greene, 2005a), the model is yit =
( + wi) + 
T  xit + vit   uit, where wi is a random variable with zero mean
and nite variance. The rm-specic e¤ects capture heterogeneity and are assumed
uncorrelated with the regressors.
In Section 2.4.2 below, the two models incorporating time-varying ine¢ciency
are estimated and compared to their earlier counterparts.
2.3.2 Multioutput Production and Distance Functions
The production technology of telecommunications operators is, as for other utilities,
multi-input and multi-output. A convenient way to describe this technology for the
purposes of e¢ciency measurement is the distance function, which is intuitively the
distance between the production frontier and the specic point in the technology set
where a given rm is producing.
Distance functions are becoming increasingly common in the empirical literature
for various reasons. Firstly, the distance function provides a natural extension of the
production function for a multi-output rm. Secondly, compared to a cost function,
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it does not require the behavioral assumption of cost minimization.
Distance functions may be dened with an output orientation or with an input
orientation. Intuitively, the output distance function considers how the output may
be proportionally expanded if the input vector is held xed, while the input distance
function measures "the amount by which the input set of each rm may be propor-
tionally contracted with the output set held xed" (Coelli and Perelman, 2000). The
latter appears to be more suitable to a regulated industry, as it seems more likely
that such rms would have more control on inputs than on outputs. This argument
is similar to those encountered in the literature on the empirical estimation of cost
functions for multi-product regulated rms. For this reason, the remainder of the
analysis will focus on the discussion of input distance functions.
Formally, the production technology of the rm can be described from an input
perspective by L(y), the set of all input vectors x 2 Rk+ that can produce the
output vector y 2 RM+ , i.e. L(y) = fx 2 R
k
+ : x can produce yg. The input distance
function may be dened on the input set as:
DI(x;y) = maxf : (x=) 2 L(y)g (2.3)
The input distance function,DI(x;y), is non-increasing in y and is non-decreasing,
linearly homogeneous and concave in x. Moreover, if the input vector x is an element
of the feasible input set L(y), the input distance function will take values greater
than or equal to unity. Using the notation above, DI(x;y)  1 if x 2 L(y). If the
vector x is located on the inner boundary of the input set, the distance function will
be equal to one.
The distance function can be used to calculate the input-oriented measure of
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technical e¢ciency, given by TE = 1DI . If a rm is e¢cient, it will be on the frontier
and both TE and DI will be equal to 1. Throughout the majority of the literature,
the Debreu-Farrell measure of technical e¢ciency implied by the denition above
is adopted, that is technical e¢ciency is measured in terms of equiproportionate
contraction of all inputs (input-orientation). In other words an input vector, for
instance, is technically e¢cient for a given output if no equiproportionate contraction
of all inputs is feasible. The advantage of radial measures is that they are invariant
to the units of measurement.
Distance functions can be estimated by econometric methods, as in the present
study, or mathematical programming techniques. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
is a linear programming method which constructs a piece-wise frontier and compares
the each rm in the sample with a peer group. Based on the frontier, distance func-
tions and e¢ciency measures can be dened wiht an input or an output orientation.
2.3.3 Econometric Estimation
In this study, we rely on the translog functional form, introduced by Christensen
et al. (1973), which is used very frequently in e¢ciency estimation because it is a
exible form, i.e. does not restrict the elasticities of substitution between inputs
and allows for returns to scale to vary over the output range. In particular, it has
been used in the distance function context by Coelli and Perelman (1999) and other
studies. The translog distance function can be specied as:
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lnDI;it(x;y) = 0 +
MX
m=1
m ln ym;it +
1
2
MX
m=1
MX
n=1
mn ln ym;it ln yn;it (2.4)
+
KX
k=1
k lnxk;it +
1
2
KX
k=1
KX
l=1
kl lnxk;it lnxli;it
+
KX
k=1
MX
m=1
km lnxk;it ln ym;it +
KX
k=1
kxk;itt+
MX
m=1
mym;itt
+1t+
1
2
11t
2
where i = 1; 2; :::N denotes rm i in the sample and t = 1; 2; :::T indicates the
time period. Given the relevance of the time component for the present study, the
standard translog function is augmented by a time trend and its interactions with
the other variables.
From the continuity of the distance function, the symmetry between cross-
derivatives follow:10
mn = nm; m; n = 1; 2; :::M
and
kl = lk; k; l = 1; 2; :::K
As the distance is dened in terms of an equiproportionate contraction of the
inputs, the distance function is homogeneous of degree 1 in inputs. A very common
and convenient way to impose the homogeneity constraints directly on the distance
function derives from the observation that
10These are directly imposed in the formulation of the translog function. In the empirical imple-
mentation of the translog, the two cross-products between the same variables are summed together.
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DI(!x; y) = !DI(x; y);8! > 0
Therefore, one of the inputs can be chosen arbitrarily so that ! = 1=xK , which is
equivalent to dividing all inputs by xK . The estimated form of the distance function
can then be rewritten as:
  lnxK;it = 0 +
MX
m=1
m ln ym;it +
1
2
MX
m=1
MX
n=1
mn ln ym;iy ln yn;it (2.5)
+
K 1X
k=1
k lnx

k;it +
1
2
K 1X
k=1
K 1X
l=1
kl lnx

k;it lnx

l;it
+
K 1X
k=1
MX
m=1
km lnx

k;it ln ym;it +
K 1X
k=1
kx

k;itt+
MX
m=1
mym;itt
+1t+
1
2
11t
2   lnDI
where xki = xk;it=xK;it. In Equation 2.5, in line with common practice (Coelli
et al., 2003) lnDI is no longer interpreted as a function, but as the value taken by
the function itself.
  lnxK;it = 0 +
MX
m=1
m ln ym;it +
1
2
MX
m=1
MX
n=1
mn ln ym;iy ln yn;it (2.6)
+
K 1X
k=1
k lnx

k;it +
1
2
K 1X
k=1
K 1X
l=1
kl lnx

k;it lnx

l;it
+
K 1X
k=1
MX
m=1
km lnx

k;it ln ym;it +
K 1X
k=1
kx

k;itt+
MX
m=1
mym;itt
+1t+
1
2
11t
2 + vit   uit
Given that the distance can be interpreted as the di¤erence between the observed
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data and the predictions given by the transformation function, the distance term
(  lnDI) is replaced with a composite error term, vit uit, where vit is an error term
and uit is the ine¢ciency component. As a result, the function can be estimated
using the same methods developed for stochastic production frontiers (Coelli et al.,
2003) and the e¢ciency score can be estimated by exp( uit).
2.4 Data and Empirical Evidence
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
The data set used in this chapter relies on the statistics published by the U.S.
regulator, the Federal Communications Commission.11 It includes 27 incumbent
Local Exchange Carriers (LECs) over the period from 1990 to 2003.
Local exchange carriers provide a range of di¤erent access lines, as well as local,
intrastate and interstate calls. On the basis of data availability and for simplicity,
the outputs considered in the analysis are access lines, local calls and toll calls. In
particular, these measures exclude leased lines, which are not available for the entire
sample period.
The inputs are aggregated into labor, capital and materials. Labor is measured
by the number of full-time employees. In line with previous papers, materials are
calculated as operating costs minus total compensation to employees and deprecia-
tion costs, deated by the producer price index for commodities. Finally, capital is
constructed using the perpetual inventory method and is measured in constant 1990
11The statistical reports are contained in the Automated Reporting Management Information
System (ARMIS), available from the regulators website. The tables used for the analysis are
Reports 43-01 (Annual Summary Report), 43-02 (USOA Report - Balance Sheet Accounts), 43-08
(Infrastructure Data Report) and 43-08 (Operating Data Report).
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Min Max Obs. % Between
Deviation Variation
Access Lines (units) 6,204,843 7,589,101 232,465 41,400,000 378 0.884
Local Calls (m) 15,800 20,100 529.459 99,300 378 0.978
Toll Calls (m) 2,826.463 3,129.041 84.337 16,800 378 0.937
Labor (units) 14,057.51 16,370.05 692 76,585 378 0.967
Materials ($ 000) 860,616.5 969,545 54,248 4,455,259 378 0.942
Capital ($ 000) 4,356,075 5,152,482 228,051.1 24,800,000 378 0.979
Sheath / line (Km/line) 0.034 0.020 0.002 0.117 346 0.651
Utilization (000) 0.393 0.221 0.038 0.976 374 0.940
Modernization (units) 0.090 0.040 0.006 0.220 373 0.304
Note: Fraction of variance due to between variation is dened as V ar(uit)=(V ar(uit) + V ar(it)),
where uit and it are the residuals of a GLS regression of the corresponding variable on a constant.
(Farsi et al., 2005)
US$.12
In order to account for the environment in which the rms operate and for the
characteristics of their networks, we construct three variables. Firstly, a measure of
density (sheath length per access line) is included to account for di¤erent geographic
conditions across the operators. Secondly, as a proxy of the utilization of the net-
work, the number of calls per switch is calculated. Finally, we also incorporate in
the analysis an indicator of network modernization, given by the share of ber on
the total kilometers of cable.
The summary statistics are given in Table 2.3. As can be seen, there is substantial
variability in the sample. Given the panel nature of the sample, it is useful to
understand the share of "between" variation over the total, in order to gain an
insight into the importance of heterogeneity across rms. The last column reports
the share of between variation out of total variation. This measure highlights striking
di¤erences within the rms and indicates that the treatment of heterogeneity may
pose concerns, if not fully captured by the variables included in the model.
While most of the variation in the sample derives from di¤erences across coun-
tries, rather than changes over time, almost all variables show a trended pattern.
12Details are provided in Chapter 1.
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For instance, all output measures increase over the sample period and, for some of
the rms, there is a peak between 1999 and 2001, corresponding to the boom in
the telecommunications industry at the end of the 90s. Capital also has an up-
ward trend, while the number of employees decreases over time for all rms, which
is consistent with labor saving technical change as found, for instance, by Resende
(1999). In the estimation, we include a time trend and its interactions with inputs
and outputs in order to account for common movements of these variables across
rms.
2.4.2 Estimation Results
In applications, it is common to transform the data by dividing each observation
by its geometric mean so that the arithmetic sample averages of the variables in
logarithms are equal to 0. This transformation allows direct interpretation of the
rst-order parameters m, k and 1as the elasticities evaluated at the sample mean.
Therefore, in Equation 2.5, variables were transformed accordingly. Moreover, in the
estimation capital was used as the "numeraire", in line with Coelli and Perelman
(2000).
The results presented in this section were obtained under the assumption of
half-normal distribution for the ine¢ciency term. The translog functional form,
augmented with a time trend and interaction terms between time and inputs and
outputs, was the starting point of the analysis. The likelihood ratio test was used
to compare di¤erent restrictions to this general form and the following specication
was chosen:13
13The specications were: 1. Full translog including time trend and interactions with time; 2.
Translog with separability between inputs and outputs, i.e. km = 0; 3. Terms including time
set equal to zero; 4. Restriction 2 and other cross-terms set equal to zero (mn = 0;m 6= n and
kl = 0; k 6= l); 5. Cobb-Douglas.
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In Table 2.4, we report results from the following panel estimators: 1) Fixed
e¤ects (time-invariant ine¢ciency); 2) Random e¤ects (time-invariant ine¢ciency);
and Battese and Coelli (1992).
Results from the following estimators, which allow the ine¢ciency component
uit to vary freely from period to period, are shown in Table 2.5: 1) Pooled, i.e. the
sample is treated as a cross-section; 2) Fixed e¤ects (time-varying ine¢ciency); and
3) Random e¤ects (time-varying ine¢ciency).
The latter two estimators are also known as true xed e¤ects and random
e¤ects estimators given that, unlike their standard panel counterparts, they separate
ine¢ciency from heterogeneity. In addition, as can be seen from the equations
above, it is assumed that all ine¢ciency is time-varying, as opposed to the opposite
assumption that all ine¢ciency is time-invariant, as in the standard panel models.
More details on the di¤erences between these estimators are provided in the previous
section on methodology.
The estimated coe¢cients on the rst-order input terms are positive in all models,
as expected in an input distance function. However, results for the panel estimators
For specications 1, 3 and 5, the OLS residuals were skewed in the wrong direction and therefore
the models were excluded.
We also checked whether all the rms in the initial sample could be pooled together. This was
done by comparing the log-likelihood of the estimated model, removing from the sample one rm
at a time. One rm which produced a negative contribution to the log-likelihood was removed from
the initial sample.
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Table 2.4: Standard Panel Models
Fixed E¤ects Random E¤ects Battese-Coelli
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable:   lnKit
lnLit 0.119*** 0.124* 0.109***
(0.028) (0.057) (0.028)
lnMit 0.127*** 0.129*** 0.139***
(0.015) (0.021) (0.016)
lnLinesit -0.323*** -0.313*** -0.306***
(0.036) (0.086) (0.035)
lnLCallsit -0.002 -0.014 -0.017
(0.023) (0.035) (0.022)
lnTCallsit 0.026* 0.022 0.027
(0.014) (0.023) (0.014)
(lnLinesit)
2 -0.260 -0.270 -0.198
(0.364) (0.406) (0.355)
(lnLCallsit)
2 0.020 0.023 0.017
(0.017) (0.032) (0.016)
(lnTCallsit)
2 0.008 0.009 0.007
(0.009) (0.016) (0.009)
(lnLit)
2 0.199*** 0.201 0.204***
(0.064) (0.206) (0.064)
(lnMit)
2 0.037 0.045 0.048
(0.057) (0.103) (0.056)
t 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.007) (0.003)
t2 -0.004** -0.004 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
lnLinesit  t 0.052* 0.052 0.044
(0.024) (0.029) (0.024)
lnLCallsit  t 0.000 0.000 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
lnTCallsit  t -0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
lnLit  t 0.014*** 0.014 0.012***
(0.004) (0.012) (0.004)
lnMit  t 0.005 0.004 0.002
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Constant - 2.174*** 2.206***
- (0.407) (0.086)
u
v
n/a 52.533 26.509
 - - 2.174
 - - -0.006
log Likelihood 644.098 505.874 511.645
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * signicant at 10 %, ** signicant at 5 %, *** signicant
at 1 %. L*: labor normalized by capital; M*: materials normalized by capital; Lines: access lines;
LCalls: local calls; TCalls: toll calls; t: time trend.
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Table 2.5: Models with Time-Varying Ine¢ciency
Pooled True FE True RE
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable:   lnKit
lnLit 0.282*** 0.295*** 0.198***
(0.055) (0.036) (0.010)
lnMit 0.369*** 0.386*** 0.137***
(0.047) (0.037) (0.007)
lnLinesit 0.168 0.133 -0.245***
(0.123) (0.089) (0.020)
lnLCallsit -0.681*** -0.676*** -0.140***
(0.026) (0.033) (0.005)
lnTCallsit -0.263*** -0.274*** 0.001
(0.025) (0.018) (0.005)
(lnLinesit)
2 -3.933*** -5.114*** 0.366
(1.252) (0.953) (0.225)
(lnLCallsit)
2 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004*
(0.022) (0.012) (0.002)
(lnTCallsit)
2 -0.008 -0.017 0.005
(0.022) (0.012) (0.003)
(lnLit)
2 0.311** 0.330*** 0.294***
(0.108) (0.075) (0.020)
(lnMit)
2 0.169 0.003 0.063
(0.265) (0.122) (0.034)
t 0.009 0.012 0.008***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.002)
t2 -0.016** -0.021*** -0.001
(0.006) (0.004) (0.001)
lnLinesit  t 0.220** 0.293*** 0.001
(0.091) (0.063) (0.015)
lnLCallsit  t 0.001 0.002 0.000
(0.007) (0.005) (0.001)
lnTCallsit  t -0.013* -0.014** -0.003***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.001)
lnLit  t 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.020***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.002)
lnMit  t -0.047*** -0.051*** 0.005**
(0.010) (0.009) (0.002)
Constant 0.214*** - -
(0.041) - -
u
v
1.189 1.325 4.844
log Likelihood 142.133 184.603 464.782
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * signicant at 10 %, ** signicant at 5 %, *** signicant
at 1 %. L*: labor normalized by capital; M*: materials normalized by capital; Lines: access lines;
LCalls: local calls; TCalls: toll calls; t: time trend.
that assumed time-invariant ine¢ciency, although very similar to each other, do not
appear reasonable. For instance, while the coe¢cients on labor and materials are
positive as expected, they are unrealistically low and imply a coe¢cient on capital
which is above 0.7 in both cases.14
Results in Columns 1 and 2 (pooled and true xed e¤ects, respectively) are
substantially di¤erent from those from other models and appear more in line with
expectations. In the true random e¤ects model, rst-order input terms are signicant
14The coe¢cient on capital can be recovered by exploiting the constraint that the sum of the
rst-order coe¢cients on inputs is equal to one.
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but their magnitude is unreasonable, similarly to the results in Table 2.4.
Evidence on the output coe¢cients is equally contradictory and, depending on
the specication, rst-order terms in either lines or calls are signicant. Again,
results from the pooled and the true xed e¤ects models appear more reasonable.
For instance, the sum of the signicant rst-order output coe¢cients is slightly less
than one in Columns 3 and 4, indicating the presence of increasing returns to scale,
as found for instance by Uri (2002) in a similar sample of U.S. operators. Regarding
the signicance of the rst-order coe¢cient on lines, it should be noted that the
pattern of lines over time matches closely the time trend. The parallel movement of
lines and the time trend could explain why their interaction is signicant, while it
is not possible to identify the contribution of each variable separately.
The presence of ine¢ciency in the sample is found across estimators, as shown
by the ratio of the standard error of the ine¢ciency term (u) and the standard
error of the symmetric error component (v). However, this value is very high for
the random e¤ects model with time-invariant ine¢ciency, which may be due to the
strong assumption that ine¢ciency is uncorrelated with the regressors and is also
consistent with the observation that there is little "within" rm variation for some
variables, i.e. rm heterogeneity is reected in high values of u.
For this reason, we attempt to model observed heterogeneity directly by incor-
porating in the estimation some characteristics of the operators networks.15 There
are di¤erent alternatives as to how to address observable heterogeneity (Coelli et
al., 1999), including: (a) in the model specication (i.e. the underlying assumption
is that environmental variables a¤ect production levels rather than ine¢ciency);
15The variables are: sheath per line (dispersion of the network), share of bre cable to total
kilometres (modernization) and the ratio of calls to switches (capacity usage).
106
and (b) in the mean of the ine¢ciency distribution (i.e. the ine¢ciency term is
assumed to follow a truncated normal distribution and its mean is a function of
the environmental variables). In these models, environmental variables shift ei-
ther the input function or the ine¢ciency. In terms of other assumptions, the rst
option does not present any di¤erences compared to the standard pooled model,
while the shift of the underlying mean of the ine¢ciency component (case b) im-
plies that ine¢ciency follows a truncated normal distribution: ui = jUij, where
Ui  N(i; 
2
u); i = 0 + 
0
1zi.
Table 2.6 provides results from these alternative models.
When the environmental variables are directly included in the distance function
(Column 1), sheath per line is the only signicant variable, but with a very small
coe¢cient ( 0:0001). Given that the mean of sheath per line is about 34 meters
per line, the average e¤ect of the variable is about 0.003, which is signicant but
small. An alternative approach is a two-step model, which di¤ers from the one
reported in the text in that conventional ine¢ciency estimates are obtained, omitting
the inuence of environmental variables, and then regressed on such environmental
variables. Results from this approach conrm the signicance of sheath per line, as
shown in the text. However, incorporating the environmental variables directly in
the model appears preferable, as argued by Greene (2007) and Wang and Schmidt
(2002).
In Column 2, the mean of the ine¢ciency component uit is assumed to be a
linear function of sheath per line. As expected, higher sheath length (i.e. a less
dense network) results in higher ine¢ciency.
Regarding the other estimates, the main di¤erence with Table 2.4 is that the
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Table 2.6: Models with Heterogeneity
Environmental Variables Heterogeneity Mean Truncated Normal
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable:   lnKit
lnLit 0.285*** 0.233*** 0.280***
(0.055) (0.053) (0.057)
lnMit 0.374*** 0.252*** 0.364***
(0.048) (0.047) (0.049)
lnLinesit 0.127 0.274* 0.175
(0.125) (0.121) (0.126)
lnLCallsit -0.681*** -0.672*** -0.679***
(0.026) (0.023) (0.026)
lnTCallsit -0.266*** -0.280*** -0.267***
(0.025) (0.022) (0.025)
(lnLinesit)
2 -4.080*** -2.712** -4.034***
(1.253) (1.170) (1.295)
(lnLCallsit)
2 -0.003 0.011 -0.005
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
(lnTCallsit)
2 -0.011 -0.028 -0.008
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
(lnLit)
2 0.321** 0.360*** 0.308***
(0.109) (0.103) (0.111)
(lnMit)
2 0.138 0.291 0.168
(0.272) (0.229) (0.274)
t 0.015 -0.002 0.008
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
t2 -0.020** -0.009 -0.017**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
lnLinesit  t 0.235** 0.125 0.227**
(0.093) (0.090) (0.095)
lnLCallsit  t 0.002 0.004 0.003
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
lnTCallsit  t -0.014* -0.015** -0.015**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
lnLit  t 0.037*** 0.048*** 0.038***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
lnMit  t -0.048*** -0.050*** -0.045***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Sheath per line it 0.00009**
(0.000)
Utilization it 0.000 -
(0.006)
Modernization it 0.000 -
(0.006)
Constant 0.246*** 0.356** 0.297
(0.031) (0.133) (0.145)
Mean of ine¢ciency: 0.176
Sheath per line i - 4.128***
(0.737)
u
v
1.582 1.397 1.338
log Likelihood 145.516 168.552 142.532
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * signicant at 10%, ** signicant at 5%, *** signicant
at 1%. In Column 2, the mean of the ine¢ciency distribution is assumed to take the form i =
constant +   sheathi. L*: labor normalized by capital; M*: materials normalized by capital;
Lines: access lines; LCalls: local calls; TCalls: toll calls; t: time trend.
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rst-order coe¢cient on lines is signicant and has the wrong sign in Column 2. In
general, there are inconsistencies across the di¤erent estimators as to the sign and
signicance of coe¢cients on rst-order, quadratic and interaction terms involving
lines. There does not seem to be a consistent pattern across rms in the relationship
between the dependent variable ( lnCapital) and the lines variable (lnLines), and
this may make the identication of the coe¢cients problematic. While lines are an
important part of an operators assets, the composition of capital, and therefore the
share of transmission over total capital, may vary among di¤erent rms depending,
for instance, on the distribution of customers over the service area. For instance, in
the last year of the sample the proportion of transmission on total assets in operation
varied from around 15% to about 30%.
In Column 3, we report results from the truncated normal model. The sample
is treated as a cross-section, i.e. all the observations are pooled together without
accounting for unobserved heterogeneity. The main di¤erence with the pooled model
in Table 2.5 is the assumption on the distribution of the ine¢ciency term, which in
this case is ui  N
+(; 2u). The symmetric error remains unchanged compared to
the standard model: vit  N(0; 
2
v).
E¢ciency Estimates
Table 2.7 summarizes the e¢ciency measures obtained with the di¤erent estima-
tors. It also reports results from the truncated normal model, for which coe¢cient
estimates are provided in Appendix.
Results in terms of e¢ciency estimates are in line with the conclusions reached
for model specication. For the panel estimators with time-invariant ine¢ciency,
the estimates do not exhibit the expected shape and average technical e¢ciency is
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Table 2.7: E¢ciency Measures
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
Time-Invariant E¢ciency
Fixed E¤ects 0.188 0.221 0.012 1.000 378
Random E¤ects 0.193 0.206 0.013 0.866 378
Time-Varying E¢ciency
Battese-Coelli 0.183 0.217 0.011 0.970 378
True Fixed E¤ects 0.857 0.038 0.694 0.948 378
True Random E¤ects 0.933 0.047 0.784 0.995 378
Cross-Section Models
Pooled 0.881 0.050 0.719 0.966 378
Environmental Variables 0.863 0.066 0.655 0.952 346
Truncated Normal 0.814 0.073 0.622 0.963 378
Heterogenous Mean 0.803 0.081 0.633 0.970 378
Notes: In the model with heterogeneous mean, network density (proxied by sheath per line) is
the environmental variable used in the estimation. The number of observations in the model with
environmental variables is lower because of missing observations for all rms (e.g. 1990 observations
are missing for all).
very low. As found for instance in Greene (2004), the low estimates of e¢ciency
are expected, given that these models do not allow separating heterogeneity from
ine¢ciency, therefore overestimating the latter. In addition, in line with Greene
(2004) and Resende (2006), we nd little di¤erence between estimates from time-
invariant models and the Battese-Coelli (1992) formulation. Rankings are also very
highly similar across these three models.
In all other models, e¢ciency measures show the expected shape and their aver-
ages are signicantly higher. In line with our ndings on coe¢cient estimates, these
results conrm that for the present sample the estimators that perform better are
those that allow the ine¢ciency term to vary over time, either by treating the sam-
ple as a cross-section or by separating time-varying ine¢ciency from time-invariant
rm-specic e¤ects. In addition, among these estimators, the true random e¤ects
model provides the highest estimates of e¢ciency, as reported for instance by Greene
(2004) for the WHO dataset. However, we consider these estimates unreliable, given
they are obtained from a model whose coe¢cients are out of range (Table 2.4, Col-
umn 2). In addition, the true random e¤ects estimator did not converge for some
of the model specications tested and therefore its results for the present sample
110
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
Pooled Efficiency
T
ru
e
 F
E
 E
ff
ic
ie
n
c
y
Figure 2.1: E¢ciency Estimates - Pooled and True FE Models
should be taken with caution.
For these reasons, we focus on the results from the true xed e¤ects model and we
compare its results with the cross-section estimators. All the latter give very similar
estimates of e¢ciency, and this also holds for the models in which the ine¢ciency
term is assumed to have a mean di¤erent from zero, i.e. the truncated normal and
the model with heterogeneous mean. In the gure below, we plot e¢ciency estimates
from the pooled model against the true xed e¤ects model.
When comparing the results of the xed e¤ects model with time-varying ine¢-
ciency with those of standard pooled model, a strong correlation emerges between
the e¢ciency estimates. However, the overall variation of the e¢ciency estimates is
lower in the true xed e¤ects model. Moreover, when average e¢ciency by rm is
computed, the average estimates of the pooled model are more dispersed compared
with the true xed e¤ects model, which produces results that are more similar across
rms. Both these observations can be explained by the fact that the rm-specic
dummy captures the unobserved heterogeneity across operators, thus leading to
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Figure 2.2: Average Technical E¢ciency over Time
fewer di¤erences among the e¢ciency scores of the operators.
In the gure below, we plot average e¢ciency over time, noting that the model
specication used in the study already included a time trend and its interactions
with inputs and outputs. As shown in the gure, average e¢ciency shows substantial
variability over the sample period and therefore estimators which do not account for
time variation do not seem suitable. Moreover, average e¢ciency does not follow
a monotonic pattern, as also found by Resende (2006) in his sample of U.S. local
exchange carriers over the 1988  2000 period.
The variation in technical e¢ciency over the 14 years covered by the study is
expected, given its relatively long time-span and also the fast pace of change in
the telecommunications market. The present sample extends from 1990 to 2003, a
period which coincides with major changes in the U.S. industry. For instance, a
"bubble" in investment in telecommunications companies and infrastructure took
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place between 1997 and 2000 in the U.S. and abroad. In the following years, despite
the fact that capital investment was drastically reduced,16 operators experienced low
rates of capacity utilization. Consistently with this observation, average e¢ciency
in the present sample, after a peak in 1999, declined until 2002.
In addition, signicant market changes were initiated in the U.S. by the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996. The Act opened local markets to competition, imposing at
the same time conditions to make competition e¤ective, e.g. on interconnection of
networks, non-discrimination and cost-based pricing of network elements leased by
new entrants.17 Moreover, the Act required that certain conditions be met before
the incumbent local exchange carriers (LECs) could enter the long-distance market
(Economides, 2005).18 Given that long-distance calls originate and terminate on lo-
cal networks, local telephone companies would control access to a bottleneck input
required by long-distance companies. If local operators were allowed to compete in
the long-distance market with no conditions attached, they would have an incen-
tive to act anticompetitively towards their rivals (e.g. raise the price of an essential
input) (Armstrong, 2002).
In terms of the specic form of regulation adopted in the U.S., an increasing
number of U.S. states moved from rate-of-return regulation to some form of incen-
tive regulation from 1990 (Ai and Sappington, 2002). In light of this, the decline
16As reported by Lenain and Paltridge (2003), the Telecommunications Industry Association
announced that capital spending by U.S. telecommunications service providers in 2002 was back to
the same level as 1997.
17 In addition to building their own facilities, new entrants had two ways of entering the local mar-
ket: 1) reselling retail services provided by the incumbent; 2) lease unbundled network components
(Economides, 2005).
18After the breakup of AT&T in 1984, local exchange carriers that were formerly part of the
Bell System (Regional Bell Operating Companies, RBOCs) were prevented from o¤ering services
outside certain areas dened by regulation (e.g. Nynex - now Verizon - operated in the states of
New York and New England). Within these areas, they provided both local calls and toll calls.
The term long-distance call in the U.S. market refers to a call outside the service area in which
a given RBOC was allowed to operate, e.g. a call between California (Pacic Bell - now AT&T)
and New England.
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in technical e¢ciency from 1990 to 1994 may appear surprising. Therefore, the
expectation that incentive regulation encourages rms to pursue higher e¢ciency
would not be conrmed by Figure 2.2. This is among the conclusions of a study
by Uri (2002), who nds that average technical e¢ciency has not increased between
the 1988-1990 time period and 1991-1999, i.e. before and after the introduction of
incentive regulation across the U.S.19 However, the e¤ects of incentive regulation
cannot be assessed on the basis of simple measures, such as those reported in the
Figure above or in Uri (2002). Firstly, no general conclusions can be drawn as to the
correlation between the introduction of incentive regulation and technical e¢ciency
without a proper statistical study. This type of analysis has been carried out in other
papers, such as Majumdar (1997), who nds a marginally positive e¤ect of incentive
regulation on technical e¢ciency. Secondly, the impact of incentive regulation may
be lagged, as found again by Majumdar (1997), and therefore not be reected in
e¢ciency measures in the rst years of the sample.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have estimated an input distance function for a panel of U.S.
telecommunications operators over 14 years to analyze their technical e¢ciency.
Compared with previous studies on the telecommunications industry, the new ele-
ment in the analysis is the application of panel estimators that account for (freely)
time-varying ine¢ciency.
The application of alternative estimators in our sample suggests that results are
19Uri (2002) argues that the lack of change in technical e¢ciency can be explained by observing
that, over the 1988-1999 period, total factor productivity increased, but this was due to innovation
related to signicant investments in switching and transmission equipment rather than increases in
e¢ciency.
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sensitive to the specic estimator used. We nd large di¤erences in e¢ciency scores
and rankings, depending on whether the ine¢ciency component is assumed to be
time-invariant or varying over the sample period. Average estimated e¢ciency lev-
els are very high for the xed e¤ects and random e¤ects models with time-varying
ine¢ciency, while they are much lower for the time-invariant panel estimators, as
expected. These two approaches rely on very di¤erent assumptions on the nature of
ine¢ciency. In one case, all ine¢ciency is assumed to be time invariant and any other
component that varies over time is absorbed by the symmetric error. In the other,
the opposite view is taken and the model assumes all ine¢ciency is time-varying,
therefore leaving any element which does not change over time (e.g. ine¢cient
management practices) in the rm-specic e¤ect. Variation in e¢ciency estimates
observed over the sample period conrms the importance of panel estimators which
account for such variation over time, especially over long periods. However, the
rather large discrepancies between results provided by di¤erent estimators also in-
dicate that further analysis is needed as to the underlying sources of ine¢ciency.
Ideally, a richer dataset could help uncover more observed heterogeneity between
rms and therefore focus better on the ine¢ciency component.
Finally, the analysis relies on an input distance function and this approach su¤ers
from some general limitations. Firstly, normalized inputs appearing as regressors in
an input distance function may not be exogenous. This is a debated issue (Kumb-
hakar and Lovell, 2000) which has been addressed, for instance, by instrumenting
potentially endogenous variables using GMM techniques (Atkinson and Primont,
2002). Moreover, the study focuses on technical e¢ciency, which only provides a
partial view of the rms behavior as technical e¢ciency does not imply that, given
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input prices, a rm chooses the input mix that minimizes cost. In order to reach con-
clusions on cost e¢ciency, the study would need to be complemented by a stochastic
cost function approach.
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Part II
Institutions and Infrastructure
Development: Evidence from
Cross-Country Data
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Chapter 3
Regulatory Institutions and
Mobile Penetration in Low and
Middle-Income Countries
3.1 Introduction1
In developing countries, liberalization, restructuring, privatization and the intro-
duction of independent regulatory agencies for infrastructure industries appear to
have generally been successful in improving sector performance in terms of higher
investment and service availability, particularly in telecommunications. However,
the specic policies and factors behind both reform successes and failure are the
subject of intense debate.
The relationship between the existence of an independent regulator and the de-
velopment of infrastructure industry investment and productivity levels has been a
1Parts of this Chapter have been published in Maiorano and Stern (2007) on a di¤erent sample
of countries. This concerns in particular, Sections 3.1, 3.2 and parts of 3.3. The sample used in the
published paper is the same as in Section 3.7.3, but with a di¤erent model specication.
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particular focus of debate and this specic issue has been investigated in numer-
ous papers, with reference both to the telecommunications and electricity sectors
(Gutierrez, 2003; Cubbin and Stern, 2006). These studies focus on the charac-
teristics of regulatory institutions that tend to be associated with higher levels of
certain performance indicators in public utilities, such as the electricity produced
or the number of telephone lines per inhabitant. The independence of the regulator
is generally a major explanatory variable, following the literature on central bank
independence (e.g. review in Stern and Trillas, 2003). However, this literature does
not, with some exceptions, pay much explicit attention to the institutional setting
within which the new regulatory agencies operate.
This chapter takes a fresh look at the relationship between regulation and perfor-
mance in the telecommunications sector, by investigating the issue of independence
in the mobile communications sector, rather than the xed network which is the
focus of previous papers on regulatory institutions in this industry. In particular,
it can be reasonably assumed that regulatory institutions have a di¤erent impact
in markets in which there are competing rms, rather than a single state-owned
operator. Given that mobile telephony is usually characterized by a certain degree
of competition almost from its commercial launch, the role of regulation may be
di¤erent from that exercised in the xed market, where the development of xed
telephony often takes place for a long time in the absence of competition and the
infrastructure is deployed entirely by a state-owned monopolist.
In addition, we draw lessons from strands of the economic literature that are
sometimes neglected in previous studies and, in particular, attending to the role of
the institutional setting. In consequence, we also take account of further potential
119
interrelated e¤ects, in particular (a) the economic impact of telecommunications
infrastructure on aggregate income; and (b) the role of country institutions in pro-
moting economic growth and the quality of regulatory institutions.
Concerning the relationship between telecommunications penetration and na-
tional income, income is considered one of the most important determinants of de-
mand for telecommunications services. But, in addition, investment in telecommu-
nications infrastructure can contribute to economic growth directly by an increase
in production and, indirectly, by facilitating communications between rms, thus
increasing their production possibilities (Röller and Waverman, 2001).
We explicitly include this feedback e¤ect in the present analysis to provide a
fuller picture of the interrelationship between income and telecommunications in-
frastructure capacity. We do this by focusing on the case of mobile telephony where
recent research has suggested an impact of the rapid expansion of mobile telephones
subscribers2 on GDP levels and growth rates in middle and low income countries
(Waverman et al., 2005).
Another related issue that is considered in this chapter is the role of country
institutions. When investigating the impact of regulation on telecommunications
development, it is crucial to ensure that this e¤ect does not capture other factors
which are not explicitly included in the analysis. More specically, our study tries to
separate the impact of regulation from the potential indirect e¤ects due to country
institutions.
The present study attempts to bring together these questions into a unied
framework of analysis. We do this by estimating a system of equations for a panel
2Following the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the denition of subscribers
throughout the chapter includes both pre-paid and post-paid users of telephone mobile services.
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of 93 low and middle-income countries over the 1995 - 2004 period.
In summary, the evidence we present conrms the positive e¤ect of regulatory
institutions on telecommunications penetration. In particular, the presence of a
separate regulator is associated to higher mobile penetration in low-income coun-
tries and the estimated e¤ects is higher than for medium-income countries. Country
institutions are also found to have a positive impact on GDP per capita and regula-
tory quality, even if those results hold only for some of the proxies used for country
institutions. However, we do not nd evidence of the positive e¤ect of mobile pene-
tration on GDP per capita, once the latter is treated as endogenous in a xed e¤ects
model.3
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the most relevant
results from the related literature. Section 3.3 sets out the approach adopted in
the paper; Section 3.4 provides a description of the data; Section 3.5 sets out the
empirical strategy; Section 3.6 discusses the main results; Section 3.7 presents results
from alternative specications of the model; and Section 3.8 provides some short
concluding comments and a summary table of the key results.
3.2 Related Literature
The standard perspective on utility industries is that the existence of very long-lived
and sunk assets gives rise to a time inconsistency problem, which is similar to that
which a¤ects monetary policy as described by Barro and Gordon (1983) (Levine
et al., 2005). In the telecommunications industry, if the public authority cannot
commit to future price levels credibly, that is to refrain from lowering prices beyond
3Waverman et al. (2005) rely on a similar setting, but do not include xed e¤ects in their
equation for mobile penetration.
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the originally declared targets, the operator will anticipate the authoritys incentive
to appropriate its return on sunk investment. As a result, the operator may choose
a lower than optimal level of investment. The establishment of an independent
regulator is seen as a way of addressing this commitment problem and of safeguarding
consumers at the same time, mainly because it should be better insulated from
political pressure and therefore less inclined to pursue policy objectives through
arbitrary intervention in the regulated sector.4
In consequence, there is a growing body of empirical evidence looking at the
relationship between the presence of an independent regulator and investment in the
telecommunications network, mirroring the extensive literature testing the impact
of independent central banks on ination and growth. The most relevant papers for
the present work are discussed in this section.
Gutierrez (2003) is the recent contribution which is the most closely related to
our study. Using a panel of 22 Latin American countries over the period 1980 -1997,
he nds that good regulatory governance has a positive impact on xed lines deploy-
ment and e¢ciency (measured as employees per main lines). In Gutierrez (2003),
the main explanatory variables are privatization, competition and regulatory devel-
opment, where the latter is represented by an index covering, for instance, whether
there is separation of telecom operations and regulatory activities and whether the
creation of the regulator is backed by law or by a minor legal norm.
The main advantage of Gutierrezs index is the attempt to characterize regu-
latory governance in a more comprehensive way than allowed by a simple dummy
variable for the presence of the regulator, thus recognizing that the mere existence
4For instance, see Levine and Rickman (2002) for the theoretical underpinnings in a model of
price regulation under asymmetric information.
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of an independent regulator is not by itself informative of the quality of institutions.
Moreover, he addresses the potential endogeneity of the regulatory variable in his
dynamic model. However, his analysis is based on a reduced-form equation that
neglects the potential interactions among network deployment, income level and
regulatory governance. In addition, the results from his dynamic model should be
treated with caution, as explained in Section 3.7.2 below.
Opposite results, obtained with a di¤erent dataset and model specications,
are presented by Estache et al. (2006). They study a panel of 204 developed and
developing countries during the period 1990 - 2003, in a model that also incorporates
measures of country governance such as investment risk and corruption. For the
purposes of this chapter, the key results of the paper are that the presence of a
separate regulator does not a¤ect xed penetration, while the majority privatization
of the incumbent does have a positive e¤ect.
Regarding the endogeneity of reforms, in a recent paper Gual and Trillas (2006)
investigate the determinants of reforms concerning regulators independence and
entry barriers in the telecommunications sector. In particular, they dene indepen-
dence by an index covering the regulators functions, its funding, the years since
establishment and the percentage of private ownership, among other factors. Reg-
ulatory independence is regressed on explanatory variables which include proxies of
country institutions used in the growth literature, such as the legal origin of the
country, the general quality of government and the rule of law.5
Gual and Trillas nd that the rule of law variable has a signicant negative im-
5Those variables relating to the wider institutional environment have been used as the explana-
tory variable of interest by Henisz and Zelner (2001), who focus on institutions at the macro-political
level. They create an index of political constraints for 147 countries over the period 1960-1994 and
they nd that it has a positive impact on telecommunications infrastructure development.
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pact on independence. They explain this result arguing that "independence is a
substitute for other ways to achieve commitment not to expropriate".6 This inter-
pretation is consistent with the view of the independent regulator as an answer to
the commitment problem, as summarized above. However, other researchers (Cub-
bin and Stern, 2006) nd that the rule of law is a complement to better quality
regulation rather than a substitute.
An alternative approach is to look at specic policy outcomes rather than actual
network development. In Edwards and Waverman (2006), for instance, intercon-
nection rates charged by incumbent operators are the dependent variable which is
explained by an index of regulatory governance and other controls in a panel data
context. This approach has the appeal of narrowing the focus to an outcome which
is more related to institutional quality than measures of performance, and of sim-
plifying the empirical methodology.
However, the Edwards-Waverman approach does not seem suited for the research
question of the present study. Firstly, there are no available time-series data on pol-
icy outcomes for a su¢ciently large set of low and middle-income countries. In
addition, as a more general point, this type of approach would implicitly assume
that a given policy outcome automatically leads to a higher degree of development
of telecommunications networks. The more relevant question for this study is pre-
cisely to explain the development of telecommunications, rather than assuming that
it would follow from the "right" type of policies. For instance, in the case of inter-
connection rates, the positive outcome would traditionally be considered to be a low
level of charges in order to promote service competition, as in Edwards and Waver-
6 Interestingly, other measures of institutions, such as the Polcon index developed by Henisz and
Zelner (2001), a measure of procedural complexity (i.e. the number of steps a new rm has to take
to operate) and a proxy for government e¤ectiveness were not signicant.
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man (2006). However, interconnection rates which were too low (i.e. below cost)
would give distorted price signals, and therefore may encourage entry by ine¢cient
competitors while acting as a disincentive for investment by the incumbent.
Most papers on regulatory institutions usually analyze the direct impact of regu-
latory governance on outcomes, while other types of institutions are not considered,
with a few notable exceptions.7 Cubbin and Stern (2006) try to estimate the impact
of country institutions on outcomes in the electricity sector and nd that there is no
signicant statistical evidence of the impact of country governance in models that in-
corporate country xed e¤ects, once regulatory governance is controlled for. For the
telecommunications industry, Estache et al. (2006) and Gasmi et al. (2006) include
proxies for country institutions in their models. Estache et al. (2006) surprisingly
nd that measures both of corruption and investment risk are associated to higher
xed penetration, but the interactions between these proxies and regulatory reform
policies (presence of a regulator and privatization of the incumbent) have a negative
sign. The authors interpret this result by arguing that "even though corruption may
lead to some performance improvements in the presence of red tape and resistance
to change, reform policies can lead to stronger and better performance outputs in a
much more ethical way." Gasmi et al. (2006) study a sample of 29 developing coun-
tries over the period 1985 - 1999, and they nd in a dynamic model that corruption
has a negative e¤ect on mobile penetration while checks and balances in the polit-
ical system have a positive coe¢cient. The methodology proposed in this chapter
will address the relationship between country governance and mobile penetration
in the context of a system of simultaneous equations, assuming that the channels
7The paper by Henisz and Zelner (2001) focuses on the e¤ect of country institutions on telecom-
munications investment. Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) study the impact of executive constraints
on growth and on the growth of telephones per capita.
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through which country governance can inuence penetration are the level of income
and regulatory governance.
Finally, all these studies rely on formal measures of institutional quality which,
in developing countries, may not be indicative of the e¤ective degree of regulatory
governance (Pande and Udry, 2005). Attempts to provide de facto measures of in-
dependence, i.e. taking account of how regulators and governments actually operate
in practice, have been introduced in the literature on central banks independence
by Cukierman (1994) and Haan and Koi (2000) and are currently being developed
for utilities (Montoya and Trillas, 2007).
3.3 Main Issues and Methodology
The focus of this study is the relationship between measures of telecommunications
development and regulatory governance, while taking explicit account within a sys-
tem framework of (a) the role of income and (b) country governance. In this section
we outline a framework to address these issues. We rstly describe the scope of
the study; and, secondly, briey explain the main theoretical references and the
approach followed.
The present work studies the penetration of telecommunications infrastructure,
as measured by the number of mobile telephone subscribers per head. Among the
factors that may a¤ect penetration, we consider the e¤ect that income may have on
the uptake of mobile telephone subscriptions, as could be expected based on standard
demand models. However, in the case of developing countries this is also important
to investigate in order to understand whether penetration is demand-constrained or
supply-constrained.
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Another consideration relates to the possible feedback e¤ects between penetra-
tion and income. Network infrastructure services, including telecommunications,
play a crucial role for the economy (Jensen, 2007).8 There is considerable evidence
that higher telecommunications penetration - xed and mobile - can have signicant
e¤ects on income.9 This potential feedback e¤ect is represented by the two-sided
arrow in the top row of Figure 3.1. In fact, the methodology of this study is adapted
from the literature on the economic impact of infrastructure, as described below.
Country Institutions GDP
Regulatory Governance
Regulatory Governance Infrastructure Development
GDP Infrastructure Development
Figure 3.1: Factors potentially a¤ecting infrastructure development
Considering the second row of Figure 3.1, the economic importance of the telecom-
munications industry has been among the factors contributing to the active role of
governments in this sector. The reform process that has taken place in developed
countries and in many low and middle-income countries aims at achieving public
interest targets by complex policy changes, in which the establishment of a regu-
latory framework is accompanied by sector restructuring, the liberalization of the
market and the privatization of the incumbent. In short, introducing private nance
8Canning (1999) and Canning and Bennathan (2000).
9Correa (2006) assesses the contribution of investment in telecommunications to productivity
using input-output analysis. Röller and Waverman (2001) and Waverman et al. (2005) estimate
system of equations to address the endogeneity of infrastructure. Esfahani and Ramirez (2003)
develop a framework for deriving reduced form equations to deal with the endogeneity of infrastruc-
ture.
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and privatizing expanding telecommunications industries has been the main force
behind the development of new regulatory organizations as well as, arguably, en-
couraging general improvements in country governance in the areas of commercial
law enforcement.
The present study concentrates on the regulatory framework for telecommuni-
cations per se and, in particular, on key aspects of regulatory governance (e.g. the
establishment of a separate regulator). As described in the literature review, regula-
tory reform has the stated objective of promoting better infrastructure development,
among other targets, by attracting investment and lowering the cost of capital. This
e¤ect is symbolized by the arrow in the middle panel of Figure 3.1.10
E¤ective regulatory frameworks need to be adapted to the specic circumstances
of each country and, in particular, to their governance characteristics. This is shown
in the third part of Figure 3.1. One interpretation of this relationship views the
establishment of an independent regulator as a substitute for strong country in-
stitutions (e.g. strong property rights and competition authorities, supported by
strong and independent commercial courts). However, an alternative and perhaps
more plausible view is that countries with strong institutions may be more likely
to engage in substantive reform, which will include genuinely independent and high
quality sector regulatory agencies.
Finally, as highlighted by widespread evidence of the positive impact of high-
10 It may be argued that countries with more widespread telecommunications penetration are more
likely to set up regulators and that therefore there may be some feedback e¤ects from infrastructure
development to regulatory governance. In fact, this apparent feedback may instead be related
to other factors, such as liberalization or privatization, a¤ecting both regulatory governance and
infrastructure development. Moreover, in the type of countries considered in the present study,
the reform of the telecommunications sector often takes place under the inuence of international
lending institutions.
For this reason, no causal relationship is assumed from mobile penetration to the establishment
of a separate regulator.
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quality country governance and institutions on GDP growth rates (Acemoglu et al.,
2005), we need to include the potential direct e¤ect of country institutions on income
into the analysis. The last panel of Figure 3.1 summarizes that, in this setting,
country governance is assumed to a¤ect mobile penetration indirectly through the
channels of GDP per capita and regulatory governance.
3.3.1 Analytical Framework
In this section, we present the main methodological reference for the study. In gen-
eral, papers on regulatory institutions do not rely on a formal theoretical analysis,
but are based on informal considerations on the factors that may a¤ect the devel-
opment of infrastructure. A more formal approach could be derived from growth
models and, given the emphasis of the present study on the endogeneity of per capita
income and regulatory institutions, specically the literature on the impact of in-
frastructure on growth. A similar approach is provided by the paper by Esfahani
and Ramirez (2003), who base their estimation on a growth accounting framework
in which they include di¤erent types of capital.
The question of endogeneity is addressed by the analytical framework in Esfa-
hani and Ramirez (2003), which incorporates two infrastructure sectors, i.e. xed
telecommunications and electricity generation. The paper aims at addressing the
issue of simultaneity between infrastructure and aggregate output by developing a
system approach and incorporates, in the empirical specication of the model, coun-
try characteristics and policies which are assumed to a¤ect the interrelation between
infrastructure and output. The main focus in Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) is to
specify both the adjustment to the equilibrium path and the steady-state as func-
tions of country characteristics. However, unlike the present study, the model is
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specied so that the equation for the infrastructure sectors can be estimated in a
reduced form.
The basis of the Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) paper is an augmented Cobb-
Douglas production function, in which infrastructure capital is included among the
inputs and constant returns to scale have been imposed.
ln y =  ln k +  lnn+ (1    ) lnQ (3.1)
where y is aggregate output (Y ) divided by labor (L), k represents non-infrastructure
capital (K) over labor (L), n infrastructure capital (N) divided by labor (L) and
Q indicates all other factors that a¤ect productivity. Q and labor L are treated as
exogenous in this model. Expressing the production function in growth form, one
obtains
y = (1    )q + k + n (3.2)
where i indicates the growth rate of per-capita variable i and q the growth rate
of Q. The accumulation equations for capital and infrastructure are
k = sky=k      l (3.3)
n = sny=n     l
where si is the share of output devoted to the accumulation of input i = k; n,
 is a constant depreciation rate and l is the growth rate of labor. The authors
note that such rates of accumulation "generally depend on institutional and policy
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factors as well as preference and production opportunities in the economy." In the
steady state, the endogenous per-capita variables grow at the same rate, which is
equal to the long-run productivity growth (q).11 From this, the steady state ratios
between infrastructure and output (n=y) and between capital and output (k=y)
are given by si =(q
 +  + l), with i = k; n. In this expression, si represents the
steady-state rate of accumulation of asset i = k; n.
The di¤erence between actual accumulation in sector i (i) and the steady-state
rate of growth (i ) is derived from Equation 3.3 as
i   q
 = siy=i  (q
 +  + l) (3.4)
This di¤erence can be expressed as a function of the gap between the initial and
the steady-state ratio of asset i to output. Firstly, (q +  + l) can be substituted
with si y
=i in Equation 3.4. Then, the right-hand side can be rewritten as (q +
 + l)
h
siy=i
si y
=i   1
i
. Collecting sisi
the equation can be transformed as follows:
i   q
 = (q +  + l)

si
si

y=i
y=i
 
si
si

= (q +  + l)

si
si

i=y
i=y
  1 +
si
si
 
si
si

= (q +  + l)

si
si

Gi +
si   s

i
si

(3.5)
where Gi is the gap between the initial and the steady state ratio between asset
i and output. Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) focus on the case of xed investment
rates (si = s

i ). They note that, even if si=s

i can be approximated as one, si may
11This is obtained from Equation (3.2) when all growth rates are set equal. In addition, it is
assumed that the long-run productivity growth is constant across countries.
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still deviate from si .
While neoclassical models consider this a second-order e¤ect in steady-state,
Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) argue that for an infrastructure sector, deviations
of rates of accumulation in the short-run are important. They argue that asset
imbalances leading, for instance, to service suspension provide strong incentives to
increase the rate of accumulation in the short-run. On this basis, they conclude that
si s

i
si
may be large compared with Gi and therefore cannot be considered negligible.
This consideration implies that, in Equation 3.5, sisi
 1 while the term in the
square brackets remains. Moreover, it is assumed that
si s

i
si
can be approximated as
si s

i
si
= gi(X)Gi for i = k; n. The function gi(X) incorporates the e¤ect of a vector
of variables X, which can also include measures of the e¤ectiveness of institutions
and other country characteristics. When substituting in Equation 3.5 one obtains
(for si  s

i )
i = q
 + (q +  + l)[1 + gi(X)]Gi (3.6)
Therefore, in the neighbourhood of the steady-state, the adjustment rate to asset
imbalances (Gi) for sector i = k; n is given by (q
++ l)[1+gi(X)] and is a function
of country characteristics X. From the denition of Gi and the approximation
Gi  log(1 +Gi) for small Gi,
Gi = log

1 +
i=y
i=y
  1

= log

i
y

  log

i
y

= log

si
q +  + l

  log

i
y

(3.7)
The asset gap can be substituted in Equation 3.6 to give
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i = q
 + (q +  + l)[1 + gi(X)]

log(si )  log(q
 +  + l)  log

i
y

(3.8)
In Equation 3.8 above, the growth rate in asset i = k; n is expressed as the
sum between (a) the long-run rate of growth (q, productivity growth) and (b) the
product between adjustment rate (which depends on various country characteristics)
and the infrastructure gap Gi. In turn, the infrastructure gap depends on the initial
ratio between the asset and output and the factors that determine the long-run
investment rate in the asset (si ). In the empirical formulation of the model, the
function gi(X) is replaced by a linear function of variables X. As can be seen from
Equation 3.8, Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) derive the growth rates for asset sectors
so that they can be estimated in a reduced form.
The growth rates thus obtained for the asset sectors i = k; n can be substituted
into Equation 3.2 to give the growth rate of per capita output. The equation in
Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) is simplied so as to incorporate only one infrastructure
sector n.
y = n + (1  )q
 + (1  )(q   q) + (q +  + l)[1 + gk(X)]Gk (3.9)
In Expression 3.2 above, Gk is the analogous of Equation 3.7 and is a function
of sk, which is assumed to depend on country characteristics as was the case for s

i
in Equation 3.8. Moreover, the function gk(X) is assumed linear in the empirical
part of the paper.
The Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) estimation relies on Equations 3.8 and 3.2. In
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particular, the former is a reduced-form equation and its tted values are inserted
in the latter in place of n. In order to make the equations operational, the au-
thors proxy the unobservable variables si and s

k with the overall investment GDP
ratio and some country-level variables which can a¤ect long-run levels. Regarding
the other steady-state variable, q, this is set equal to the average growth rate of
productivity across countries and time.
Building on Esfahani and Ramirez (2003), we adapt their model to the framework
commonly used in studies on the e¤ectiveness of sector regulators. Firstly, following
Röller and Waverman (2001) and Waverman et al. (2005), the analysis focuses on
the equilibrium path of the variables rather than on their growth rates. Secondly,
the estimation approach di¤ers in that we estimate the equations jointly, while
Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) do not account for the potential feedback e¤ect from
income growth to infrastructure development, as explained above. Thirdly, the panel
dataset used by Esfahani and Ramirez (2003), in line with many growth studies, have
averaged data over ve-year periods, while studies on infrastructure sectors usually
rely on annual data. Finally, given that allowing for endogenous regulatory quality
is among the objectives of the analysis, we also consider an additional equation
in which the dependent variable is the presence of a separate regulator (or other
institutional characteristics of the telecommunications sector) as explained below.
3.3.2 Summary of the Approach
In order to deal with the interactions described above and represented in Figure 3.1,
a system of simultaneous equations is estimated in which the dependent variables
are infrastructure development, per capita income and regulatory governance. This
approach assumes that these variables are endogenous.
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As will be explained in more detail in Section 3.5 below, the basic economet-
ric specication consists of three equations, which have been derived from theory or
from previous empirical studies. In the rst equation, the penetration of telecommu-
nications infrastructure is explained by income, regulatory governance, investment
in telecommunications and other variables. The second equation relates income lev-
els to the penetration of telecommunications, a measure of country institutions and
other variables. Finally, in the third equation, regulatory governance is explained
by income, country institutions and other variables.
Jointly estimating the system of equations presents the advantage of improving
the e¢ciency of the estimates, compared to the results obtained by instrumental
variables estimators on each equation. However, with systems estimation, if the
structure of the model is misspecied any modelling error in any one equation will
be propagated through the system. In consequence, we rst estimate the equations
individually in order to focus on their specication more carefully.
The limitations of the analysis are mainly related to the measurement of the
governance variables. Firstly, in common with other studies (but see a new dataset
in Montoya and Trillas, 2007), regulatory governance is measured on the basis of
formal characteristics of the legal framework, such as the existence of the regulator
and the way it is funded. However, this may not coincide with the actual governance
of the regulatory authority i.e. how the regulator operates and is allowed by the
government to operate - in practice.
Secondly, related to the previous point, in this chapter the only available measure
of regulatory governance for all our countries is a dichotomous variable which takes
value one when a certain characteristic is present (e.g. regulator separate from
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Ministry, autonomous funding) and zero otherwise. This type of variable does not
allow us to quantify di¤erences between countries regulators in any detail. However,
compared to an index-type variable,12 it is more suitable for system estimation.
Thirdly, country institutions are among the explanatory variables in the system.
There is an open question of the potential endogeneity of country institutions. This is
a key and hotly debated theme in the empirical literature on institutions and growth
(Durlauf et al., 2005). In the present study, the issue is addressed by treating the
proxies for country institutions as predetermined for the year in question.13 This
approach is motivated by institutions strong persistence over time, especially in
relation to the limited timeframe of the present sample.
Unlike previous studies on regulatory governance in telecommunications, this
chapter focuses on mobile communications, in order better to tailor the analysis
for low and middle-income countries.14 Given the substantial sunk investments to
deploy the xed network and the chronic waiting lists, mobile phones have proved
formidable substitutes for xed lines in developing countries.
In terms of methodology, the main advantage of this approach is that we estimate
a system of equations rather than a single reduced form equation that is informed
by the underlying economic relationships. This should allow to investigate much
more thoroughly the interactions described above, which perforce are either ignored
or only implicitly modelled in the single equation reduced form model. For instance,
12For example, as explained in Section 3.2, Gutierrez (2003) measures regulatory quality by an
index which includes six di¤erent components, such as whether the regulator is separate from the
Ministry and whether it is independently funded. A similar approach is also followed by Cubbin and
Stern (2006). In both studies, the index of regulatory quality is only an explanatory variable, rather
than a dependent variable as in the present paper. Such indexes typically can take only a discrete
number of values and, therefore, cannot be treated as continuous variables in the estimation. For
this reason, for estimation in a system it is simpler to have a dummy variable rather than the
ordered data that would result from an index.
13For instance, see Rajan and Zingales (1998).
14However, a recent paper by Gasmi et al. (2006) analyses a sample of 29 developing countries
over the period 1985 - 1999 using a single-equation model.
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our approach can shed light on the economic factors that determine the quality of
regulatory governance and, potentially, on mobile telecoms penetration. In particu-
lar, it allows testing whether and how far country general institutions are a driver
of mobile penetration through their indirect e¤ects on infrastructure regulation and
on income levels.
Secondly, a key di¤erence compared with previous papers is that they do not
consider the e¤ect of telecommunications infrastructure on income. The failure to
treat income as endogenous can lead to inconsistency in a reduced-form equation.
The approach proposed in the paper should provide more reliable results by explicitly
allowing for income to be endogenous.
Thirdly, the paper also relates to studies measuring the impact of telecommu-
nications penetration on income. In this respect, this papers contribution is the
explicit inclusion of regulatory governance and country institutions in the frame-
work of analysis, as well as the treatment of regulation as endogenous.15
Finally, the present dataset includes a reasonably large set of developing countries
only (93 countries). Hence, we have a more homogenous group of countries than
in most previous studies. The latter have generally combined both developed and
developing countries and therefore implicitly assume that a common model holds
for very di¤erent countries (e.g. Wallsten (2003) and Waverman et al. (2005) for
the cross-section results).
15Waverman et al. (2005) include a rule of law measure, while Esfahani and Ramirez (2003)
include a dummy for private ownership.
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3.4 Description of the Sample
Our dataset consists of an unbalanced panel of yearly data on 93 low-income and
middle-income countries over the period 1995 to 2004. The main sources for the data
are the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) World Telecommunications
Indicators and the World Development Indicators from the World Bank. This section
describes the main variables, while details on the other variables included in the
analysis are provided in Appendix.
Telecommunications penetration is measured by the number of mobile sub-
scribers per 100 inhabitants, as explained in Appendix 1. In line with other studies
(Gutierrez, 2003; Röller and Waverman, 2001), GDP per capita is measured in con-
stant U.S. dollars.
For regulatory governance, a limited number of indicators have been chosen.
These include: whether (a) the country has passed a framework law for the telecom-
munications sector; (b) the country has established a regulator as a separate entity
from the policy maker;16 and (c) the regulator is not funded by the Governments
budget. In addition, the years since the creation of the regulator are also considered
in order to capture the time necessary to build up sta¤ numbers and competen-
cies and reputation, as in Cubbin and Stern (2006). The indicator for a separate
regulator we construct is conceptually di¤erent from the denition of autonomy in
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU)s database, which is based on
responses from country regulators and therefore on a subjective assessment that the
regulatory agency is independent of the executive and of the industry. We believe
16The year in which the law establishing the regulator was passed may di¤er from the year when
the regulator was actually set up. In most countries in our sample, they coincide. For Belize, it was
not possible to identify the law setting up the regulator.
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that the establishment of a regulatory body is a more objective measure and can be
veried independently, as was done to construct our dataset. Data sources for these
regulatory variables include the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) on-
line database on country and regulators proles,17 Henisz, Zelner and Guillén (2004),
Wallsten et al. (2004)18 and the regulators websites.
The variable for privatization is an indicator which takes value one when the
xed incumbent has been privatized and zero otherwise. Privatization is dened
here as the sale of more than 50% of the incumbents shares by the government.
Similarly, the liberalization dummy takes value one if competition for long-distance
services in the xed market is permitted. Regarding privatization, the data collected
by Henisz, Zelner and Guillén (2004) for the period up to 1999 were updated using
the World Bank Privatization Database and other publications.19 The liberalization
variable was also drawn from Henisz, Zelner and Guillén (2004) and was updated
using case studies from a variety of sources.
The countries considered in the analysis are very diverse, as shown in the sum-
mary statistics in Table 3.1. Even though all the countries in the sample are charac-
terized by the World Bank as low and middle-income, the level of GDP per capita
in constant dollars varies from 156.30 USD to more than 9,000 USD. Similarly, if
we only restrict our attention to the last year in the sample, the number of mobile
subscribers per 100 inhabitants (mobile penetration) ranges from 1 in Niger to 105
in the Czech Republic in 2004.
17http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/proles/guide.asp?lang=en
18http://www.aei-brookings.org/publications/abstract.php?pid=724 Scott Wallsten, George
Clarke, Luke Haggarty, Rosario Kaneshiro, Roger Noll, Mary Shirley, and Lixin Colin Xu. "New
Tools for Studying Network Industry Reforms in Developing Countries: The Telecommunications
and Electricity Regulation Database." AEI-Brookings Joint Center Related Publication 04-05.
March 2004.
19http://rru.worldbank.org/Privatization/
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Mobile penetration (subs. per 100 pop) 921 9.03 15.33 0 105.64
Fixed penetration (subs. per 100 pop) 914 10.79 10.92 0.07 50.48
GDP per capita (US$ 2000) 926 1953.47 1933.19 156.30 9650.72
Share of private credit (%GDP) 925 29.65 27.89 1.38 165.72
Openness (%GDP) 924 82.12 39.20 12.80 228.87
Source: ITU, World Bank
In Table 3.1, and in all the estimated equations, monetary variables are included
on an exchange rate basis, in constant 2000 US dollars, rather than in PPP terms.
This approach follows, for instance, Röller and Waverman (2001), Cubbin and Stern
(2006), Gutierrez (2003), Estache et al. (2006) and the panel data analysis in Wa-
verman et al. (2005).
When looking at the behavior of the variables across time, it appears, not sur-
prisingly, that mobile penetration and GDP per capita, as well as capital and labor
per capita, show an upward trend. Conversely, other variables, such as the index of
political constraints (Polcon), show little variation over time. As explained further
in the next section, we explicitly take into account in the estimation the various con-
siderations on the dynamic behavior of the variables, especially mobile penetration
and GDP per capita.
The variables regarding sector reform are summarized in Figure 3.2, which shows
higher mobile penetration in countries that have implemented di¤erent types of re-
forms (telecommunications law, separate regulator, liberalization of long-distance
services and majority privatization of the incumbent) compared to the others. At
rst glance, this would suggest the reform may have had a positive impact on pene-
tration. However, the di¤erences seem more signicant for liberalization and priva-
tization than for the establishment of a separate regulator.
It is interesting to note that the countries that have reformed the telecommuni-
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Figure 3.2: Mobile penetration, in countries that have and have not implemented
reform, 2004. Source: ITU, regulators websites.
cations sector by 2004 almost coincide with the entire sample. Out of 93 countries,
84 have enacted a law reforming the telecommunications sector and most of them
had done so by year 2000. In theory this could reduce the degree of inter-country
variation needed to identify the e¤ect of regulatory reform; in practice, the time
dimension from the very di¤erent dates at which countries introduced their reforms
could provide the necessary variation to discriminate between countries. However,
this source of identication is limited in this sample by the presence of countries
that have carried out the reform process at the very beginning or at the end of our
sample period. For instance, 54 countries in total have either set up a regulator in
1995-6 or in 2004.
In order to analyze di¤erences across countries in the timing of reform, the age of
the regulator is a good proxy. It also provides an indication of the authoritys sta¤
expertise and reputation, which may be important in addressing the commitment
problem described in the literature section. Figure 3.3 shows a histogram of the age
of the regulator as of 2004, the last year in the sample. The variable indicates the
number of years since the establishment of the regulator, starting with the year after
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the law introducing a regulator was passed.20 The average age is almost 5.5 years
and the median is 5, that is around half the regulators have more than 5 years of
operation.
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of countries by age of regulator, 2004. Source: ITU, regu-
lators websites.
The correlation between the di¤erent elements of regulatory reform is shown
in Table 3.2. However, the correlation between enacting a modern telecom law
and having a separate regulator is high, but weaker than expected. This is due
to a number of countries that do not have a separate regulator even though they
have passed a sector law and vice versa (around one quarter of the sample as of
2004). In addition, around one quarter of the countries that have privatized the
xed incumbent operator have also introduced some liberalization measures in the
long-distance xed telecommunications market, even though the two events have
not necessarily been contemporaneous. In consequence, the degree of correlation
between the regulatory variables that we nd for telecommunications is quite high
but lower than Cubbin and Stern (2006) found in their sample for electricity.
20For instance, the rst group includes countries that do not have a separate regulator or that
passed the law in 2004. The second group includes countries that passed the law establishing the
regulator in 2001 - 2002, i.e. age of the regulator is between 1 and 2 years, and so on.
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Table 3.2: Correlation matrix
Law Separate Reg. Funding Competition Privatization
Telecom Law 1
Separate Regulator 0.5823 1
Independent Funding 0.4631 0.6966 1
Competition 0.3028 0.2160 0.0716 1
Privatization 0.2232 0.2409 0.0203 0.3550 1
The relationship between GDP per capita and the rate of mobile penetration is
crucial to this study and is plotted in Figure 4. The two variables exhibit a positive
correlation, in line with expectations. In addition, the wide variation which was
highlighted in the summary statistics is also clearly visible in the graph. Finally, the
positive relationship is consistent both with (a) GDP driving mobile subscription, a
demand-side e¤ect; and (b) mobile availability and usage increasing GDP, a supply-
side e¤ect.
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Figure 3.4: Correlation between mobile penetration and per capita GDP, 2004.
Source: ITU, World Bank.
3.5 Econometric Methodology
On the basis of the discussion above, the variables that are considered endogenous in
the present analysis are (i) the penetration rate of mobile telecommunications, (ii)
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GDP per capita and (iii) a measure of regulatory governance.21 Hence, we formulate
a three equation model, which consists of an equation describing the behavior of
telecommunications penetration and two further equations for the other potentially
endogenous variables.
The model that we estimate is set out below. In the basic formulation of the
system, it is assumed that the three endogenous variables have an impact only on
the contemporaneous values of other endogenous variables i.e. we assume no lagged
e¤ects. Other restrictions, derived from the previous discussion, are also imposed in
the following equations.
The estimation relies on a panel of countries over time from 1995 to 2004, and
we assume that the parameters of the model are constant both across countries and
over time. This assumption is relaxed in Section 3.7.1.
The penetration of mobile subscribers (PENit) in country i at time t is assumed
to be a function of the other potentially endogenous variables in the system, per
capita income (GDPpcit) and regulatory governance (RGit) and of some exogenous
variables. This gives us the following equation for mobile penetration rates:
lnPENit = 0;i + 1 lnGDPpcit + 2 RGit + 3Privatit + 4Liberalit (I)
+ 5(RGit  Privatit) + 6(RGit  Liberalit) + 7(Privatit  Liberalit)
+ 8Xit + t + "1;it
where Xit is a vector of controls;
22 Privatit is a dummy denoting majority priva-
21The measures of regulatory governance used in the present study are described in the Data
Section above.
22These included various price measures, both for xed and mobile services, the penetration of
xed services, the percentage of rural population, population density and the size of the waiting list
for xed lines.
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tization, and Liberalit is a dummy indicating competition in the long-distance xed
market. In addition, the interaction terms between the variables that represent pol-
icy reforms allow investigating the e¤ects of one component of reform conditional
on the others. 0;i are country-specic e¤ects, t are time dummies and "1;it is an
error term for this rst equation.
In Equation (I), for the reasons discussed in the previous section, the estimated
coe¢cients on lnGDPpcit and RGit are expected to be positive. The e¤ects of xed
line privatization and liberalization are indeterminate. They may have a negative
e¤ect on mobile penetration, as it may be sensible to assume that those reforms
would improve availability and quality of xed services. However, there are also
reasons why the impact could be positive e.g. if one of the mobile operators is part
of a newly commercialized incumbent xed line operator.
The equations describing the other two potentially endogenous variables are:
lnGDPpcit = 0;i + 1Insti;t 1 + 2 lnPENit + 3 lnKit + (II)
4 lnHKit + 5Zit + t + "2;it
RGit = 0;i + 1Insti;t 1 + 2 lnGDPpcit + 3 ln IntlEffectit (III)
+4Privatit + 5Liberalit + t + "3;it
The equation for GDP per head takes the form of an aggregate production func-
tion, in which mobile telecommunications are included as an input, following Röller
and Waverman (2001). In this equation, Insti;t 1 is a proxy for country institu-
tions, HKit is a proxy for human capital measured per capita, Kit is a measure of
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per capita physical capital, Zit is a vector of controls, 0;i are country-specic e¤ects,
t are time dummies and "2;it is an error term. In the model that we estimate, it is
assumed that country institutions are pre-determined. For this reason, we include
in the system Insti;t 1, which pre-date the period of analysis, rather than Insti;t on
the grounds that institutions in previous years cannot be a¤ected by income levels
in subsequent periods (see Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Esfahani and Ramirez, 2003
for previous use of this approach). All variables in Equation (II) are expected to
have a positive e¤ect on income levels.
In Equation (III) regulation is modelled as a dummy variable, which takes the
value of 1 if a given characteristic (e.g. sector law or separate regulator) is present
and zero otherwise. As explained in the previous section, di¤erent measures of good
regulation will be employed in the estimation. We treat regulation as an endogenous
variable in this model, and it is assumed that the choice of whether to have a regu-
latory framework in place depends on country institutions and some other factors.
The other factors that we consider include the country income level (GDPpcit) and
pressure by international organizations (e.g. conditionality conditions imposed by in-
ternational nancial institutions), as proxied by multilateral lending (IntlEffectit).
"3;it is the error term for Equation (III).
The functional form of the third equation is a linear probability model. While
this model does not constrain predicted values to lie in the interval between 0 and
1 (Greene, 2003), it is particularly suitable for estimation in a multi-equation sys-
tem. In order to alleviate the potential problem of out-of-range estimates, we check
predicted probabilities after estimation to verify that they belong within the correct
interval.23
23However, we test whether a logit model would produce similar results. These are reported in
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As we have a panel data set, we initially include country-specic xed e¤ects in
all three equations. In most of the analysis, the xed e¤ects model was considered
the basis for the estimates, as is very often the case with models like Equation (I) and
(II). The xed e¤ects model is less restrictive in its underlying assumptions than the
random e¤ects model in that it allows for correlation between the regressors and the
country-specic unobserved e¤ect. Country-specic heterogeneity, including omitted
variables, is captured by the xed e¤ects. However, this removal of heterogeneity
across countries may also be a limitation, as highlighted by Pritchett (2000) and
Durlauf et al. (2005). In the context of the analysis of income di¤erences, some
important variables (e.g. country governance) a¤ecting income show very little
variation over time within a given country and, given that the xed e¤ects estimator
only uses "within variation", the e¤ects of these variables cannot be identied.
Related to this general point, in our sample the policy variables are constant
throughout the sample for the majority of countries. For this reason, their co-
e¢cients cannot be identied separately from the country-specic xed e¤ect in
Equation (I). Therefore we cannot restrict the estimation to a xed e¤ects model
and we report results from the pooled OLS estimator, the random e¤ects model and
the xed e¤ects model, where the latter is estimated on the subsample of countries
for which "separate regulator", the main policy variable of interest, shows some
variation.
For the other equations, the within estimator is the preferred methodology. We
estimate the equations jointly by 3SLS in order to allow for the possibility that
errors are correlated, for instance due to unobserved shocks a¤ecting both income
and mobile penetration.
Appendix.
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3.6 Results
This section is divided into two main parts. In the rst part, we report results for
each equation estimated separately and, in the second part, we show the system
estimates.
The results obtained estimating each equation separately are reported in order
to provide a better insight on the data and also to explore the specication of the
equations before the joint estimation of the system.
3.6.1 Equation-by-Equation Estimates: Equation I
The results for the penetration of mobile services (Equation I) are shown in Table 3.3.
The specications shown provide estimates from pooled OLS (Column 1), random
e¤ects (Column 2) and xed e¤ects models (Column 3). All columns include time
dummies to take account of any common cross-country time period e¤ects. The
reported standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.24
In addition, the pooled OLS model includes continent dummies. The xed e¤ects
model is estimated for a subset of countries for which RGit exhibits some within-
country variation.25
Evidence regarding the two main explanatory variables, lnGDPpc and RG, is
mixed. In the pooled OLS and the random e¤ects models, GDP per capita has a
positive signicant coe¢cient, while it is not signicant in the xed e¤ects model.
This seems to indicate that the heterogeneity across countries, as represented by
di¤erent income levels, is absorbed by the xed e¤ects, while within country variation
24This adjustment follows the result in Wooldridge (2002). It allows both for heteroscedasticity
and for correlation across observations for the same country.
25The subsample excludes the countries for which the dummy "separate regulator" does not
change across time or only one period di¤ers from the others (i.e. the regulator was established in
the second year of the sample or in the last one).
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Table 3.3: Mobile Penetration - Basic Specication
POLS RE FE
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: lnPEN
Independent Variables
lnGDPpcit 1.121*** 1.274*** 0.042
(0.105) (0.093) (1.774)
RGit 0.175 0.055 -0.415*
(0.191) (0.161) (0.208)
Privatit 0.228 0.415* 0.172
(0.298) (0.223) (0.286)
Liberalit 1.047** 0.718 -0.033
(0.456) (0.480) (0.703)
RGit  Privatit 0.359 -0.160 -0.519*
(0.349) (0.268) (0.285)
RGit  Liberalit -1.052** -0.604 0.056
(0.449) (0.445) (0.589)
Privatit  Liberalit -0.451 -0.495* -0.629
(0.375) (0.285) (0.391)
lnPriceMobileit 0.069 0.098* 0.044
(0.069) (0.056) (0.095)
lnFaultsit -0.063** -0.022 -0.015
(0.032) (0.025) (0.047)
Constant -10.298*** -10.846*** -2.923
(0.851) (0.825) (11.809)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Corrected std. errors Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.856 0.840 0.893
Countries 69 69 38
Observations 315 315 168
Note: Standard errors in brackets under coe¢cients. Corrected std. errors are robust to het-
eroscedasticity and serial correlation. The model in Column 1 also includes continent dummies. In
Column 3, the sample includes only countries for which RG varies across time.
provided by such di¤erent income levels plays a more limited role, as indicated by
an insignicant coe¢cient in the xed e¤ects model.
Most of the coe¢cients on the policy variables are not signicant and the same
holds for the interactions between them. Moreover, when interactions are signicant
they have a negative coe¢cient. For instance, in Column 1 the negative coe¢cient
on RGit Liberalit indicates that, conditional on the liberalization of the xed mar-
ket, the establishment of a separate regulator is associated on average with lower
mobile penetration. The insignicant or negative coe¢cients on the interaction
terms question the commonly held assumption that there are additional benets in
a reform process encompassing the establishment of a regulator, privatization and
liberalization.
Other controls in Equation (I) were generally not signicant. In addition to the
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regressors shown in the table, the signicance of various price indicators for xed
and mobile services was investigated, but these variables were not found to be signif-
icant except for the price of a 3-minute peak mobile call in the random e¤ects model
(Column 2).26 This result contrasts with what was found by Röller and Waverman
(2001) and Waverman et al. (2005). However, in these papers prices are dened as
average revenues (i.e. revenues divided by the number of subscribers) rather than
average market prices faced by consumers. A negative relationship between average
revenue per user and market penetration is expected, as mobile operators target less
lucrative customer groups as the market matures. This phenomenon is common to
mobile markets in developed countries, e.g. in Europe, where operators try to coun-
terbalance ARPU (average revenue per user) declines from traditional voice services
with high-value services such as mobile broadband. Given this, the logarithms of
average revenues were used instead of prices in the estimation of Equation I. Both
xed and mobile revenue per subscribers were found signicant, as in the above cited
papers. Despite their signicance, these variables were not included in the chosen
specication due to their limited availability, which would have reduced sample size
signicantly, and because of endogeneity concerns.
The waiting list for a connection to the xed network and the number of reported
faults were also considered among the regressors, as they may both encourage poten-
tial users to subscribe to the mobile network rather than the xed network. However,
they were not signicant except for the number of faults per 100 xed lines in the
pooled OLS model (Column 1).
Similarly, population density and the percentage of rural population were in-
26Logarithm of the average price of a 3-minute mobile call (peak time) in US$ 2000. Details on
the other variables are provided in Appendix.
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cluded to incorporate country characteristics that may a¤ect the cost of coverage
for mobile operators. For instance, the impact of rural population may incorporate
two opposite considerations: on the demand side, a high percentage of rural popu-
lation may increase penetration due to the appeal of mobile telephony in areas not
easily reached by the xed network; on the supply side, rural areas are less densely
populated than cities and therefore more expensive to cover for mobile operators.
Both variables were not signicant.
As explained in Section 3.5, the xed e¤ects model does not allow exploiting the
"between" variation. Given that, in the present sample the policy variables do not
vary over time for most of the countries, we cannot rely on the within estimator.
For this reason, in what follows we focus on estimates from a pooled OLS model
which incorporates dummies for the di¤erent continents (Table 3.4, Columns 1-3)
and a random e¤ects model (Table 3.4, Columns 4-6).
Table 3.4 shows the coe¢cients in Equation (I) re-estimated omitting insignif-
icant variables (Columns 1 and 4).27 Given that robust standard errors are not
available for the system estimation, we also check whether this adjustment a¤ects
the signicance of the estimates (Columns 2 and 5). Moreover, in order to investi-
gate the e¤ect of treating lnGDPpc as an endogenous variable in a single-equation
context, Equation (I) was re-estimated using two-stage least squares, where the in-
struments were given by the right-hand side variables in Equation (II) (in addition
to all the exogenous variables in Equation I). These instrumental variable estimates
provide an intermediate step between the results in Columns 2 and 5, and the full
system estimates. In Table 3.4, the instruments for the endogenous variables are
27Policy variables are still included even when they are not signicant, while faults in the xed
network and the price of a mobile call are removed because their inclusion reduces sample size by
more than 550 observations, i.e. sample size increases by almost 65% when they are excluded.
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Table 3.4: Mobile Penetration - Signicant Variables
POLS POLS POLS - IV RE RE RE - IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent Variables
lnGDPpcit 1.100*** 1.100*** 1.160*** 1.257*** 1.257*** 1.264***
(0.085) (0.036) (0.047) (0.079) (0.067) (0.082)
RGit 0.312** 0.312*** 0.323*** 0.110 0.110 0.111
(0.148) (0.080) (0.080) (0.099) (0.080) (0.080)
Privatit 0.418** 0.418*** 0.410*** 0.395** 0.395*** 0.396***
(0.159) (0.098) (0.099) (0.148) (0.115) (0.116)
Liberalit 0.830** 0.830*** 0.819*** 0.431 0.431* 0.439*
(0.289) (0.161) (0.161) (0.252) (0.194) (0.194)
RGit  Liberalit -0.888** -0.888*** -0.896*** -0.498* -0.498* -0.506*
(0.247) (0.173) (0.174) (0.252) (0.196) (0.197)
Privatit  Liberalit -0.210 -0.210 -0.209 -0.621** -0.621*** -0.617***
(0.284) (0.160) (0.162) (0.192) (0.160) (0.160)
Constant -10.427*** -10.427*** -11.798*** -11.143*** -11.143*** -11.200***
(0.565) (0.256) (0.322) (0.577) (0.481) (0.580)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Corrected std. errors Yes No No Yes No No
R-squared 0.853 0.853 0.851 0.834 0.834 0.833
Countries 93 93 93 93 93 93
Observations 881 881 876 881 881 876
Note: Standard errors in brackets under coe¢cients. Corrected std. errors are robust to het-
eroscedasticity and serial correlation. In Columns 1 to 3, continent dummies are included in the
model. In Columns 3 and 6, lnGDPpc is treated as endogenous variable and the instruments are
the regressors in Equation 2, in addition to all the exogenous variables in Equation 1.
only the exogenous variables while, in the system (Table 3.8), the regressors include
also the endogenous variables in order to take account of feedback e¤ects.
Columns 1 - 3 provide results for the estimation of Equation (I) using pooled
OLS, after the removal of the insignicant policy interactions, of the price of mobile
peak calls and of the share of faults out of xed lines. While the latter variable was
signicant using the pooled OLS estimator (Table 3.3, Column 1), it was available
only for a limited number of countries and therefore reduced the sample size by
more than 20 countries and 550 observations. For this reason, and to improve
comparability with the random e¤ects estimates, it was removed from the equation.
The main di¤erence between Column 1 and Table 3.3 (Column 1) is given by the
signicant coe¢cient on the regulatory governance and of the majority privatization
dummy. Moreover, Column 2 shows that the adjustment to the standard errors
of the coe¢cients does not a¤ect much their signicance. Finally, the coe¢cient
on lnGDPpcitincreases when it is treated as endogenous in Column 3. The same
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Table 3.5: Marginal E¤ects on Ln Mobile Penetration
POLS RE
RGit Liberalit Privatit RGit Liberalit Privatit
Coe¢cient 0.131 0.260 0.365 0.002 0.007 0.264
Standard error 0.072 0.092 0.086 0.078 0.109 0.104
p-value 0.071 0.005 0.000 0.974 0.948 0.011
Note: Marginal e¤ects calculated from the IV estimates (Columns 3 and 6).
specication was also estimated using the random e¤ects model (Columns 4 - 6).
Unlike the OLS model, the RGitdummy remains not signicant even after removing
the adjustment to the standard errors (Column 5). As in Column 3, when the
equation is estimated by 2SLS the coe¢cient on lnGDPpcit in the random e¤ects
model increases (Column 6).
In order to understand better the impact of the policy variables, marginal e¤ects
are computed.28 Marginal e¤ects are computed from Columns 3 (pooled OLS with
continent dummies) and 6 (RE) to provide a better comparison with the system
estimates. Marginal e¤ects are found to be signicantly di¤erent from zero in the
pooled OLS estimator, while only privatization is signicant when the model is
estimated by random e¤ects (Table 3.5).
As explained in Section 3.4, other proxies for regulatory governance were consid-
ered. The marginal e¤ects of the telecommunications law, of the age of the regulator
and of the independent funding of the regulator (i.e. autonomous from the govern-
ment budget29) were insignicant in all the specications shown in Table 3.4.
Finally, as a check, additional specications of Equation (I) were estimated: (a)
a exible formulation in which the coe¢cients were allowed to vary for low-income
and middle-income countries; (b) a dynamic equation; and (c) a longer time period
28The marginal e¤ect was calculated by taking the derivative of Equation (I) with respect to
the variable of interest and evaluating the derivative at the sample mean. We then tested the null
hypothesis that the derivative was zero.
29This is a commonly used measure of independence. However, it should be noted that indepen-
dent funding implies that the regulator relies on the industry for its funding. In small markets, this
may not be synonymous with independence.
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Table 3.6: Income Equation
Polcon Share of credit
POLS RE FE POLS RE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent Variables
Insti;t 1 -0.121 -0.002 -0.013 0.189 0.057 0.053
(0.185) (0.033) (0.033) (0.052)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)***
lnPENit 0.336 0.028 0.022 0.261 0.028 0.021
(0.102)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.088)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)***
lnKit 0.418 0.400 0.293 0.442 0.420 0.272
(0.158)*** (0.058)*** (0.038)*** (0.152)*** (0.059)*** (0.060)***
lnHKit -0.821 -0.226 -0.198 -0.700 -0.260 -0.267
(0.256)*** (0.195) (0.203) (0.253)*** (0.183) (0.191)
lnOpennessit -0.158 0.104 0.099 -0.163 0.091 0.091
(0.076)** (0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.078)** (0.028)*** (0.029)***
Constant 4.164 3.139 4.120 3.353 2.859 4.108
(1.354)*** (0.446)*** (0.355)*** (1.195)*** (0.434)*** (0.492)***
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Corrected std. errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.80 0.70 0.57 0.82 0.74 0.57
Countries 92 92 92 93 93 93
Observations 797 797 797 802 802 802
Note: Standard errors in brackets under coe¢cients. Corrected std. errors are robust to het-
eroscedasticity and serial correlation.
(15 years) for which data was available for a subset of countries. The results are
reported in Section 3.7 below.
3.6.2 Equation-by-Equation Estimates: Equation II
The results for the GDP per capita production function are shown in Table 3.6. We
estimate this equation taking as proxy measures of the quality of country governance
both (a) the Polcon index described in the data section and (b) the logarithm of the
share of credit to the private sector to GDP. All explanatory variables are consid-
ered exogenous and year dummies are included. Results from pooled OLS, random
e¤ects and xed e¤ects estimators are provided, and standard errors are robust to
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
The coe¢cient of the impact of mobile penetration on GDP per capita is positive
and signicant in all specications, as expected and as found in Waverman et al.
(2005). Its size decreases signicantly when panel data estimators, rather than OLS,
are used. Compared to Waverman et al. (2005), who obtain an estimate of 0.075 in
their panel data model, the magnitude of our estimate (0.021 - 0.028) in the panel
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models is signicantly smaller.30
The variables used as proxies for country governance produce mixed results.
When Polcon is used as a proxy for country institutions it is never signicant, while
the development of nancial markets is signicant at the 1% level in all specications.
The signicance of the credit variable is in line with the literature on nancial
markets and growth (see Levine (2005) for a review). Regarding the impact of
Polcon, it should be noted that is a measure of constraints on the executive power
in a given country. In the study, it was assumed that this was also an indirect
measure of the constraints to the expropriation of private property by the executive
power. However, this assumption is probably not very robust and Polcon does not
show any correlation with income levels.
As in the previous section, the model was estimated without adjusting the stan-
dard errors in order to provide comparability with the results from the system ap-
proach. This was carried out using the xed e¤ects estimator which, for Equation
(II), does not su¤er from the lack of variability in a regressor (RGit) described
above for the penetration equation. When the standard errors are not adjusted, all
variables are signicant at the 1% level.
Moreover, as a check on the importance of country institutions, the Kaufmann
et al. (2006) indexes of rule of law and quality of governance were also considered.
These variables are only available for even years from 1996 to 2004 and, for this
reason, Equation (II) was estimated for those 5 years rather than for the whole 10-
year period. For both indexes, the coe¢cient on institutions in a xed e¤ects model
30The results are not directly comparable, as Waverman et al. (2005) do not include country-
specic e¤ects. In addition, they transform penetration as PEN / (35 - PEN). Finally, Waverman
et al. (2005) prefer the estimates from the cross-section model, which implies that if, in a given
country, there were one additional mobile phone for 100 people the country would experience a per
capita GDP growth higher by 0.059 percent.
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was signicant at the 1% level and was comparable to the coe¢cient on institutions
in Columns 5-6, Table 3.6. While this is a very crude check, it conrms the signicant
e¤ect of country institutions on income levels.
Finally, a methodological issue arises from the choice of the time horizon in
the GDP equation. The theoretical models that inform empirical studies generally
address the question of steady-state growth. As a result, empirical growth studies
have traditionally used cross-sections of countries, where data for each country were
averaged over long periods of time. However, the estimation of growth models relies
increasingly on panels where data have been averaged over ve or ten years. This
raises the question of whether it is appropriate to use long-run models to interpret
short intervals of data (Levine, 2005; Durlauf, Johnson and Temple, 2005) and this
potential pitfall seems even more acute if annual data are used. This is an open
question in the empirical growth literature and needs to be weighed against the
advantages of using panels, possibly in dynamic specications that help distinguish
short-run from long-run e¤ects, rather than country cross-sections.
3.6.3 Equation-by-Equation Estimates: Equation III
The estimates of Equation (III) for the presence or absence of a telecommunications
regulator are reported in Table 3.7. They provide no evidence of any systematic
link between country institutions and regulatory governance. This is counter to the
results in Gual and Trillas (2006). However, we conrm their nding that Polcon
(which we interpret as an index of the checks and balances in the political system
of a given country) is not signicant in a model explaining a measure of regulatory
quality.
The specications shown in Table 3.7 (Equation III) compare estimates from
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Table 3.7: Regulatory Governance Equation
Polcon Share of credit
POLS RE POLS RE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent Variables
lnGDPpcit -0.052 -0.014 -0.068 -0.028
(0.040) (0.035) (0.043) (0.040)
Insti;t 1 0.253 0.081 0.035 0.036
(0.179) (0.139) (0.046) (0.047)
Privatit 0.159* 0.188** 0.157* 0.192**
(0.090) (0.091) (0.088) (0.091)
Liberalit 0.180* 0.267*** 0.169 0.259**
(0.104) (0.080) (0.104) (0.082)
Privatit  Liberalit -0.242 -0.247** -0.206 -0.235**
(0.152) (0.107) (0.159) (0.108)
ln Internationalit -0.008 0.002 -0.011 0.001
(0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026)
Constant 0.567 0.304 0.654* 0.326
(0.304) (0.249) (0.302) (0.252)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Corrected std. errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.27 0.19 0.26 0.19
Countries 91 91 91 91
Observations 808 808 807 807
Note: Standard errors in brackets under coe¢cients. Corrected std. errors are robust to het-
eroscedasticity and serial correlation. Columns (1) and (3) also include dummies for continents.
a pooled OLS model, where dummies for continents are also included, and a ran-
dom e¤ects model. As explained above, because of the lack of variability in the
dummy indicating regulatory governance, we did not estimate a xed e¤ects model.
Moreover, all columns include time dummies and standard errors are robust to het-
eroscedasticity and serial correlation. After estimation, tted values were computed
and it was veried that they belonged to the interval between 0 and 1.31
As with Polcon (Columns 1 - 2), the share of private credit over GDP (Columns
3 - 4) does not have any statistically signicant impact on the establishment of a
separate regulator.32
The equation is relatively unsuccessful in explaining the presence of a telecommu-
31For the pooled OLS model in Column 3, this occurs for 95% of the predicted values. In addition,
tted values are compared with the actual values of separate. When there is a separate regulator
(i.e. separate = 1), the model correctly predicts the existence of a separate regulator in about 71%
of observations (i.e. the tted values are between a threshold value, which we set at 0.5, and 1).
When there is not a separate regulator (i.e. separate = 0), the tted values are between 0 and the
threshold value of 0.5 for 68% of the observations.
32As for Equation II, the Kaufman et al. indexes of rule of law and quality of governance were also
considered as proxies for country institutions. Their signicance was checked in a sample consisting
of even years only, due to limitations to the variables0availability. Even in a xed e¤ects model,
both had positive and signicant coe¢cients at the 10% level, which contradicts the results obtained
with the other two indicators.
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nications regulator.33 The only signicant variables, once time dummies are included
in the model, are the dummies indicating the liberalization of long-distance xed
services and the majority privatization of the incumbent. The positive coe¢cients
on other policy reforms are expected and are consistent with the fact that telecom
regulators are frequently established as part of a package with liberalization and
privatization.
As a further check on the signicance of the regressors, a panel logit model
including the same variables as Table 3.7 was estimated. It conrmed that the only
signicant variables were the policy variables and their interaction. The estimates
from the logit model are reported in Appendix.
Finally, given that standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and serial cor-
relation are not available for the system, Equation III was re-estimated without
adjusting the standard errors. This a¤ected greatly the signicance of the regressors
and all coe¢cients became signicant, except for the proxy for multilateral lending
(ln Internationalit). Given these contradictory results on the specication of Equa-
tion III, all regressors were included in the model for joint estimation in the system,
as reported below.
3.6.4 System Estimates
The system of simultaneous equations given by Equations (I) - (III) was estimated by
three-stage least squares, where all right-hand variables were considered exogenous,
33The model in Column 1 was also estimated for the other variables used as indicators of reg-
ulatory governance. When the dependent variable was the dummy indicating that a telecommu-
nications law was passed in the country, the coe¢cient on liberalization was signicant at the 1%
level. The liberalization indicator was also the only signicant regressor, at the 10% level, when
the dummy for the funding of the regulator was the dependent variable, and it was not signicant
at all when the model in Column 3 was estimated.
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Table 3.8: System Estimates
Dependent Variables: lnPENit lnGDPpcit RGit
(1) (2) (3)
lnGDPpcit 1.076*** lnPENit 0.006 lnGDPpcit -0.080***
(0.036) (0.016) (0.021)
RGit 0.782*** Insti;t 1 0.057*** Insti;t 1 0.054**
(0.104) (0.008) (0.022)
Privatit 0.352*** lnHKit -0.338** Privatit 0.167***
(0.083) (0.108) (0.048)
Liberalit 0.977*** lnKit 0.258*** Liberalit 0.141**
(0.173) (0.035) (0.054)
RGit  Liberalit -1.266*** lnOpennessit 0.086*** Privatit  Liberalit -0.186*
(0.204) (0.016) (0.080)
ln Internationalit -0.009
(0.016)
Constant -5.939*** - 1.212***
(0.273) (0.160)
Fixed E¤ects Continent Country Continent
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.845 0.997 0.260
Countries 92 92 92
Observations 780 780 780
Note: Standard errors in brackets under coe¢cients. The proxy for institutions is nancial markets
development, i.e. the share of credit to the private sector on GDP. Columns (1) and (3) include
dummies for continents.
except for the interactions between the regulatory dummy and liberalization.34 In
Equation (I), the insignicant interactions between policy variables were left out of
the model.
The results are presented in Table 3.8.35 Time dummies are included in all equa-
tions, while xed e¤ects are only included in Equation II and the other two equations
incorporate continent dummies, as in previous sections, to allow the identication
of the e¤ect of regulatory governance RGit.
In the rst column, the signs and signicance of the coe¢cients conrm broadly
the results obtained for the penetration equation when all variables are considered
exogenous (Table 3.4).Moreover, all policy variables have signicant marginal e¤ects
(Table 3.9) as in the single-equation counterpart of the pooled OLS model (Table
34 It was veried that each equation satised the order condition and that the system passed the
rank condition.
35 In the system results reported in Table 8, around 95% of the predicted values from the regulation
equation are inside the 0 - 1 interval. In addition, as for the single equation case, it was checked how
many times the model correctly predicted the outcome. When the dummy for a separate regulator
was 1, the model predicted the correct values 65% of the times. When separate regulator was equal
to 0, it was correctly predicted only for 45% of the observations.
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Table 3.9: Marginal E¤ects
RGit Liberalit Privatit
Coe¢cient 0.511 0.257 0.351
Standard error 0.090 0.090 0.083
p-value 0.000 0.004 0.000
Note: Marginal e¤ects are calculated from the penetration equation.
(3.5).
Similarly, in the GDP equation in Column 2, most coe¢cients are in line with
the single-equation results (Table 3.6). A major di¤erence is given by the coe¢-
cient on mobile penetration in Table 3.8, which is insignicant once the feedback
e¤ect between income and mobile penetration is taken into account. This result
also contradicts the ndings on the positive e¤ect of mobile phones in Waverman et
al. (2005) whose model, however, di¤ers from the present specication of the GDP
equation in that it does not include country-specic xed e¤ects. Interestingly, when
a longer time period is considered (for a subset of countries) while still relying on
a system of three equations, this nding is reversed and the coe¢cient on mobile
penetration becomes signicant (Section 3.7). While this discrepancy may be an
indication that a longer time period matters to detect such an e¤ect or that the
sample in Section 3.7 includes countries in which the mobile market is more devel-
oped, it also highlights the di¢culties in disentangling causality within the present
framework.
Finally, in the last equation to explain the presence or absence of an indepen-
dent regulator (Column 3), most variables are signicant. In particular, the proxy
for country governance has a positive e¤ect on the establishment of a separate reg-
ulator. The liberalization of xed services and the privatization of the incumbent
are also associated with higher probability that the country establishes a separate
regulator. Modelling the development of economic institutions in general is di¢cult
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(e.g. see examples in Acemoglu et al., 2005). In particular, regarding telecom-
munications regulatory agencies, Gual and Trillas (2006) study this issue using a
cross-section of countries, as explained above, focusing more on between country
heterogeneity compared to the present setting. This aspect of the analysis needs
further consideration.
3.7 Alternative Specications
In this section, some alternative specications for Equation I are presented. Firstly,
coe¢cients are allowed to vary for low-income and middle-income countries, exploit-
ing the large number of countries available in the sample. Secondly, a dynamic
model for Equation I is estimated. Finally, for a subsample of countries a longer
time interval is considered.
3.7.1 Flexible Formulation of Equation 1 by Income Level
The sample used in the present study comprises a large number of countries which,
although they are all classied by the World Bank as low and middle-income coun-
tries, show a large variation in income, as described in Section 3.4. For this reason,
the sample was split into two subsamples, consisting of low-income and of middle-
income countries, and interactions between all variables and a dummy for countries
with low GDP per capita were included in Equation I.36 As before, the equation
was rst estimated individually in order to better focus on its specication. Only
signicant variables in the single equation were kept for estimation of the system,
while the other two equations were unchanged compared to previous sections. The
36An alternative formulation would have been to interact the variables directly with per capita
GDP.
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Table 3.10: System Estimates: Interactions with Income
Dependent Variables: lnPENit lnGDPpcit RGit
(1) (2) (3)
lnGDPpcit 1.078*** lnPENit -0.018 lnGDPpcit -0.079***
(0.039) (0.011) (0.021)
RGit 0.695*** Insti;t 1 0.061*** Insti;t 1 0.051*
(0.106) (0.008) (0.022)
Privatit 0.265** lnHKit -0.420*** Privatit 0.166***
(0.128) (0.099) (0.048)
Liberalit 1.262*** lnKit 0.238*** Liberalit 0.143**
(0.201) (0.033) (0.055)
RGit  Liberalit -1.396*** lnOpennessit 0.083*** Privatit  Liberalit -0.185*
(0.207) (0.017) (0.081)
Privatit  Liberalit -0.305 ln Internationalit -0.010
(0.215) (0.016)
lowPrivatit 0.143
(0.177)
lowLiberalit -0.283
(0.193)
lowPrivatit  Liberalit 1.254***
(0.356)
Constant - - -
Fixed E¤ects Continent Country Continent
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.851 0.997 0.260
Countries 92 92 92
Observations 780 780 780
Note: Standard errors in brackets under coe¢cients. The proxy for institutions is nancial markets
development, i.e. the share of credit to the private sector on GDP.
results for the system are presented in Table 3.10.
Most coe¢cients in Columns 2 and 3 are similar to those obtained in Table 3.8.
In the penetration equation, the coe¢cients on the policy variables vary compared
to the basic formulation due to the inclusion of interactions with the low income
dummy. Regarding the other variables, the results from this alternative specication
conrm the positive e¤ect of GDP per capita on mobile penetration. In addition, as
in Subsection 6.4, we nd no evidence that higher mobile penetration is associated
to higher GDP per capita, once the feedback e¤ect of GDP on penetration is taken
into account.
The marginal e¤ects of the policy variables are reported in Table 3.11. Con-
cerning regulation, this more exible specication highlights di¤erences between
low-income and middle-income countries. The coe¢cient on the separate regulator
is higher for low-income countries which suggests that the role of a separate regu-
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Table 3.11: Marginal E¤ects by Income Level
All Sample Low Income Middle Income
RGit Liberalit Privatit RGit Liberalit Privatit RGit Liberalit Privatit
Coe¢cient 0.396 0.396 0.200 0.487 0.299 0.549 0.311 0.387 0.181
Standard error 0.090 0.123 0.109 0.093 0.125 0.119 0.089 0.117 0.107
p-value 0.000 0.001 0.067 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.089
lator is more important for less-developed markets, where a credible framework for
interconnection, coverage and quality of service is crucial to ensure service avail-
ability. In more developed markets, other factors may be relevant in explaining the
penetration of mobile services. In particular, reforms in the xed telecommunica-
tions sector suggest a more competitive and developed xed market, which may act
as a competitive constraint on mobile operators. Moreover, due to data availability,
this model does not incorporate competition in the mobile market itself, which may
be a major factor in explaining penetration.
3.7.2 Dynamics in Mobile Penetration
The specication proposed so far is static while, similarly to the models estimated
in the growth literature, it may be argued that the penetration of mobile phones
in the current period is a¤ected by penetration in previous periods. For instance,
Gutierrez (2003) and Cubbin and Stern (2006) nd evidence that the lags of the
dependent variable have signicant and large coe¢cients. This formulation assumes
that the impact of past values of the regressors is persistent and is captured by the
coe¢cient on the lagged dependent variable.
For this reason, we specify the following dynamic model, which includes the
variables that were found to be signicant in the analysis above in addition to the
lagged dependent variable.
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lnPENit = 0;i + 1 lnPENi;t 1 + 1 lnGDPpcit + 2 RGit + 3Privatit (3.10)
+4Liberalit + 5(RGit  Liberalit) + 6(Privatit  Liberalit) + t + "1;it
When the number of time periods is small (T = 10 in our sample), the standard
xed e¤ects estimator of a dynamic model is biased.37 This is due to the correlation
between the lags of the dependent variable and the error term in the model. For
this reason, as in Gutierrez (2003), the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator is used
in order to overcome the bias created by the introduction of lagged values of the
dependent variable in Equation 3.10.
We report the results from the Arellano-Bond estimator in Table 3.12, once
insignicant coe¢cients have been removed. As this model cannot be readily in-
corporated within a linear system, we only report single equation estimates. In the
rst column, all variables are treated as exogenous except for the lagged dependent
variable. In addition, lnGDPpcit is considered endogenous in the second column,
while in the third RGit is also endogenous.
Compared with previous estimates obtained from the pooled OLS and random
e¤ects models, the coe¢cients on the policy variables are not signicant and the
coe¢cient on GDP per capita, when signicant, is smaller. Therefore, the lagged
dependent variable appears to incorporate the impact of past values of the right-
hand variables, apart from GDP per capita in Column 1. This result raises the issue
of a better dynamic specication of the penetration equation. However, once the
lagged dependent variable is included, lags of the policy variables are insignicant.
37Nickell (1981) nds that, in an autoregressive model of order 1, if the coe¢cient on the lag of
the dependent variable is 0.5 the bias is -0.167 (assuming 10 time periods).
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Table 3.12: Dynamic Specication
All Exogenous GDPpc Endog. GDPpc and RG Endog.
(1) (2) (3)
Independent Variables
lnPENi;t 1 0.849*** 0.824*** 0.815***
(0.067) (0.069) (0.067)
lnGDPpcit 0.981* 1.034 0.834
(0.473) (0.888) (0.776)
RGit -0.065 -0.102 -0.162
(0.091) (0.083) (0.119)
Liberalit 0.076 0.053 0.092
(0.134) (0.128) (0.137)
Privatit 0.027 0.032 0.046
(0.108) (0.103) (0.107)
RGit  Liberalit -0.166 -0.175 -0.141
(0.104) (0.098) (0.129)
Privatit  Liberalit -0.066 -0.094 -0.146
(0.117) (0.121) (0.128)
Constant 0.021 0.098 0.114
(0.037) (0.072) (0.071)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Wald test 328.44 338.08 392.08
2nd order serial correlation -0.89 -0.85 -0.77
p-value 0.376 0.396 0.439
Countries 93 93 93
Observations 693 693 693
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets under coe¢cients. The lagged dependent variable is
treated as endogenous in all columns. The Arellano-Bond test for 2nd order serial correlation fails
to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the residuals.
As a check, the model was estimated by xed e¤ects to verify whether the co-
e¢cient on lagged penetration in Table 3.12 was in the correct range. The xed
e¤ects estimate (0.612) provides a lower bound for the coe¢cient and therefore our
Arellano-Bond estimates are consistent with this result. Moreover, compared with
Gutierrez (2003), who estimates the model for xed line penetration, the coe¢cient
on the lagged dependent variable is pretty similar (Gutierrez nds 0.7748 and 0.7287
depending on the specication) but the coe¢cient on GDP per capita is insigni-
cant in this model, once its endogeneity is taken into account.38 Finally, it should
be noted that the Arellano-Bond estimator addresses the endogeneity of the lagged
dependent variable under the assumption of a small number of time periods and
a number of cross-sections going to innity.39 Therefore, the results obtained by
38Gutierrez (2003) treats liberalization, privatization and regulation as predetermined variables.
39 In their article, Arellano and Bond (1991) apply the estimator to an unbalanced panel of 140
companies over at least 7 periods.
Recognizing the importance for applied work of panels where the cross-section and time dimen-
sions are of similar size, Alvarez and Arellano (2003) investigate the properties of the estimator
when they both go to innity. However, their focus is the exploration of panels with larger T rather
than with smaller N. In addition, concerns on the small sample properties of the Arellano-Bond
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Gutierrez (2003) should be treated with caution, given that the Arellano-Bond es-
timator has not been proven to be consistent for datasets with a small number of
cross-sections, as in Gutierrez (2003).40
While the results from the dynamic specication of Equation (I) indicate the
importance of taking dynamics into account, there is a question of whether this
setting is appropriate to deal with the interrelationships between variables that this
study aims to analyse. Restricting the estimation to a single equation would still
allow to treat some variables as endogenous, but not to incorporate any feedback
e¤ects. Moreover, in the Arellano-Bond estimator the size of the instruments matrix
can increase very quickly with the number of endogenous or predetermined variables,
leading to poor identication. This risk would need to be carefully weighed when
choosing the lag structure for the model and for the instruments.
3.7.3 Longer Time Period
As a further check, the same model in Section 3.5 was re-estimated over a longer
period. For this purpose, a subsample of 30 countries was selected out of the initial
93 countries. This sample was constructed by selecting the countries based on the
availability of data over a 15-year period (1990 - 2004), rather than the shorter
timeframe adopted in the rest of the chapter (1995 - 2004).
Moreover, for these countries, data on investment in telecommunications in-
frastructure (both xed and mobile) was available for a su¢cient number of years
and was included in the model specication. Investment levels, relative to country
GDP, give an indication of whether the infrastructure is being developed to keep
estimator, due to the large size of the instrument matrix, are discussed in Kiviet (1995).
40That dataset includes 22 countries over 18 years.
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Table 3.13: System Estimates: 15-Year Sample
Dependent Variables: lnPENit lnGDPpcit RGit
(1) (2) (3)
lnGDPpcit 0.991* lnPENit 0.027** lnGDPpcit 0.533*
(0.500) (0.009) (0.244)
RGit 1.194*** Insti;t 1 0.038** Insti;t 1 -0.010
(0.337) (0.012) (0.065)
Privatit 0.916*** lnHKit -0.321** Privatit 0.419***
(0.217) (0.101) (0.064)
Liberalit -0.383** lnKit 0.576*** Liberalit 0.364***
(0.119) (0.030) (0.083)
RGit  Privatit -0.733** lnOpennessit -0.005 Privatit  Liberalit -0.401***
(0.317) (0.023) (0.094)
ln InvRatioi;t 1 0.317*** ln Internationalit -0.047
(0.058) (0.030)
Constant -10.358* 2.808*** 5.956**
(4.439) (0.292) (2.121)
Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.944 0.997 0.730
Countries 30 30 30
Observations 343 343 343
Note: Standard errors in brackets under coe¢cients. The proxy for country institutions is nancial
markets development, i.e. the share of credit to the private sector on GDP.
up with demand for telecommunications services. As mentioned above, there is a
question of whether penetration is demand-constrained or supply-constrained in de-
veloping countries. As in Esfahani and Ramirez (2003), we attempt to mitigate the
simultaneity between the dependent variable and the investment ratio by replacing
the latter with its lagged value.
The penetration equation was rstly estimated individually and only signicant
variables were then kept in the specication estimated jointly in the system and
shown in Table 3.13.
While the signicance of most coe¢cients is in line with the results in the main
section of the chapter, there are some striking di¤erences. Firstly, in Column 2
the coe¢cient on penetration is now signicant compared with Table 3.8 and this
di¤erence may be related to the longer time required for the impact of mobile phones
on GDP to show in the data.41 Secondly, the proxy for country governance has a
lower and less signicant coe¢cient in Column 2 compared to results from the overall
41The within estimator is used for Column 2 both for the smaller sample and for the results in
the main Section of the chapter. Given that this method relies on within-country variation, i.e.
over time, a larger number of periods leads to better dened coe¢cients.
167
sample, while it is not signicant at all in Column 3. Therefore, in this sample we nd
evidence of an indirect e¤ect of country conditions on mobile penetration through
GDP per capita but not through regulatory governance. Thirdly, the estimates
suggest that the likelihood of establishing a separate regulator is higher in countries
with higher GDP per capita, in contrast with the overall sample.
The sample used in this subsection di¤ers in many respects from the larger
sample on which most of the analysis in this chapter has relied. The countries in
the subsample form a selected, and possibly better, set of countries compared to the
overall sample of 93 countries for two main reasons. Firstly, these are countries for
which a longer time series for data on mobile penetration is available, which means
that they are likely to have more developed markets. For instance, competition in the
mobile market is not controlled for in this study due to data availability and may
be the source of some unobserved heterogeneity among the countries. Secondly,
the countries were also selected on the basis of data quality, e.g. availability of
information on investment in telecommunications. Again, this seems to indicate a
selected group of countries compared to the larger sample used in the rest of the
study.
Finally, the marginal e¤ects of the policy variables tend to be larger compared
to the estimates in Tables 3.9 and 3.11. A major di¤erence that points again in the
direction of a di¤erent stage of development for the countries in the subsample is the
fact that the liberalization of long-distance services has now a negative coe¢cient,
which seems to indicate some substitutability between xed and mobile services.
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Table 3.14: Marginal E¤ects
RGit Liberalit Privatit
Coe¢cient 1.022 -0.383 0.499
Standard error 0.283 0.119 0.159
p-value 0.000 0.001 0.002
Table 3.15: Summary of Main Results
Equation: Penetration GDP Regulatory
Governance
RGit lnGDPpcit Insti;t 1 lnPENit Insti;t 1
1. Basic Formulation
Coe¢cient 0.511 1.076 0.057 0.006 0.054
Standard error 0.090 0.036 0.008 0.016 0.022
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.716 0.016
2. Income Interactions
Coe¢cient 0.396 1.078 0.061 -0.117 0.051
Standard error 0.090 0.039 0.008 0.111 0.022
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.113 0.023
3. Longer Period
Coe¢cient 1.022 0.991 0.038 0.027 -0.010
Standard error 0.283 0.550 0.012 0.009 0.065
p-value 0.000 0.047 0.002 0.004 0.878
Basic formulation refers to the results in Section 3.6.4, Income interactions to Section 3.7.1 and
Longer Period to Section 3.7.3.
3.8 Concluding Remarks
This study analyses the link between GDP, mobile telecommunications penetration
and regulatory governance (country and sector-specic) in a sample of low and
middle-income countries over a 10-year period. The main new element in the analysis
is the estimation of a system of simultaneous equations, in which mobile penetration,
income level and a proxy for regulatory governance are all treated as endogenous.
As far as we are aware, this is an approach that has not been adopted elsewhere for
infrastructure industry models.
The results from the main model formulation are checked for robustness by
estimating two alternative specications. Firstly, the sample is split into low-income
and middle-income countries and coe¢cients are allowed to vary by income level.
Secondly, the basic formulation is estimated on a subsample of 30 countries for which
data are available over a 15-year period, rather than a 10-year period as for the rest
of the analysis. The key estimated coe¢cients are summarised in Table 3.15.
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We nd evidence that the existence of a separate industry regulator is associated
to higher penetration rates for mobile telecommunications in developing countries,
with estimates varying widely depending on the specication. In particular, we nd
a di¤erent pattern between low-income and middle-income countries. The marginal
e¤ect of a separate regulator in lower-income countries is higher compared to middle-
income countries. On this basis, the establishment of a separate body in charge of
regulating the industry appears crucial in lower-income countries, while in richer
countries the e¤ect of the regulator on penetration is not as substantial. This can be
explained by the fact that, in middle-income countries, market forces may be more
important for encouraging the sectors development.
Other indicators of regulatory governance, such as the existence of a sector law
or the funding of the regulator through licence fees, were not found to have any
signicant impact on mobile penetration rates, both in the single equation and in
the system estimates. Therefore, our results are less robust than Gutierrez (2003)
or Cubbin and Stern (2006); it is not clear whether this is due to our relatively
simplistic regulatory variable or to the possibility that the role of regulators is not
as crucial for mobile operators as it is in other sectors.
According to the estimates obtained in the system (basic formulation and spec-
ication with income interactions), there is a positive relationship between country
institutions, proxied by the development of the nancial sector, and sector-specic
governance. Therefore, part of the positive e¤ect of regulatory institutions on the
telecommunications sector may be related to overall country governance. However,
it is likely the importance of country institutions is underestimated in the present
study. The importance of better proxies for country institutions is highlighted by
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the higher coe¢cients and signicance obtained when the Kaufmann et al. (2006)
indexes for the rule of law and quality of governance are considered.
Finally, the impact of mobile telecoms infrastructure on per capita GDP is not
found to be signicant except for a subset of countries over a longer 15-year timespan.
This may be related to unobserved characteristics of the subsample, which was
selected on the basis of the availability of data for a longer period, but may also
indicate that the impact of mobile infrastructure on GDP cannot be detected over
a short timespan. Moreover, the analysis is carried out on aggregate data, which
are not well suited to uncover the mechanism through which mobile phones can
a¤ect income and growth (for a new approach, see Jensen, 2007). In addition, the
particular specication chosen for the system of equations may a¤ect the results
signicantly and leaves open an avenue for further research.
3.9 Appendix
3.9.1 Telecommunications Penetration
In this study telecommunications penetration is measured in terms of mobile phones.
In less developed countries, mobile phones have shown high growth rates since their
introduction and have proved formidable substitutes for xed lines. For this reason,
mobile telephony cannot be ignored in the analysis and focusing on xed lines only
would not capture the reality of developing countries.
Measuring penetration solely on the basis of mobile lines seems the preferable
option, compared to using the total number of lines (i.e. xed and mobile). In
particular, it can be reasonably assumed that regulatory institutions have a di¤erent
impact in markets in which there are competing rms, rather than a single state-
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owned operator. Given that mobile telephony is usually characterized by a certain
degree of competition almost from its commercial launch, the role of regulation
appears to be signicantly di¤erent from that exercised in the xed market, where
the development of xed telephony often takes place for a long time in the absence of
competition and the infrastructure is deployed entirely by a state-owned monopolist.
In fact it could be argued that, in the mobile market, the role of regulators is not
as crucial as it is for the xed market, where the very asymmetric structure often
requires regulatory intervention to grant new entrants access to the portions of the
incumbents infrastructure that cannot be economically replicated. By combining
the xed and mobile markets together, one would in fact constrain the impact of
regulatory institutions to be the same in both, even if the two markets were in dif-
ferent stages of development. On the basis of the above considerations, the variable
of interest in the analysis is mobile penetration.
3.9.2 Explanatory Variables
There are di¤erent variables that are used in the literature as proxy for country insti-
tutions. The institutional characteristics considered in this study are: (a) protection
against expropriation risk (e.g. POLCON index on executive constraints); (b) nan-
cial market development (e.g. share of credit to the private sector on GDP).42
More specically, it is assumed that the most relevant institutional characteris-
42Another important aspect of a countrys endowment is given by the functioning of the legal
system, measured for instance by an index of procedural complexity. Djankov et al. (2003) nd
that higher procedural formalism is a strong predictor of longer duration of dispute resolution [and]
higher corruption. Formalism is dened by Djankov et al. (2003) as the extent to which regulation
causes dispute resolution to deviate from the neighbor model. They refer to the neighbor model
as a situation in which a controversy is resolved by a third on fairness grounds without resorting
to courts. Given that regulators decisions are normally subject to appeal to courts, the threat of
litigation may represent a constraint for the regulator to provide good decisions. This threat is
credible only if the legal system is capable of dealing with it e¢ciently and justly. Unfortunately,
this dimension cannot be captured in a panel setting due to data limitations.
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tics that impact the main variables mentioned above are protection against expro-
priation risk (e.g. POLCON index on executive constraints) and nancial market
development.43 In particular, it has been shown that protection against expropri-
ation risk a¤ects GDP per capita and investment positively in a cross-section of
countries (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005).
In addition, a large body of literature (e.g. review by Levine, 2005) estimate that
nancial sector development has a positive impact on per capita GDP, by facilitating
those sectors which are typically more dependent on access to external funding. This
factor may also be important for investment in the telecommunications industry,
especially due to the large investments required.44
The POLCON index is POLCON III from Henisz, W. J. (2002) "The Institu-
tional Environment for Infrastructure Investment," Industrial and Corporate Change
11(2). The source for the share of credit to private sector is the World Bank Devel-
opment Indicators.
In addition to the variables described in the text, other variables that may a¤ect
mobile telecommunications penetration are the average price of mobile services and
the average price of xed services. These are also measured in constant U.S. dollars,
consistently with GDP per capita. Mobile and xed prices are measured as: (1) price
of a 3-minute peak call; (2) price of a 3-minute o¤-peak call; (3) monthly subscrip-
tion; (4) connection charge. 45 The source for these variables is the International
43These variables di¤er from those used in Gual and Trillas (2006), which are not available for
the whole time frame of the present study.
44For developing countries, other factors may be important, such as loans from international
institutions and foreign direct investment.
45 It could be argued that prices should be expressed in relative terms, compared with the general
level of prices in a given country. However, GDP per capita already provides an indication of
the cross-country di¤erences which are also likely to be reected in consumers purchasing power.
Therefore, in line with Röller and Waverman (2001) and Waverman et al. (2005), prices are included
in the penetration equation.
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Telecommunications Union.
In the GDP per capita equation, in addition to the variables already described
above, the following variables are included. Human capital is proxied by labor
force and physical capital stock is from Miketa (2004), and is calculated using the
perpetual inventory method in US$ at constant 2000 prices.46 Openness is dened
as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a share of GDP.
The variable measuring the e¤ect of international pressure is multilateral debt
service, which is dened as the sum of interest and principal due to the World
Bank, regional development banks, and other multilateral agencies, as a percentage
of public and publicly guaranteed debt service.
All variables for which we do not mention the source are from the World Bank
Development Indicators.
3.9.3 Additional Results: Logit Model
Equation 3 was estimated using a logit model in order to check the results in the
main text. As in Table 7, in a logit random e¤ects model the policy variables and
their interaction are the only signicant regressors. Finally, a xed e¤ects model did
not converge.
46Miketa, A., 2004: Technical description on the growth study datasets. Environmentally Com-
patible Energy Strategies Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA),
Laxenburg, Austria, October 2004. http://www.iiasa.ac.at/ECS/data_am/index.html
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Table 3.16: Dependent Variable: Separate Regulator (Yes/No)
Share of Credit Polcon
RE RE
(1) (2)
Independent variables
lnGDPpcit -0.238 -0.107
(0.402) (0.350)
Insti;t 1 0.433 1.594
(0.444) (1.454)
Privatit 2.368** 2.232**
(0.800) (0.805)
Liberalit 1.793* 2.085**
(0.891) (0.854)
Privatit  Liberalit -2.125* -2.413*
(1.269) (1.255)
ln Internationalit 0.263 0.234
(0.279) (0.287)
Constant -4.356 3.666
(2.826) (2.932)
Time Dummies Yes Yes
Corrected std. errors No No
Wald Chi2 183.88 181.03
Countries 91 91
Observations 807 808
Note: Standard errors in brackets under coe¢cients.
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